Woollen v. Whitacre
| Decision Date | 26 November 1883 |
| Docket Number | 10,793 |
| Citation | 91 Ind. 502 |
| Parties | Woollen v. Whitacre |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Huntington Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed at the appellant's costs.
W. H Trammel, T. L. Lucas and W. W. Woollen, for appellant.
Suit upon a promissory note, payable at the First National Bank of Indianapolis, alleged to have been executed by the appellee to James B. Drake, and assigned to the appellant, by endorsement, for value, before maturity. The appellee answered, under oath, denying the execution of the note. Trial by jury; verdict for appellee; judgment on verdict over appellant's motion for a new trial. The only error assigned by the appellant is that the court below erred in overruling his motion for a new trial.
At the trial the appellant made the proper request for the court to give the jury the following instruction:
The court modified the charge by omitting the words in italics, and giving, in lien thereof, the following: "And his testimony is to be considered the same as that of any other witness under the rule above stated."
The court had, in its charge immediately preceding the above, informed the jury, in substance, that, in determining the credibility of a witness, it was proper for them to consider his appearance, manner of testifying, his capacity for understanding and his means for knowing the facts about which he testified; also, his disinterestedness and freedom from bias or prejudice. The jury was also informed that they were the exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses. Taking the charges together, we think there was no error in the modification complained of. Indeed, that part of the charge requested, and refused, told the jury, in substance, that it was their duty to consider, among other things, the interest of a witness. If it be true, as a matter of law, that it is the duty of the jury to consider the interest of a witness in determining his credibility, then it would seem also to be their duty, as a matter of law, to give less weight to the testimony of a witness having an interest in the result of a suit than to that of one having no interest. However this may be as a matter of fact, it is not so as a matter of law. The decisions of this court are numerous to the effect that it is error for the court to say or intimate to the jury that any circumstance or fact should be considered by them to the disparagement of a witness's testimony. The court may properly say to the jury that, in considering the credibility of a witness, certain things may be considered by them; but it is error for the court to inform the jury, directly or indirectly, that such things must, as a matter of law, be regarded in determining the question of credibility. Whenever the court does so, it invades the province of the jury. Nelson v. Vorce, 55 Ind. 455; Pratt v. State, 56 Ind. 179; Millner v. Eglin, 64 Ind. 197 (31 Am. R. 121); Works v. Stevens, 76 Ind. 181.
The appellant, at the proper time and in the proper manner requested the court to instruct the jury that they might find either a general or a special verdict; that if they found a general verdict, they must return answers to all the interrogatories submitted to them; and that if they found a special verdict, they need not answer the interrogatories. The appellant, at the time of requesting this instruction, submitted to the court a form for a special verdict, and also submitted interrogatories addressed to the jury. The court refused to submit to the jury the form for a special verdict and the interrogatories, until the appellant elected which he would have submitted, the form for a special verdict or the interrogatories, and also refused to give the instruction as requested. The record does not purport to contain all the instructions given by the court to the jury, and we must, therefore, presume that the court properly instructed the jury that they might in their discretion return either a general or a special verdict. The appellant had the privilege, if he desired, of requesting the court to direct the jury to return a special...
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State v. Fleming
...gave to the jury the most favorable expression upon the subject of admissions and their effect which the defendant could ask. (Woollen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502; Lewis Christie, 99 Ind. 377.) It is next contended that the court erred in refusing to give the following instruction: "The jury a......
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The Wabash Railroad Company v. Biddle
...certain facts as shown in the parts of instructions set out. The following cases are cited: Fulwider v. Ingels, 87 Ind. 414; Woollen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502; Shorb v. Kinzie, 100 Ind. Cline v. Lindsey, 110 Ind. 337, 11 N.E. 441; Jones v. Casler, 139 Ind. 382, 47 Am. St. 274, 38 N.E. 812; D......
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Territory v. Curran
...testimony of a witness given at a former trial it must be proven that the witness is dead at the time his evidence is offered (Woollen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502;Wabash R. Co. v. Miller, 59 N. E.-Ind. App.-485). The rule was extended later so as to admit the evidence given at a former trial b......
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Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Buchanan
...for the judge, to draw inferences or presumptions of fact from the evidence." Thomp. Charging the Jury, p. 64. In the case of Woollen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502, it was said: "The decisions of this court are to the effect that it is error for the court to say or intimate to the jury that any ......