Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 2001-CA-00999-COA.

• Decision Date: 08 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2001-CA-00999-COA.,2001-CA-00999-COA.
• Citation: 856 So.2d 446
• Parties: Steve A. WOOLDRIDGE, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Debra K. WOOLDRIDGE, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

856 So.2d 446

Steve A. WOOLDRIDGE, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Debra K. WOOLDRIDGE, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 2001-CA-00999-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

April 8, 2003.

Rehearing Denied July 29, 2003.

Certiorari Granted September 5, 2003.

C. Michael Malski, Tupelo, attorney for appellant.

Rex F. Sanderson, Houston, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

LEE, J., for the court.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

¶ 1. This case comes to this Court for a second time following our previous remand in 1997 with instructions that the chancellor appraise certain real property and that Debra be awarded money for her contribution to caring for the family.¹ ¶ 2. Steve and Debra Wooldridge married in 1973, and a daughter, Laura, was born in 1976. They divorced in 1983, but one month thereafter resumed living together. A second daughter, Leigh Ann, was born in 1985. The couple ended their relationship and finally separated in 1994. Debra sought custody of the children and an equitable distribution of assets accumulated during the years she and Steve lived together after their divorce. In May 1996, the chancellor ordered Steve to pay $200 per month per child to Debra for child support, to pay all reasonable educational expenses of both girls, to pay medical expenses of the girls, and to reimburse Debra's sister $1,600 for educational expenses advanced to Laura. The chancellor also awarded Debra one-half the interest in real estate owned by Steve known as the "Bowles property."

¶ 3. Debra appealed to this Court, and in our opinion of November 1997 (see footnote 1), we reversed and remanded noting that although palimony and common law marriage are not recognized in this state, the supreme court has allowed property division among unmarried couples in unique circumstances. While this Court found that the chancellor erred in divesting Steve of title to the Bowles property, since such property was acquired with Steve's personal funds and those funds were not commingled during his cohabitation with Debra, we affirmed the chancellor's finding that Debra was equitably entitled to compensation for the caregiving duties she performed. We reversed and remanded with orders that the chancellor award Debra a reasonable money judgment for her contribution in caring for the family. We further instructed that, instead of divesting Steve of title to his property, the chancellor could place a lien upon the property to ensure payment of the judgment.

¶ 4. After remand, Debra filed a complaint in June 1998 requesting that the chancellor enforce this Court's judgment and asking that Steve be ordered to pay child support arrearage. After amending her complaint, Debra requested a minimum of $100,800 as compensation for her domestic services, and requested $85,250 for Laura's educational expenses, plus attorney's fees and court costs. After a hearing, the chancellor awarded Debra $70,000 for her domestic services, $3,000 in attorney's fees, and ordered Steve to pay 65% of Laura's loans, finding a failure of proof as to the timing of loans with respect to Laura's twenty-first birthday. Debra filed a motion for reconsideration, which the chancellor denied in June 2001. Steve appealed and Debra cross-appealed the chancellor's judgment to this Court.

¶ 5. On appeal, Steve argues the chancellor erred in essentially awarding "palimony" to Debra, erred in relying on Debra's expert for valuation of domestic services she provided, erred in finding Steve responsible for certain educational loans incurred by Laura, and erred in awarding attorney's fees to Debra. We review Steve's issues and find no merit, save the award of attorney's fees which we reverse and render.

¶ 6. With Debra's cross-appeal, she asks that we reverse the chancellor's decision to only require Steve to pay 65% of Laura's college expenses and that we find him responsible for 100% of the loans. She also asks that we increase the chancellor's award of compensation for her services in light of the value of the Bowles property, plus asks that we award her additional attorney's fees. We find no merit to Debra's issues in her cross-appeal.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

I. IS THIS COURT BOUND TO FOLLOW THE "LAW OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE?

¶ 7. Steve first claims that we are not to follow the doctrine of "law of the case," as such would result in a manifest injustice. We conduct de novo review of this issue since it involves an issue of law. Simpson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 564 So.2d 1374, 1377 (Miss.1990).

