Woodworth v. Kendall

• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PARKER
• Citation: Woodworth v. Kendall, 172 Kan. 332, 239 P.2d 924 (Kan. 1952)
• Decision Date: 26 January 1952
• Docket Number: No. 38514,38514
• Parties: WOODWORTH et al. v. KENDALL et al.

Page 924

239 P.2d 924

172 Kan. 332

WOODWORTH et al. v. KENDALL et al.

No. 38514.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Jan. 26, 1952.

Syllabus by the Court.

In an action to recover rent alleged to be due under the terms of a farm lease the defendants, in a cross-petition filed some three and one-half years after its execution, sought for the first time to maintain a cause of action to reform such lease on the ground of fraud in its inception. Thereafter, as the result of a pretrial conference, and in advance of other issues joined by the pleadings, the question whether defendants were entitled to reformation was submitted to the trial court which sustained a demurrer to the evidence adduced by defendants on that issue upon the ground any right they might have had to such relief for fraud as charged and relied on in their cross-petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The record examined, and held, that under the evidence as presented the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer.

W. K. Thompson, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellants.

Howard A. Jones, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Charles L. Davis, Jr.,; Donald Patterson and William E. Haney, all of Topeka, were with him on the briefs for appellees.

PARKER, Justice.

On March 19, 1946, the parties to this action executed an ordinary farm lease on an 80 acre tract of real estate located on Shawnee County. The instrument was dated March 1, 1946, and, under its terms, the plaintiffs leased defendants the property for a term of 12 months ending on the last day of February 1947, for a rental of $550. On the same day defendants executed and delivered plaintiffs a note, pursuant to the terms of the rental agreement, for the total amount of rent therein specified, whereby they promised to pay the latter 12 monthly payments of $20 each, payable on the first day of each month beginning March 1, 1946, up to and including February 1, 1947, $100 on March 1, 1946, $110 on June 1, 1946 and $100 on November 1, 1946. Without further written agreement defendants continued in possession of the leased premises until January 18, 1949, when plaintiffs commenced an action against them for rent alleged to be due for their occupancy thereof at an annual rental of $550 per year.

The record discloses that defendants filed an answer and cross-petition in the action about a month after it was instituted. It also reveals that two months thereafter they filed a first amended answer and cross-petition. Later, on September 12, 1949, they filed their second amended answer and cross-petition. In their last cross-petition defendants, for the first time, alleged plaintiffs perpetrated fraud on them in an attempt to hold them over as tenants for the years 1947 and 1948, under the lease of March 1, 1946, when $110 of the $550 rental mentioned therein was not for rent at all but was to reimburse plaintiffs for plowing thirty acres of ground prior to the time they took possession of the farm ground and asked for reformation of the lease of March 1, 1946, excluding the sum of $110 therefrom for the farm years of 1947 and 1948. In addition they also asked for a money judgment against plaintiffs under and by virtue of these and other allegations of their cross-petition.

At this point it should perhaps be stated that although all three of the answers and cross-petitions, to which we have heretofore referred, contain allegations raising questions pertaining to the amount of rent due under the lease as executed and damages claimed to have been sustained by defendants as a result of plaintiffs' conduct during their occupancy of the leased premises, we have purposely refrained from detailing them for the reason, as will presently be disclosed, issues raised by such allegations are not here subject to appellate review.

Shortly after defendants filed their second amended answer and cross-peition it was decided at a pretrial conference that the newly injected question of reformation of the lease as pleaded in the cross-petition was an equity not a jury matter and should be disposed of by the court in advance of issues triable by a jury. Thereafter, such issue came on for hearing before the trial court which ultimately sustained a demurrer to the evidence adduced by defendants in its support. Thereupon defendants took an appeal from that ruling to this court where they now impliedly concede, if in fact they do not actually do so, that the sole question involved on appellate review is whether the trial court erred in holding that under their evidence any right they might have had to reform the lease on grounds of fraud was barred by the statute of limitations.

Obviously realizing that under the allegations of their cross-petition they are seeking affirmative relief and recognizing that under our decisions, Collins v. Richardson, 168 Kan. 203, 208, 212 P.2d 302; McCarthy v. Sink, 152 Kan. 659, 107 P.2d 790; Howard v. Howard, 149 Kan. 223, 86 P.2d 510; Muckenthaler v. Noller, 104 Kan. 551, 180 P. 453, construing the provisions of G.S.1949, 60-313, we have held that a cause of action...