Woosley v. United States
Decision Date | 24 April 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1691.,71-1691. |
Citation | 478 F.2d 139 |
Parties | Robert Michael WOOSLEY, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Dale L. Rollings, St. Charles, Mo., for defendant-appellant.
Robert E. Grote, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MATTHES, Chief Judge, VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge, and MEHAFFY, GIBSON, LAY, HEANEY, BRIGHT, ROSS and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.
Upon this rehearing en banc of the instant appeal1 we grant relief to Robert Michael Woosley, a Jehovah's Witness, from a five-year prison sentence for refusing induction into the military service in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462.
Appellant was convicted on his guilty plea, which the district court refused to permit him to withdraw. Woosley then appealed the conviction. We sustained this ruling of the district court and affirmed the conviction in United States v. Woosley, 8 Cir., 440 F.2d 1280, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864, 92 S.Ct. 53, 30 L.Ed.2d 108 (1971). Thereafter, Woosley petitioned the district court under Rule 35, Fed.R.Crim.P. for reduction of his sentence. The court, without a hearing, denied the petition on November 5, 1971, and on November 23, 1971, again without a hearing, denied appellant's motion to reconsider. Woosley now brings this timely appeal from those orders.2
At the time of sentencing, the record showed appellant Woosley to be 19 years of age, married, steadily employed, and a prospective father of a child to be born within two months. His difficulties with the Selective Service System from his sincere religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness, which beliefs do not permit him to take up and bear arms against other people nor permit him to perform civilian service as a conscientious objector at the order of a Selective Service Board, an arm of the military in the view of Jehovah's Witnesses. Thus he did not ask his draft board to classify him as a conscientous objector but did request a ministerial classification. The Board declined this request and thereafter ordered Woosley, a resident of Springfield, Illinois, to report for induction. He declined induction at the induction station in St. Louis, Missouri, and prosecution followed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The district judge described Woosley as "a fine young man," and from the testimony adduced at the hearing on motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea, the court noted that "This young man should have desired to obtain a conscientious objector status."
Without doubt the evidence available to the district court showed Woosley to be a sincere and religiously motivated conscientious objector who failed to qualify for an exemption from military service solely because his religious tenets forbade him to apply for and perform civilian work as a conscientious objector. Notwithstanding this showing, the court pronounced a five-year sentence, the maximum prison term authorized by law. Our reading of the record discloses no indication of the reasons for the severity of the sentence, except a comment made by the court at an earlier hearing on July 10, 1970, when the court, in response to counsel's plea for probation, stated:
On this appeal, Woosley urges these propositions:
(1) The district court did not resort to appropriate standards in imposing sentence but utilized a "mechanical" and automatic approach in giving him a maximum prison sentence, as evidenced by the sentencing judge's similar treatment of all selective service violators who refused induction regardless of the circumstances of the violation or of the violator;
(2) That the trial court abused its discretion in not granting Woosley probation and in refusing a hearing on his postconviction application for reduction of the sentence under Rule 35.
We hold Woosley is entitled to relief and remand for resentencing under standards enunciated herein.
The federal courts have uniformly agreed that "a sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review." United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); see, e. g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-341 (8th Cir. 1930).3
This circuit has generally adhered to the principle that a sentence within statutory limits should not be disturbed if the district court has exercised discretion in imposing the sentence. United States v. Smallwood, 443 F.2d 535, 543, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 853, 92 S.Ct. 95, 30 L.Ed.2d 93 (1971); United States v. Dennison, 437 F.2d 439, 440 (1971); Cassidy v. United States, 428 F.2d 585, 588 (1970). Yet, in fact, this court has undertaken to review the severity of sentences following a district court's denial of a reduction under Rule 35, Fed.R.Crim.P., although we found no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Hood v. United States, 469 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Anderson, 466 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1972).4 If we possess the power to review the severity of the sentence or the appropriateness of the sentencing procedure, this appeal from the denial of relief under Rule 35 properly places these issues before us.
The Supreme Court support for the rule that federal appellate courts generally may not review a sentence is pure dicta, 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 533 at 451-52 (1969). See, e. g., Tucker, supra, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592; Gore, supra, 357 U.S. 386, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405; Blockburger, supra, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306. However, in a contempt case, Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 78 U.S. 766, 2 L.Ed.2d 837 (1958), the Court not only reviewed the severity of the sentence imposed by the district court, but also set it aside and imposed its own sentence. The Court observed:
From our review of the cases, we think it clear that the repetitive pronouncement of the general rule of unreviewability of sentences imposed within statutory limits does not insulate from review every sentence within statutory limits.
We believe that we have the power to examine and review a sentence if it is shown to have been imposed on a mechanical basis. Appellant asserts that the district judge in referring to "my policy" in the sentencing proceeding held on July 10, 1970, (see p. 140, supra) clearly meant that he sentenced all defendants convicted of refusing induction to a maximum five-year prison term. Although the record does not clearly disclose this meaning, counsel for appellant states in his brief that his examination of the district court records uncovered no selective service case where this district judge imposed less than the maximum term of imprisonment for refusing induction under § 462. At oral argument the United States Attorney referred to his research into sentences pronounced by the district judge for defendants who have refused induction into military service. Restricting consideration to sentences in the Eastern Division of Missouri, we understand the statements of...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Commission
...United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1974); Woolsey v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973) (En banc ); United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Charles, 460 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir. 1972); U......
-
U.S. v. Calvert
...to review." United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). * * * Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 141 (8th Cir. 1973) (en banc). However, we * * * possess the power to review the severity of a criminal sentence within narrow limits where the cou......
-
State v. Basham, 2007 Ohio 6995 (Ohio App. 12/26/2007)
...excessive under traditional concepts of justice or is manifestly disproportionate to the crime or the defendant. Woosley v. United States (1973), 478 F.2d 139, 147. The imposition by a trial judge of a sentence on a mechanical, predetermined or policy basis is subject to review. Woosley, su......
-
State v. Smith, 2010 Ohio 1232 (Ohio App. 3/25/2010)
...excessive under traditional concepts of justice or is manifestly disproportionate to the crime or the defendant. Woosley v. United States (1973), 478 F.2d 139, 147. The imposition by a trial judge of a sentence on a mechanical, predetermined or policy basis is subject to review. Woosley, su......