Woolley v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 01 December 1914
• Docket Number: 2586
• Citation: 45 Utah 227,144 P. 1094
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: WOOLLEY v. TAYLOR et al

144 P. 1094

45 Utah 227

WOOLLEY v. TAYLOR et al

No. 2586

Supreme Court of Utah

December 1, 1914

Appeal from District Court, Third District; Hon. Geo. G. Armstrong Judge.

Action by Edwin T. Woolley, administrator of the estate of Moses Davis, deceased, against Joseph E. Taylor, who died pending the action, which was revived against Alma O. Taylor, and another, his executors.

Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Rawlins Ray & Rawlins for appellants.

Young Snow & Ashton for respondents.

STRAUP, J. McCARTY, C. J., and FRICK, J., concur.

OPINION

STRAUP, J.

This action involves the ownership of real estate in Salt Lake City, of shares of the capital stock of the Utah or Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, and a few shares of the capital stock of an orchard company at Provo. Moses Davis, a widower residing in Salt Lake City, had but one son, David J. Davis, and but one daughter, Rachel S. Davis, both of whom were over the age of twenty-one years. He purchased the real estate on the 13th of August, 1900. A warranty deed of conveyance was then made in his name and delivered to him. He took possession of the property, and, with his daughter, occupied it. On the 1st of September, 1900, he, by warranty deed, conveyed it to his daughter. They continued to occupy the property until his death on the 14th of March, 1909. The deed from him to his daughter was not recorded until the 15th of March, 1909, the next day after his death. In 1907 he was the owner of shares of the capital stock of the Utah or Utah-Idaho Sugar Company and shares of stock of other industrial corporations. He then indorsed in blank 345 preferred and 345 common shares of stock of the sugar company and a few shares of the orchard company, placed them in an envelope, indorsed thereon a description of its contents, describing the kind and number of shares of stock and stating that they were "the property of Rachel S. Davis," his daughter, signed the indorsement, delivered the envelope containing the stock to his banker at Salt Lake City with directions to deliver it to his daughter after his death. He similarly placed 582 shares of sugar stock and shares of stock of other corporations in another envelope with similar indorsements, delivered it also to the banker, with directions to be delivered after his death to David J. Davis, his son. Such deliveries were made by the banker after the death of Moses Davis. After his death, and on the 31st day of March, 1909, Rachel S. Davis, unmarried, by warranty deed, conveyed the real estate to Joseph E. Taylor. The deed was not recorded until the 2d of May, 1910. She also, on the 25th of May, 1910, indorsed and delivered to Taylor the shares of stock theretofore delivered to her by the banker. She also transferred to Taylor the household furniture on the premises occupied by her and her father. Now the administrator of Moses Davis, claiming that his intestate at the time of his death was the owner of the real estate, the shares of stock delivered to Rachel S. Davis, and of the furniture, seeks by this action to recover them from Taylor. Taylor died pending the action. His executors were substituted as defendants. The court denied plaintiff's demands as to the real estate and stock, but granted them as to the furniture, and gave plaintiff judgment for seventy-five dollars, its value. The plaintiff appeals.

Taylor was not a purchaser for value. The properties were conveyed and transferred to him by Rachel S. Davis as mere gifts. The case turns on questions of delivery of the deed and of the stock by Moses Davis to Rachel S. Davis. If sufficient and complete deliveries were made by him, then she, as against the plaintiff who does not rely on fraud, or that the deliveries were made to cheat or affect then existing creditors, acquired title; otherwise, not. The court found good and sufficient deliveries were made. These findings are assailed. As to the deed from Moses Davis to Rachel, there is this: When he purchased the property he stated that he was buying it for his daughter, and after he had purchased it that he "would leave it to her." After his purchase he talked with the conveyancer and expressed an intention to give the property to his daughter, but to retain a life estate, and expressed a wish to make a deed and "put it away" until he was dead, when his daughter could get it. The conveyancer informed him such a deed would not be good, and that:

"Unless you deliver the deed, she can't get any title; you must deliver the deed to her now; then she can do as she wants with it--put it away or destroy it, or anything else."

The father and daughter were both present. The conveyancer thereupon drew a warranty deed conveying the property to the daughter by the father. The father signed and acknowledged it, and then in the presence of the conveyancer handed it to his daughter. After that, improvements were made on the property and were paid for by him. He and his daughter lived on the property for more than eight years and until he died she keeping house for him and caring for him. During all that time the property was insured and assessed in his name, and all insurance and taxes paid by him. There is testimony that the daughter in 1908 said that her father "ought to leave me the property," and after his death, "I am glad father left me the home." Upon these facts, and the fact that the deed was withheld from record, the plaintiff urges non-delivery of the deed by her father to her, and that it was not, nor intended to be, a grant in proesenti. The testimony of the conveyancer, showing an actual and manual handing of the deed by the father to his daughter without reservations or restrictions of any kind, is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the father thereafter had the deed in his possession, or that he, at the time of its delivery, or thereafter, reserved or exercised any control or dominion whatever over it. The deed on its face is an absolute conveyance of the fee and warranty of title from him to her. There is no evidence to show that it in fact was not what it on its face purports to be. True, it was not recorded until after the father's death. That is a circumstance bearing on the question of delivery and intent; but it does not, in and of itself, show non-delivery, or disprove the direct evidence of delivery. That the father, after the deed was made, paid the taxes and insurance and paid for the improvements is evidence, considered by itself, of more or less weight, of ownership or of some right in him. But as to that the relation of the parties must be considered, he a widower with some means, she his daughter without means, and his only dependent, living with him, keeping house for him, and caring for him. Under such circumstances, the father living on the premises and making such payments is not inconsistent with ownership of the property in her. That was but natural for a father to do for his daughter, and is unlike a case of a claimed grant in proesenti to a stranger where the grantor remained in possession, improved the property, and paid the taxes. We, therefore, think the daughter had title and hence conveyed title...