The doctrine of the law of the case is similar to that of former adjudication, relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the case. Whatever is once established as the controlling legal rule of decision, between the same parties in the same case, continues to be the law of the case, so long as there is a similarity of facts. This principle expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has previously been decided. It is founded on public policy and the interests of orderly and consistent judicial procedure. But if the facts are different, so that the principles of law announced on the first appeal are not applicable, as where there are material changes in the evidence, pleadings, or findings, a prior decision is not conclusive upon questions presented on the subsequent appeal

Fortune v. Lee County Bd. of Supervisors, 725 So.2d 747(¶ 6) (Miss.1998) (emphasis added). Exceptions to the "law of the case" doctrine have also been recognized:

We do not think, however, that this rule is so fixed and binding upon the court that it may not depart from its former decision on a subsequent appeal if the former decision in its judgment after mature consideration is erroneous and wrongful and would lead to unjust results. Where the facts are the same, and where there has been no change of conditions or situations as that a change of decision would work wrong and injustice, the court may, on the subsequent appeal, correct its former decision where it is manifestly wrong.

Simpson, 564 So.2d at 1377.

¶ 8. Steve argues that a manifest injustice will result if we affirm the chancellor's decision to follow this Court's previous ruling. Steve argues that the trial court did not err but, rather, that the court's obedience to this Court's previous ruling results in manifest injustice. He cites Brewer v. Browning, 115 Miss. 358, 364, 76 So. 267, 269 (1917), in advising this Court that we have the authority to correct our former decision where it is manifestly wrong.

¶ 9. As cited above in Fortune, the "law of the case" doctrine is founded on public policy and the interests of orderly and consistent judicial procedure. Fortune, 725 So.2d at (¶ 6). This Court's prior opinion was unpublished; thus, it is not public policy. Whether we follow this Court's previous opinion or not will not affect other subsequent parties or negate our ability to set precedent; thus, we find the "law of the case" doctrine does not apply to this situation.

II. DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN AWARDING DEBRA $70,000 FOR HER DOMESTIC SERVICES?

¶ 10. Our standard of reviewing the decision of a chancellor is well settled: "The findings of a chancellor will not be disturbed by this Court unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied." Ward v. Ward, 825 So.2d 713(¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2002).

¶ 11. Steve argues the chancellor erred in finding Debra is entitled to an equitable award for caregiving services rendered during the time she merely cohabitated with Steve without the benefit of marriage. Steve claims that this Court's previous opinion directly contradicts controlling precedent and elevates the dissolution of Steve and Debra's relationship to the status of marital dissolution. Steve cites several cases which we review in a historical retrospective of the development of legal authority on this issue.

¶ 12. In Chrismond v. Chrismond, 211 Miss. 746, 52 So.2d 624 (1951), the husband and wife went through a formal ceremony and lived and worked together for over a decade. Chrismond, 211 Miss. at 750, 52 So.2d at 625. The husband, however, never told his wife that he had failed to formally divorce his previous wife. Id. The supreme court decided whether or not the latter wife, believing that she was married, was entitled to an equitable division of property accumulated through joint efforts with her supposed husband.

We think that the equity powers of the court are sufficient to protect the rights of the putative wife, where the supposed marriage which she entered into in good faith turns out to be void, and that she is entitled to an equitable division of the property accumulated by their joint efforts during the time they lived together as man and wife.

Id. at 757, 52 So.2d at 629. Additionally, the supreme court generally explained in Chrismond that the putative wife was entitled to an equitable division of property in certain instances:

It is a general rule that when a woman in good faith enters into a marriage with a man who is incapable of contracting marriage because of some impediment, or when both of the parties enter into a void marriage in good faith, the woman is entitled to a division of the property accumulated by the joint efforts of the parties during their relationship, and on an annulment of the marriage the courts usually assume jurisdiction to make an equitable division and settlement of the property acquired during the cohabitation of the parties, either by way of a division of the property or an allowance to the wife in the nature of alimony, at least where she has lived as the wife of the other party in good faith.

Id. at 757-58, 52 So.2d at 629.

¶ 13. The next case cited by Steve is Taylor v. Taylor, 317 So.2d 422 (Miss. 1975). In Taylor, the wife was actually married to another man at the time she and Mr. Taylor married; however, Mr. Taylor knew of the wife's previous...