Wooldridge v. United States
| Decision Date | 04 December 1916 |
| Docket Number | 2839. |
| Citation | 237 F. 775 |
| Parties | WOOLDRIDGE v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
James J. Crossley, of Portland, Or., and Bion A. Dodge and T. A Marquam, both of Fairbanks, Alaska, for plaintiff in error.
R. F Roth, U.S. Atty., of Fairbanks, Alaska, and John W. Preston U.S. Atty., and Casper A. Ornbaun, Asst. U.S. Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal.
Before GILBERT, MORROW, and HUNT, Circuit Judges.
W. H Wooldridge, called defendant, was indicted in Alaska on February 18, 1916, on two counts: One for statutory rape, alleged to have been committed December 23, 1914; and another for an attempt to commit rape on February 14, 1916, upon Laura Herrington, a girl under 16 years of age. Wooldridge was acquitted on the first count, but convicted of an attempt to commit rape as charged in the second count. Writ of error brings the case to this court.
The particular charge against Wooldridge was that he procured Laura Herrington to consent to meet him in a certain place known as 'Rose's Repair Shop,' in Fairbanks, Alaska, for the purpose of having sexual intercourse, and that he met her at the shop pursuant to arrangement, and with the intent to carry out the plan to know her carnally, but that he was prevented and intercepted in the execution of his purpose.
Section 1894 of the Compiled Laws of Alaska provides that whoever has carnal knowledge of a female person forcibly and against her will, or, being 16 years of age, carnally knows and abuses a female person under 16 years of age, with her consent, is guilty of rape. Section 2073, Compiled Laws of Alaska, is as follows:
'That if any person attempts to commit any crime, and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of such crime, but fails, or is prevented or intercepted in the perpetration thereof, such person, when no other provision is made by law for the punishment of such attempt, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as follows,' etc.
The most important question presented by defendant is whether the evidence will sustain the verdict and judgment. It is not necessary to state more of the testimony than may serve to demonstrate the material point in the case. The direct evidence of the prosecutrix herself was that she made arrangements with the officials in the United States marshal's office whereby she was to make an appointment with the defendant; that she made such an appointment with him at the request of Miller, a deputy United States marshal; that she was encouraged in making this 'date' with Wooldridge by her father, who told her, if she could make the 'date' with Wooldridge, to make it; that she made an appointment to meet Wooldridge at Rose's Repair Shop in the evening; that she went into the repair shop and was greeted by a man named Rose; that Rose was in the back room lying on the bed, and Wooldridge was sitting by him; that Wooldridge got up, buttoned his coat, and went into another room; that she stayed in the back room; that in a little while Rose went into the other room, and, after whispering with Wooldrige, Wooldridge came back and told her to turn out the lights and to stay there until they came back; that Rose returned, and told her to go away, as somebody was watching; that she went into the other room and stayed there, because the officers came in, and that then they went up to the marshal's office; that Wooldridge did not touch her, or lay his hands upon her; that she had been instructed by some of the United States officials, or her father, to talk loud when she was in there, and that she asked Wooldridge why he wanted her to turn out the light. On cross-examination she said that, just before she went to Rose's shop, she talked with Marshal Miller, who instructed her to talk loud at the meeting to be had; that she understood some of the marshals would be around somewhere. She also said that she was alone in the back room with the light out, the men being in the other room; that, when Wooldridge told her to turn out the light, he said he did not wish people to see her in there; that she was going to the front door to go out when the marshals came in.
J. P. Rose, proprietor of the shop where the prosecutrix was at the time of the alleged attempted rape, was called by the government. He testified concerning Wooldridge's movements and conversations before the girl came in, and said that he did not remember everything that was said by Wooldridge when the girl came into the shop. He was asked if he had not made a sworn statement in the marshal's office upon the night of the occurrences testified to by the prosecuting witness. He said he had. Witness was then asked concerning the statements made and incorporated in the statement, and also concerning testimony he had given before the grand jury. In part of this examination, really a cross-examination by the counsel for the government, Rose was asked if he had not stated that the girl had come into his place after Wooldridge had told him (Rose) that he desired to have sexual intercourse with her. The witness denied that he had made such a statement. The government then introduced a statement, made directly after the meeting at Rose's place, subscribed and sworn to by Rose, wherein Rose had said, among other things, that Wooldridge talked with the girl in the back room for a few seconds, and then came out of the back room, and that the girl then turned out the light; that Wooldridge had told him that he desired to have intercourse with the girl, and that Rose told him not to have anything to do with her until the grand jury got through; that it would not be safe, and that the girl would be taken up to the prosecuting attorney's office, and then back to the grand jury room, and that they would 'sweat her until she would have to tell it. ' Rose also said in this statement that, when he went back into the house, he (Rose) told the girl to come out, as somebody was watching her; that he recognized the men who were watching, and that he went back and got the girl. On cross-examination, witness stated he had not written or dictated the statement; that he did not think he ever said Wooldridge spoke of having intercourse with the girl.
Defendant testified in substance that he often called at Rose's shop; that upon the evening in question he found a light burning...
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