Wooten v. Kernan

Decision Date25 July 2017
Docket NumberCase No.: 17-CV-94-AJB-WVG
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California
PartiesWILLIAM FRED WOOTEN, Petitioner, v. SCOTT KERNAN, et al., Respondents.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

William Fred Wooten ("Petitioner") filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 on January 17, 2017, which challenges his 2014 state conviction. (See ECF No. 1.) Now before the Court is Respondents' Scott Kernan, Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and Kamala D. Harris, former Attorney General of California,1 ("Respondents") Motion to Dismiss. Respondents argue the Court should dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, for mootness. (See ECF No. 8.)

For the reasons that follow, the Court RECOMMENDS the Motion be GRANTED and the Petition DISMISSED with prejudice.

II. BACKGROUND
A. State Court Background

On August 13, 2014, a jury convicted Petitioner of violating California Penal Code Section 422, making a criminal threat. (ECF No. 9-1 at 139.)2 On December 2, 2014, the state court sentenced Petitioner to sixteen months in state prison. (ECF No. 9-2 at 133.) At the time of that sentencing, Petitioner was granted 641 days of credit for time served. (Id.) Prior to this, on April 4, 2014, the United States Marshals Service placed a detainer on Petitioner, indicating Petitioner was wanted in a federal jurisdiction for trial upon release from state custody. (ECF No. 9-2 at 131.) Petitioner was released from state custody and transferred to federal custody on an unknown date. On or around September 8, 2015, Petitioner was sentenced to 135 months in federal prison for unidentified charges (ECF No. 1 at 13).3

On December 8, 2014, Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California court of appeal claiming seven grounds for relief. (See ECF Nos. 1 at 2, 9-8.) The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in full in an unpublished opinion issued on November 12, 2015. (ECF No. 9-11 at 1.) On December 14, 2015, Petitioner sought review in the Supreme Court of California, raising the same seven claims. (Id.) The petition for review was denied without comment on February 17, 2016. (ECF No. 9-13.) Petitioner did not seek collateral review of his claims.

B. Federal Court Background

On January 17, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuantto 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, which sought to attack his 2014 state court conviction. (ECF No. 1.) On April 28, 2017, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss arguing the court lacks jurisdiction or, in the alternative, the Petition is moot. (See ECF Nos. 8, 8-1.) On June 5, 2017, Petitioner timely filed a Response in Opposition. (ECF. No. 11.)

III. DISCUSSION
A. "In Custody" Requirement
i. Petitioner Does Not Meet The "In Custody" Requirement Pursuant To § 2254

Respondents move to dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 8-1 at 1.) Respondents argue Petitioner does not fulfill the "in custody" requirement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because he was not in state custody when he filed the Petition. (Id.) In his reply to Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner concedes that he had fully served his state sentence and was not under state court supervision at the time he filed the Petition. (ECF No. 11 at 3-4.)

Subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is limited to those persons "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). As a result, once a petitioner's sentence has fully expired, he is precluded from challenging that sentence because he is no longer "in custody" for purposes of federal habeas review. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). However, the "in custody" requirement of § 2254 may be met even if the petitioner is not physically confined. For example, the Supreme Court has held an individual remains "in custody" for purposes of federal habeas relief while on parole or probation, and after release pending appeal. See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 348-49, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973) (release pending appeal); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240-43, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) (parole); Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005) (probation), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1128, 126 S.Ct. 2023, 164 L.Ed.2d 780 (2006).

The Supreme Court has recognized, in extremely limited circumstances, that apetitioner may challenge an expired state court conviction through a federal habeas petition when the prior conviction is used to enhance a current state court conviction. Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 404-05, 121 S.Ct. 1567, 149 L.Ed.2d 608 (2001). However, and most pertinent here, the Supreme Court has not extended that reasoning to federal convictions that may have been enhanced by prior state convictions.

Here, Petitioner concedes he has fully served his 2014 state sentence and, as a result he was not in state court custody nor under state court supervision when he filed the Petition in January 2017 (ECF. No. 11 at 3-4.) The record supports this concession. On December 2, 2014, the state court granted Petitioner credit for 641 days, approximately twenty-one months, already served in state custody, which exceeded his state sentence of sixteen months. (ECF No. 9-7 at 35-36.) The state court did not sentence Petitioner to probation. (Id.) Petitioner's direct appeal process concluded on February 16, 2016, the date on which the Supreme Court of California denied his Petition for review. See California Rules of Court, Rule 8.532(b)(2)(A) (Supreme Court of California decision is final upon the filing of "a denial of a petition for review of a Court of Appeal decision"). Lastly, Petitioner has failed to collaterally attack the judgment with the state. Thus, Petitioner was not "in custody" at the time he filed his Petition.

Since Petitioner served his entire sentence, was not on parole or probation, and he was not awaiting disposition of an appeal, Petitioner was not in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court in January of 2017 when his Petition was filed. Thus, his Petition pursuant to § 2254 cannot be granted.

ii. Petitioner Does Not Meet The "In Custody" Requirement Pursuant To § 2255

A district court may properly construe a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 as one filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 when a petitioner challenges a federal sentence that was enhanced by a state court conviction and the petitioner is presently in federal custody. See Allen v. State of Or., 153 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1998). Similar to § 2254, subject matter jurisdiction for § 2255 claims requires apetitioner be "in custody under sentence of" a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). However, when "a prior conviction used to enhance a federal sentence is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), then that defendant is without recourse. [...] [T]he defendant may not collaterally attack his prior conviction through a motion under § 2255." Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001).

Here, Petitioner pursued all direct remedies available but was ultimately unsuccessful when the Supreme Court of California rejected his claims. Furthermore, Petitioner failed to pursue collateral attack remedies that were available to him. Petitioner is now "without recourse" and "may not collaterally attack his prior conviction through a motion under § 2255." Id. Given this, even construing the Petition as one made pursuant to § 2255, the Petition must fail.

iii. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction

Since Petitioner was not in state custody when he filed his Petition and is without recourse to those claims, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS Respondents' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and the Petition be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

B. Petitioner's Claim For Relief Is Moot

In an alternative argument, Respondents asks the Court to dismiss the Petition as moot because Petitioner has already received the relief requested. (ECF No. 8-1 at 4.) In his Response, Petitioner claims his state conviction added three criminal history points to his federal sentencing, which enhanced his federal prison sentence. (ECF No. 11 at 6.) Petitioner claims this enhancement constitutes a collateral consequence, and thus rendered his claim not moot, citing Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994) in support of his argument. (Id.)

Mootness is jurisdictional. See Koppers Indus. v. U.S.E.P.A., 902 F.2d 756, 758 (9th Cir. 1990). The fundamental issue in deciding mootness is whether there is a currentcontroversy to which effective relief can be granted. American Rivers v. National Marine Fishery Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) ("If an event occurs that prevents the court from granting effective relief, the claim is moot and must be dismissed."). "This means that, throughout the litigation, the Plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In the context of whether a habeas petition is moot, the "analysis is specifically limited to the sort of equitable relief [a court] may grant in response to a habeas petition." Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). A habeas petition is moot when the petitioner "seeks relief [that] cannot be redressed by a favorable decision of the court issuing a writ...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT