Wool v. Maryland-Nat. Capital Park & Plan. Com'n

• Decision Date: 13 July 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. No. Y-86-3610.
• Citation: 664 F. Supp. 225
• Parties: Sanford E. WOOL v. MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

664 F. Supp. 225

Sanford E. WOOL v. MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION, et al.

Civ. No. Y-86-3610.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

July 13, 1987.

Norris C. Ramsey, Balto., Md., for plaintiff.

Steven M. Gilbert, Upper Marlboro, Md., for defendant Glendening.

Paul A. McGuckian, Co. Atty., Bruce P. Sherman, and Linda D. Berk, Asst. Co. Attys., Rockville, Md., for all other defendants.

MEMORANDUM

JOSEPH H. YOUNG, District Judge.

Plaintiff Sanford Wool was formerly employed by the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission as its Deputy General Counsel. His position was abolished effective July 1, 1984. Plaintiff has sued the Commission, eleven individuals who served on the Commission, and the County Executives of Montgomery and Prince George's Counties, alleging that the arbitrary and capricious act of abolishing his job violated due process. Defendants' motion to dismiss is ripe for resolution.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission is responsible for park development, planning and zoning within those portions of Prince George's and Montgomery Counties adjoining the District of Columbia.¹ The Commission is composed of ten members, five of whom make up the Prince George's County Planning Board, and five of whom comprise the Montgomery County Planning Board.

The Commission hired Wool in 1967 as an Associate General Counsel. He was promoted to Deputy General Counsel in 1975, where he served until his position was abolished in 1984. The chain of events culminating in the loss of his job is summarized in plaintiff's complaint as follows.

In October 1983, the head of the Legal Department submitted its proposed budget for the 1984-1985 fiscal year. The budget provided for funding of the Deputy General Counsel position as well as all other career positions in the Legal Department. On December 1, 1983, the Prince George's County Planning Board proposed that the Deputy General Counsel position be demoted to one of Associate General Counsel I. Two weeks later, the Commission acted to abolish the Deputy General Counsel slot, effective July 1, 1984, and to create the position of Associate General Counsel I. The Commission's proposed budget was then forwarded to the County Councils of Montgomery and Prince George's Counties for approval. Both County Councils approved the budget in May 1984.²

On February 21, 1984, Wool filed a grievance pursuant to the Commission's Merit System Rules and Regulations, alleging that the Commission improperly and illegally abolished his job. His grievance was denied by Executive Director Thomas Countee on April 13, 1984, and Wool appealed to the Merit System Board. The Board held hearings on July 24, 1984 and September 19, 1984. Plaintiff argued that the decision to abolish his job was a personal rather than budgetary decision, that it was based on age and/or religious discrimination, and that the Commission did not provide him with the procedural protections required by its own Rules and Regulations when it abolished his job. The Merit System Board ruled on December 31, 1984 that "very little, if any, direct evidence was produced by the appellant Wool to show that the decision to eliminate the Deputy General Counsel's position was done for anything but bone fide reasons of economy and/or efficiency." Decision of the Merit System Board at 6 (attached as Exhibit B to defendants' motion to dismiss). The Board determined that the Commission had abided by the Rules and Regulations governing the abolishment of jobs via budgetary action,³ and it affirmed the Executive Director's decision to deny Wool's grievance.

Wool appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County which, on September 24, 1985, reversed the Board's decision. The Circuit Court determined that the Board committed legal error when it ruled that the decision to abolish Wool's job was budgetary action by the County Councils rather than a Commission decision. The Court found that the record lacked substantial evidence to support the Board's decision that the abolishment was legitimate budget action. It concluded that Wool was denied several procedural protections guaranteed by Chapter 1900 of the Merit System Rules and Regulations, including consideration of all feasible alternatives before abolishing an encumbered career position; a written statement of alternatives considered; and a written rationale for eliminating the position. The Circuit Court ordered the Commission to set aside the abolishment of Wool's job, to reinstate him, and to award back pay. See Decision of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (attached as Exhibit A to defendants' reply memorandum).

The Commission appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which, on July 7, 1986, reversed the Circuit Court. The Court of Special Appeals ruled that the abolishment of Wool's job was county council budgetary action, and that the Commission had abided by the pertinent Rules and Regulations:

An employee whose position is abolished pursuant to county council budget decision is entitled to notice, counseling and preferential hiring treatment. Appellee received all of these protections. Since appellee's position was abolished pursuant to county council action under § 1935, it would make no sense for the department head to write a rationale explaining the county councils' action.

Decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals at 11 (attached as Exhibit A to defendants' motion to dismiss). The Court of Special Appeals thus upheld the abolishment of Wool's job. Plaintiff's petition for certiorari was denied by the Maryland Court of Appeals on November 11, 1986, 307 Md. 599, 516 A.2d 569 (1986).

Plaintiff filed the instant action on November 28, 1986. Count I of the five-count complaint alleges that defendants' arbitrary and capricious act of abolishing plaintiff's job denied him due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff brings this charge pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), charges that defendants conspired to deny plaintiff his constitutional rights. Count III alleges that the Merit System Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional because they allow employment to be terminated without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Counts IV and V set forth state common law claims for breach of contract and abusive discharge.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants⁴ have moved pursuant to Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the ground that, among other reasons, his claims are barred by res judicata. Plaintiff acknowledges that the Maryland courts considered many of the issues raised in plaintiff's complaint and that, normally, his claims would be barred by res judicata. He argues that in this case, however, the Court need not accord the Maryland decisions full faith and credit because the state proceedings were constitutionally deficient. Plaintiff contends that he was denied due process at the administrative hearing because the Merit System Board lacked the power to subpoena witnesses he requested, and those witnesses who appeared did not testify under oath.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).⁵ The Constitution's full faith and credit clause is implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which "requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged." Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984), quoting Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). Thus this Court must look to Maryland law to determine whether plaintiff's action is barred.

Defendants argue that all claims raised by plaintiff in this federal action either were or could have been raised in the prior state proceedings, thus his claims are barred by res judicata. Plaintiff counters by asserting first that his due process challenge regarding the Merit System Board's lack of subpoena power and testimony taken under oath was raised before, but not considered by, the Maryland courts. Therefore, he argues, that issue is not precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Second, plaintiff contends, because he was denied due process at the administrative hearing, this Court need not accord full faith and credit to the state decisions, and none of his claims is barred by res judicata.

With respect to plaintiff's first contention, defendants argue that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded that plaintiff had received all of the process he was due under the Commission's Rules and Regulations. See Decision of the Court of Special Appeals at 11. What the court actually decided is that plaintiff received notice, counseling and preferential hiring treatment, and that was all that the regulations required when a position is abolished by budgetary action. The court did not address the question whether plaintiff was denied due process at the administrative hearing because he could not compel witnesses to appear on his behalf, and testimony was not given under oath.

Only the Board itself discussed that question, which was raised for the first time during the administrative hearing, and the Board determined that plaintiff had not been denied due process. See Decision of the Merit System Board at 8. The Circuit Court explicitly declined to address the constitutional question because it reached its decision on other grounds. Thus no Maryland court has addressed this due process claim.

A.

In evaluating the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, this Court must determine what...