Wooldridge v. Hill

• Decision Date: 08 October 1953
• Docket Number: No. 18432,18432
• Citation: 114 N.E.2d 646,124 Ind.App. 11
• Parties: WOOLDRIDGE v. HILL.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 646

114 N.E.2d 646

124 Ind.App. 11

WOOLDRIDGE v. HILL.

No. 18432.

Appellate Court of Indiana, in Banc.

Oct. 8, 1953.

Vance M. Waggoner, Rushville, for appellant.

Kiplinger & Kiplinger, Rushville, for appellee.

CRUMPACKER, Judge.

The appellant commenced this suit against the appellee by a complaint in which he alleges that on October 4, 1950, he was a minor 17 years of age. On that date he entered into a parol contract with the appellee to purchase a certain Dodge automobile for the sum of $1,350 and in compliance therewith made a down payment of $405 and took possession of said automobile. Thereafter from October 9, 1950, to March 23, 1951, he made weekly payments on the balance of the purchase price aggregating the sum of $125. On April 7, 1951, while still a minor, he returned said automobile to the appellee, disaffirmed the purchase contract and demanded payment of the $530 he had paid thereon which the appellee refused to do. To this complaint the appellee filed answer agreeable to Rule 1-3 and the cause was submitted to the court for trial without jury. The court found for the appellant in the sum of $280 and rendered judgment accordingly. As a basis for this appeal the appellant charges that the court erred in the assessment of the amount of recovery in that it is too small and that there is no evidence whatever to support a finding of damages in the sum of $280 and therefore the decision of the court is contrary to law. The appellee defends solely on the proposition that a plaintiff must recover on the theory of his complaint or not at all. That the appellant's complaint is that of an infant plaintiff seeking to recover money paid out on a contract of sale whereby title to an automobile passed to him and which contract he disaffirmed in due course. That there is no evidence whatever of a contract, express or implied, between him and the appellant whereby title to the automobile involved passed and therefore the appellant is in no position to complain of a decision in his favor and to which he was not entitled in the first instance.

A careful examination of the record reveals testimony to the effect that at the time of the occurrences in question the appellant was a hired hand on the appellee's farm. He was still in high school and during the school year the appellee paid him $10 per week, room, board and laundry. During vacations in the summer his cash wages were increased to $20 per week. He had, on occasions, told the appellee of his desire to buy an automobile so that 'I wouldn't have to depend on the other fellows to take me all the time.' As a result of these conversations the appellant and appellee, on October 4, 1950, went to the place of business of a man named Alexander who owned the automobile here involved. The appellee told the appellant on that occasion that if he wanted the car he would buy it for him and that he could pay for it at the rate of $5 per week and when he got it paid for he, the appellee, would transfer title to him but in the meantime he would retain title in himself. That was agreeable to the appellant and the appellee bought the car from Alexander for $1,350 and delivered it to the appellant under the above arrangement. The appellant thereupon gave the appellee his check in the sum of $400, designated 'car payment,' which the appellee subsequently cashed. Thereafter the appellee made weekly payments aggregating $130 to April 7,...