Woolbright v. Tankinetics, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:12-CV-03123 |
| Parties | HELEN M. WOOLBRIGHT PLAINTIFF v. TANKINETICS, INC.; STRAND COMPOSITE ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION, LLC; WILLIAM K. ANGLE; ST. CLAIR P. GUESS, III; WILLIAM F. SCHWARZ; and ROBERT W. McMANUS DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Defendants Tankinetics, Inc. ("Tankinetics"); Strand Composite Engineering & Construction, LLC ("Strand"); William K. Angle ("Angle"); St. Clair P. Guess, III ("Guess"); William F. Schwarz ("Schwarz"); and Robert W. McManus ("McManus") move to dismiss the complaint on grounds of insufficient service of process, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), respectively. Before the Court are Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) and brief in support (Doc. 9), Plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 13), and Defendants' reply (Doc. 14).1 For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
On September 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint (Doc. 1) in this Court, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §621, and a claim of negligent supervision under Arkansas common law. Defendants include two domestic entities—Tankinetics and Strand—as well as four individuals who served in various capacities as owners, directors, and officers of Tankinetics and/or Strand. As to the entities, Plaintiff alleges that Tankinetics is the "principal" of "Agent Separate Defendant Strand." (Doc. 1, p. 3). Defendant Angle is alleged to be the owner and President of Tankinetics, and the owner and Chairman of the Board of Strand. Defendant Guess is alleged to be a director and President of Strand. Defendant Schwarz was Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, and is alleged to be a director and Vice-President of Tankinetics and a director, Executive Vice-President, and Chief Financial Officer of Strand. Finally, Defendant McManus is alleged to be a Vice-President of Strand. The Court notes that Plaintiff's general allegations refer to all six Defendants collectively as her employer, which causes some confusion. It is unclear whether Tankinetics or Strand was Plaintiff's direct employer, although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Right-to-Sue letter lists Strand as a recipient.
The relevant facts, as alleged by Plaintiff in the complaint, are as follows: Plaintiff Helen Woolbright is a 62-year-old woman who worked for Defendants in a variety of positions from July 7, 1997, until April 11, 2011. She began working as an accounting clerk and was later moved to perform duties in both the Human Resources and Accounting departments. Her last position was Human Resources Director and Payroll Coordinator, at a pay rate of $60,000 per year. On March 1, 2011, Defendants hired 47-year-old Jim Johnson at a pay rate of $85,000 per year to act as the Manager of Corporate Finance. He began performing some of Plaintiff's duties in the Human Resources and Accounting departments.
Upon returning from vacation on April 11, 2011, Plaintiff—who was 60 years old at thetime—was approached by Guess and Schwarz. Guess and Schwarz proceeded to inform Plaintiff that her position was being eliminated due to financial reasons and the "other girls" would fulfill her duties. Since that time, Mr. Johnson, Dina Green (age 49) and Dana Lisk (age 49) have assumed Plaintiff's duties. Graham Keymer ("Keymer"), another employee, told Tex Pickron, another former employee, that Keymer was instructed by Defendants' management to terminate "old hands."
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) Defendants Angle and McManus were not properly served with process; (2) this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Angle and McManus; (3) Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief against the individual defendants and Tankinetics under the ADEA; and (4) Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief for negligent supervision under Arkansas common law.2 Plaintiff responded in opposition, maintaining that the complaint sufficiently sets forth a cause of action for negligent supervision and asserting that Defendants are requesting premature relief, individuals may be held liable under the ADEA, and Tankinetics is liable under the ADEA because it is an "integrated enterprise" with Strand. The Court's discussion below begins with Defendants' threshold challenges to service of process and personal jurisdiction, and then addresses the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations.
Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against Angle and McManus due to ineffective service of process, as Plaintiff attempted to serve each of them via certified mail at a former address,without delivery restricted. Service of process by certified mail of a pleading must comply with Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure (Local Rule 4.1(b)), which requires delivery to be restricted to the addressee or an agent thereof who is specifically authorized in writing as the addressee's agent to receive mail. Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(3), (d)(8)(A)(i); Wilburn v. Keenan Cos., 768 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Ark. 1989) ( ). "It is the plaintiff's burden to prove proper service once it is contested." Brinkley v. City of Helena-West Helena, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151281, at *8 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 22, 2012).
The Court finds that Plaintiff did not effect proper service on Angle or McManus. Nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff complied with the proper procedure for serving an out-of-state defendant by mail, or that these Defendants otherwise waived service. Plaintiff did not file the required affidavit of proof of service for either Angle or McManus, nor did she file a copy of the return receipt for service on Angle. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(l)(1) (); Local Rule 4.1(c) (). Both Angle and McManus provided affidavits stating that they received notice of the lawsuit from their ex-wives and that they do not consent to jurisdiction or waive service. Although Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff failed to even address Defendants' argument regarding insufficient service of process. There is no evidence that Plaintiff directed the mail to be sent with restricted delivery, nor is there evidence that the mail was received and signed for by an authorized agent. Furthermore, McManus affirmatively states that his ex-wife, whose signature appears on the return receipt, is nothis agent and was not authorized to accept service on his behalf. (Doc. 9-3).
Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process will be granted as to Angle and McManus. Were it not for incurable defects in Plaintiff's claims on other grounds, the Court would give Plaintiff leave to attempt to cure the defects in service of process. However, since the claims against Angle and McManus are fatally flawed on other grounds, granting Plaintiff leave to cure would be futile.
Defendants also move for dismissal of all claims against Angle and McManus due to lack of personal jurisdiction. "To allege personal jurisdiction, 'a plaintiff must state sufficient facts in the complaint to support a reasonable inference that the defendant[] can be subjected to jurisdiction within the state.'" Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, 607 F.3d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor." Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecomm. (PTE), Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1996). When jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of proving sufficient facts to support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Wells Dairy, 607 F.3d at 518. "The plaintiff's prima facie showing must be tested, not by the pleadings alone, but by the affidavits and exhibits presented with the motions and opposition thereto." Id.
For this Court to have personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the defendant must be within reach of Arkansas' long-arm statute, and the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process. Wells Dairy, 607 F.3d at 518. Arkansas' long-arm statute allowsjurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by due process, so the main inquiry is whether the exercise of jurisdiction is constitutionally valid. Pangaea, Inc. v. Flying Burrito LLC, 647 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2011). "Due process requires 'minimum contacts' between [a] non-resident defendant and the forum state such that 'maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980)). A defendant's contacts with the forum must arise because the defendant has 'purposefully availed' itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the state." Pangaea, 647 F.3d at 745.
Personal jurisdiction may be based on either conduct by the defendant in the forum state that gives rise to the cause of action (specific jurisdiction), or the defendant's general contacts with the forum state (general jurisdiction). Id. General jurisdiction refers to the power of a court...
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