Woolett's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 13 May 1975
• Citation: 461 Pa. 703,337 A.2d 837
• Parties: In re Hugh S. WOOLETT'S ESTATE. Appeal of Jean S. GARDNER.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 837

337 A.2d 837

461 Pa. 703

In re Hugh S. WOOLETT'S ESTATE Appeal of Jean S. GARDNER.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 13, 1975.

[461 Pa. 705] George E. Loebig, Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Herbert V. Brownlee, Brownlee & Brownlee, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

JONES, Chief Justice.

Hugh S. Woolett died testate on June 4, 1972. On June 20, 1972, foloowing the naming of appellant Jean S. Gardner, administratrix c.t.a. of the estate, decedent's will was probated in Allegheny County. Thereafter, appellant filed an account which came up for audit on April 17, 1974.

On June 3, 1974, the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County entered a decree providing that the residuary estate bear the burden of estate inheritance tax, debts and administrative expenses. Thereafter, appellant filed exceptions to the decree requesting that the heirs of testator's deceased brother be required to pay a proportionate share of the above-mentioned costs. Exceptions were denied by the court en banc and this appeal followed.

Appellant's contentions involve the interpretation of the second paragraph of the decedent's holographic will. The will provides:

'LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT HUGH S. WOOLETT.

In the name of God, Amen.

I, Hugh S. Woolett, bequeath my real estate at 282 Magnolia Place, Mt. Lebanon, to my brother, Kieth M. Wollett (sic) and his heirs.

All my personal property, consisting of all household effects, automobile, insurances, and everything I possess save the real estate described above, I give and bequeath to Jean S. Gardner.

Signed this 20th day of June, 1969.

/s/ HUGH S. WOOLETT.

Witness:

/s/ Leo Vogel'

It is appellant's belief that the testator intended the second paragraph of his will to constitute a specific bequest as to his household effects, automobile and insurance policy and an 'indefinite legacy' as to all other personalty. For purposes of abatement, appellant maintains there is no residuary bequest, that an 'indefinite legacy' abates equally with a specific gift and that consequently all the beneficiaries under the will must pay a pro rata share of the estate's administrative expenses and taxes. We disagree.

Under the provisions of the Fiduciaries Act of 1949, P.L. 512, § 751, 20 P.S. § 320.751, property devised or bequeathed in a residuary clause or property disposed of in the form of a general bequest must abate before a specific devise or bequest in the payment of the decedents debts, funeral expenses and the cost of administering the estate. See Sorschek Estate, 422 Pa. 79, 221 A.2d 131 (1966). Likewise, the inheritance and Estate Tax Act of June 1961, P.L. 373, § 718, 72 P.S. § 2485--718, provides that if there is a residuary estate, it must bear the burden of inheritance tax unless the will provides otherwise. See Krogman Estate, 40 Pa.D. & C.2d 462, 464--5 (O.C.Phila.1966). Since the testator's will is completely silent with respect to the manner in which taxes and expenses be paid, if appellant is a general residuary legatee, she must bear the contested costs.

In the past we have defined a specific bequest as 'a gift by will of a specific article or part of the testator's estate, which is identified and distinguished from all other things of the same kind, and which may be satisfied only be delivery of the particular thing.' Soles Estate, 451 Pa. 568, 573, 304 A.2d 97, 100 (1973); Beatty v. Hottenstein, 380 Pa. 607, 610, 112 A.2d 397, 399 (1955). In contrast, we have defined the residue of a man's estate as 'whatever is not specifically devised or bequeathed . . ..' Bricker's Estate, 335 Pa. 300, 303--4, 6 A.2d 905 (1939); Willard's Estate, 68 Pa. 327, 332 (1871). In all cases, the test must be the testator's intent to dispose of a residue. Klein Estate, 9 Pa.D. & C. 20 (O.C.Phila.1926). See also McKinney Estate, 435 Pa. 608, 258 A.2d 632 (1969). Since no particular language is necessary to convey the residuary estate, 'words in any clause sufficiently broad to pass a general residue are not usually held to be restricted by association with other words of narrower import or by added attempts at enumeration.' Rood on Wills (Second Ed. Section 520 p. 508). See also Armstrong Estate, 347 Pa. 23, 31 A.2d 528 (1943).

Looking, as we must, at this will in its entirety, we find that testator specifically devised to his brother and heirs a particular parcel of land identified as 282 Magnolia Place. Thereafter, testator bequeathed to one Jean Gardner all else remaining in his estate ('save the real estate described above'). The intent to generally bequeath the residue seems clear.

Should there be any doubt as to testator's intent, the party arguing a gift is specific must carry the burden of proof. Soles Estate, 451 Pa. 571, 304 A.2d at 99; Wilson's Estate, 260 Pa. 407, 103 A. 880 (1918); Ferreck's Estate, 241 Pa. 340, 88 A. 505 (1913). As this Court said in Snyder's Estate, 217 Pa. 71 at 74, 66 A. 157 at 158, 'It is certainly true that the presumption of intention is favorable to general legacies in the first instance and that it requires Clear proof of a restrictive intention to repel it.' (Emphasis added).

Appellant's only argument in favor of specificity is that testator's choice to...