Woodworth v. City of Kalamazoo

• Decision Date: 22 December 1903
• Citation: 135 Mich. 233,97 N.W. 714
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: WOODWORTH v. CITY OF KALAMAZOO.

97 N.W. 714

135 Mich. 233

WOODWORTH v. CITY OF KALAMAZOO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 22, 1903

Error to Circuit Court, Kalamazoo County; John W. Adams, Judge.

Action by Hattie A. Woodworth against the city of Kalamazoo. There was a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the declaration, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

E. M. Irish, for appellant.

Harry C. Howard, for appellee.

MOORE, J.

The plaintiff was injured on the 5th day of May, 1901, by falling on a defective sidewalk in the defendant city of Kalamazoo. Her claim was presented to the city council on the 24th day of March, 1902. The council referred it to a committee, and the committee fixed a time and place for hearing. Plaintiff appeared before the committee and offered to present her evidence. The committee refused to hear it or to pass upon it because, among other reasons, it was barred by the limitation in the charter. A committee report was made to the council recommending the claim be not allowed, for the above reasons. The council adopted the report, and this damage suit was commenced by declaration. The defendant demurred 'because said claim was not presented to the city council within four months after the same arose, as is required by the provisions of the city charter; the same being Local Acts 1897, p. 1117 No. 475, c. 16.' The circuit court sustained the demurrer. The plaintiff brings the case here by writ of error.

The plaintiff's claim, as stated by counsel, is: 'First. The city charter, legally construed, does not require claims for damages for personal injuries to be presented to the city council within four months from the event of the injury. Second. That the defendant's contention would force into the charter a short time limit within which to present personal injury claims, which is too unreasonable and unjust to be placed there by construction. Third. That, if the charter could be construed in accordance with the defendant's claim, the four-months clause was repealed by Act No. 155, Pub. Acts 1899, p. 235. Fourth. That, even if the charter provision were to be given force, the defendant has waived the benefit of its provisions (a) by receiving the claim and referring it to a committee without objection; (b) by passing City Ordinance No. 156, and advertising for claims under it.'

It is claimed by defendant that the action is barred because the claim was not filed with the council within four months of the injury.

The part of the charter relied upon is found in the Local Acts of 1897, p. 1116, No. 475, c. 16, � 2, and is as follows:

'Said city council shall have authority to adjust and settle all accounts and claims against said city, and no suit or action shall be maintained against said city on any account or claim until the same shall have been presented to said council, and said council shall have had an opportunity to pass upon the same. The city of Kalamazoo shall not be liable to respond to any action or proceeding to collect any account or claim of any kind against said city for any greater amount than that named and set forth in the account or claim presented, as herein provided. In all cases of claims against said city for personal injuries or otherwise, the party having the claim shall present the same to the council in detailed form, giving all the substantial facts upon which the same is based, and shall present to the council, or the council committee to whom the same shall be referred by the council, at such time and place as shall be convenient for the council, or council committee to which the claim is referred, as aforesaid, and not exceeding thirty days from the time of presentation of the claim, all the evidence in his possession, or of which he or his attorney has knowledge, tending to prove the facts in the case, and submit the same to the full and complete examination of said council, or council committee provided, that said hearing may be adjourned from time to time to suit convenience of the parties, not exceeding thirty days more than herein provided; and it shall be a sufficient and complete defense to any action, or proceeding for the collection of any shch claim or demand, against the city, that such claim or demand and the evidence upon which the same is based, has not been presented, as hereinbefore provided. All claims for damages against the city growing out of the negligence or default of said city, or of any officer or employ� thereof, shall be presented to said city council in the manner above provided within four months after such claim shall arise, and in default thereof, such claim shall thereafter be forever barred.'

Counsel say: 'The second paragraph above quoted states a special rule as to personal injuries, that is complete in itself, and provides that noncompliance with it shall be a complete defense to the action. The third paragraph, which follows it, states a broader and more general rule as to claims for damages growing out of the negligence or default of the city. Standing alone, this last paragraph would include personal injuries arising from negligence, and would do away with the necessity of enacting much of the...