Woolfolk v. Com.

Decision Date23 August 1994
Docket NumberNo. 1173-93-2,1173-93-2
Citation18 Va.App. 840,447 S.E.2d 530
PartiesAnderson L. WOOLFOLK, Jr. v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. Record
CourtVirginia Court of Appeals

Franklin P. Hall, Richmond (Hall & Hall, on briefs), for appellant.

Margaret Ann B. Walker, Asst. Atty. Gen. (James S. Gilmore, III, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Present: MOON, C.J., FITZPATRICK, J., and HODGES *, Retired Judge.

FITZPATRICK, Judge.

Anderson L. Woolfolk, Jr. (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial of stalking in violation of Code § 18.2-60.3 (1992). On appeal, he argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. In addition, appellant contends that even if the statute is valid, there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, we find Code § 18.2-60.3 (1992) valid and the evidence sufficient to convict. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Under well-established principles of appellate review, we restate the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Jane Woolfolk, the victim in this case, divorced appellant in June 1991, after fifteen years of marriage. Ms. Woolfolk retained custody of the two minor children born of the marriage, and the final decree of divorce granted appellant the right "to see and visit with the children at reasonable times and places." By mid-July 1992, Ms. Woolfolk, acting upon the recommendation of appellant's psychologist, suspended all contact and communication between appellant and the children.

Following appellant's separation from Ms. Woolfolk in 1987, he engaged in a pattern of conduct that frequently involved following her and maintaining surveillance on her residence. In the summer of 1992, after Ms. Woolfolk began dating Bill Carter, appellant's surveillance activities increased dramatically. These activities included driving up and down the dead-end street where Ms. Woolfolk lived, parking within sight of the residence, and watching the house for extended periods of time. These activities occurred at both day and night. In addition, appellant followed Ms. Woolfolk or her guests on several occasions with his vehicle. In July 1992, Ms. Woolfolk was "alarmed" after discovering appellant had followed her to an out-of-town wedding she had attended with a female neighbor.

On August 11, 1992, someone let the air out of a tire on Mr. Carter's car while the car was parked in Ms. Woolfolk's driveway. Thereafter, appellant was served with a "no trespass" notice, forbidding him from coming in or upon Ms. Woolfolk's premises. Appellant continued to drive past or park near Ms. Woolfolk's residence.

On September 19, 1992, at 7:00 a.m., Mr. Carter awoke to a telephone call from a male caller who stated, "If you don't stop seeing her, I'm going to shoot both your asses." At trial, Mr. Carter testified that he was dating only Ms. Woolfolk during this period of time and that he recognized the caller's voice as appellant's. After Mr. Carter received the call, he contacted Ms. Woolfolk and informed her of appellant's threat. The next day, Mr. Carter saw appellant drive through his, Mr. Carter's, Fredricksburg apartment complex, forty miles from appellant's Louisa County residence.

On September 21, 1992, at approximately 10:00 p.m., two days after the threatening telephone call, Ms. Woolfolk saw appellant's unoccupied car parked near her home. Charlta H. Richardson, one of Ms. Woolfolk's neighbors, testified that she saw appellant drive down the street several times that night. Ms. Woolfolk became upset and feared that appellant was somewhere near her home on foot. Throughout the following week, appellant continued to park near or in sight of Ms. Woolfolk's home. He was within view of her residence every day from September 24 until the date of his arrest on September 28, 1992.

The evidence established that in response to appellant's threat and course of conduct, Ms. Woolfolk carried tear gas in her purse, had motion detector lights installed on the outside of her home, and "slept with a hammer" beside her bed. She watched for appellant everywhere she went and, on one occasion, she obtained a police escort when she drove Mr. Carter's car back to Fredricksburg.

Appellant denied making the threatening telephone call to Mr. Carter. He stipulated at trial that he was frequently within view of Ms. Woolfolk's home, that he followed Mr. Carter and that he drove through Mr. Carter's apartment complex on September 20, 1992. However, appellant argues that he engaged in all these activities to monitor his children's environment and prepare for a future custody hearing.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Generally, we decide constitutional questions only when necessary to the appropriate disposition of the case. Accordingly, we first address appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. See Bissell v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 397, 400, 100 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1957). "When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal of a criminal conviction, we must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and accord to the evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. The jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va.App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988) (citations omitted). Further, "[t]he weight which should be given to evidence and whether the testimony of a witness is credible are questions which the fact finder must decide." Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601-02 (1986).

Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he acted with the intent to cause emotional distress, and that "[a] fair reading of the record in this case reveals nothing more than a father who was worried and concerned about his children."

We reject this contention. The jury was entitled to disbelieve appellant's explanation that he acted only out of concern for his children. See Speight v. Commonwealth, 4 Va.App. 83, 88, 354 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987) (en banc ). Further, "[t]he mere possibility that the accused might have had another purpose than that found by the fact finder is insufficient to reverse the conviction." Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va.App. 530, 534, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452-53 (1991).

The Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted with a specific intent when he engaged in his pattern of "stalking" conduct. See Code § 18.2-60.3 (1992). " '[S]pecific intent may, like any other fact, be shown by circumstances. Intent is a state of mind which can be evidenced only by the words or conduct of the person who is claimed to have entertained it.' " Bell, 11 Va.App. at 533, 399 S.E.2d at 452 (quoting Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 210, 216, 83 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1954)). "A person's conduct may be measured by its natural and probable consequences. The finder of fact may infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts." Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 476, 484, 405 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991) (citation omitted).

The evidence proved that appellant stalked his ex-wife. From mid-summer 1992 until his arrest in September 1992, he persistently followed Ms. Woolfolk. He watched her in her home at all hours of the day and night, and even began to follow her boyfriend, Mr. Carter, who lived in Fredricksburg. Appellant threatened to shoot Ms. Woolfolk and Mr. Carter. He followed this threat by driving through Mr. Carter's apartment complex and repeatedly driving by Ms. Woolfolk's residence. Ms. Woolfolk testified that appellant's threat, combined with his persistent course of conduct, "terrified" her. In addition, she believed that appellant wanted to shoot or kill her.

From these facts and circumstances, the jury could properly find that appellant, on more than one occasion and with no legitimate purpose, engaged in conduct intended to cause his ex-wife to suffer the specific emotional distress generated by placing her in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. See Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979) ("[i]ntent is the purpose formed in a person's mind which may, and often must, be inferred from the facts and circumstances in a particular case"). Whether appellant acted with the requisite specific intent was a question for the jury. In evaluating the jury's decision in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, based on the evidence presented in this case, we cannot say that the verdict was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Hancock v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 774, 783, 407 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1991) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to convict.

VAGUENESS

Appellant next argues that Code § 18.2-60.3 (1992) is unconstitutionally vague. The statute in effect in September 1992, provided, in part:

Any person who on more than one occasion engages in conduct with the intent to cause emotional distress to another person by placing that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.

Code § 18.2-60.3(A) (1992). 1 Appellant argues, inter alia, that "the statutory phrase 'intent to cause emotional distress' is hopelessly vague in that it fails to appraise a potential defendant of what sort of conduct might violate its terms." We disagree.

As a threshold matter, the Commonwealth argues that appellant lacks standing to make a vagueness challenge to former Code § 18.2-60.3 (1992) because "an allegation that a statute is unconstitutionally vague cannot be lodged by one who has engaged in conduct 'clearly proscribed' by the statute." We have previously considered and rejected this argument in Perkins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 7, 402 S.E.2d 229 (1991), where we held that a defendant had standing to challenge the statutes in question on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. Id. at 12, 402 S.E.2d at 232; see also ...

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