Wooten v. Lightburn

• Decision Date: 30 September 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:07cv00052.
• Citation: 579 F.Supp.2d 769
• Parties: Olin WOOTEN, Plaintiff, v. Robert C. LIGHTBURN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

Page 769

579 F.Supp.2d 769

Olin WOOTEN, Plaintiff, v. Robert C. LIGHTBURN, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:07cv00052.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Abingdon Division.

September 30, 2008.

Daniel Robert Bieger, Copeland & Bieger PC, Abingdon, VA, for Plaintiff.

Charles Connor Crook, III, Marshall M. Slayton, Boyle, Bain, Reback & Slayton, Charlottesville, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GLEN M. WILLIAMS, Senior District Judge.

I. Procedural History and Background

This case was initiated by the plaintiff, Olin Wooten, a Texas resident, against the defendant, Robert C. Lightburn, a Virginia resident, as the result of a dispute regarding the purchase of real property located in Washington County, Virginia. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In essence, Wooten brought this action against Lightburn claiming that Lightburn conveyed fewer acres than what was agreed to in the purchase agreement. Thus, Wooten sought relief under the theories of breach of contract, breach of warranty, specific performance and quasi-contract. Competing motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties and were referred, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), to the Honorable Pamela Meade Sargent, United States Magistrate Judge.

By orders entered March 6, 2008, and April 8, 2008, the undersigned accepted the Magistrate Judge's recommendations and granted Lightburn's motion for summary judgment as to the breach of contract and breach of warranty claims, leaving only the equitable claims of specific performance and quasi-contract for the court's consideration. In allowing the specific performance and quasi-contract claims to survive summary judgment, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations, (Docket Item Nos. 49 and 62), which were accepted by this court, set forth the remaining disputed facts that were to be decided in consideration of each claim. With regards to the claim for specific performance of the agreement and an abatement of the purchase price, the court determined that there were disputes in fact as to whether abatement would be equitable and whether Wooten agreed to accept the risk of an acreage deficiency by not complying with the terms of the contract. As for the quasi-contract claim, the court found that disputes in fact existed as to whether Lightburn's acceptance and retention of the purchase price occurred under circumstances that rendered it inequitable for him to retain the benefit of the entire purchase price. Moreover, the court ruled that there were disputes in fact which would affect whether Wooten had a reasonable expectation of payment, whether Lightburn should reasonably have expected to reimburse Wooten due to the acreage shortage and whether society's reasonable expectations of security of person and property would be served if Lightburn was permitted to retain the entire purchase price.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c), "[i]n an action not triable of right by a jury, the court ... on its own ... may try any issue with an advisory jury." Thus, although there is no right to a trial by jury for equitable claims, by order entered April 8, 2008, the undersigned determined that because material issues of fact were involved in this case, it was appropriate to allow an advisory jury to hear the disputed facts. On July 21 and 22, 2008, this case proceeded to trial on the two remaining claims of specific performance and quasi-contract. After two days of argument and testimony, the court presented a special advisory verdict form to the advisory jury for its consideration. The advisory verdict form set forth precise questions for the advisory jury to answer and read as follows:

I. COUNT III—SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

A. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the property sold was sold by the acre or by estimation?

                      YES ____     NO ____
                

B. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a deficiency in the quantity of land conveyed?

                      YES ____     NO ____
                

C. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the quantity of land at issue was material in assessing the original purchase price?

                      YES ____     NO ____
                

D. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that, based upon the facts of this case, an abatement of the purchase price is equitable?

                      YES ____     NO ____
                

If your answer is YES to each of the above questions, then your verdict on the specific performance claim is for Wooten. If your answer is NO to any of the above questions, then your verdict on this claim is for Lightburn. Please go on to Section II.

II. COUNT IV—QUASI-CONTRACT

A. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he conferred a benefit to Lightburn by paying him the entire purchase price?

                      YES ____      NO ____
                

B. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Lightburn knew that Wooten had conferred a benefit upon him by paying the entire purchase price?

                      YES ____      NO ____
                

C. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that, under the circumstances, Lightburn's acceptance and retention of the entire purchase price occurred under circumstances that render it inequitable, or unfair, for him to retain it?

                      YES ____      NO ____
                

If your answer is YES to each of the above questions, please go to the next question. If your answer is NO to any of the above questions, then your verdict is for Lightburn on this claim. Please go to Section III.

D. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a reasonable expectation that Lightburn would return some portion of the purchase price in order to account for any acreage deficiency?

                      YES ____       NO ____
                

E. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Lightburn should have expected to return some portion of the purchase price in order to account for any acreage deficiency?

                     YES ____        NO ____
                

F. Has Wooten proven by a preponderance of the evidence that society's reasonable expectations of security of person and property would be defeated if Lightburn were to retain the entire purchase price without any repayment to Wooten?

                    YES ____         NO ____
                

If your answers to questions D, E and F above are all NO, then your verdict on the claim for quasicontract is for Lightburn. If any of your answers to questions D, E or F is YES, then your verdict on this claim is for Wooten. Please go to Section III.

III. DAMAGES AND INTEREST

If you have found for Wooten on either claim, continue to the next question. If not, your deliberations are complete. Please sign and date this verdict form and return it to the courtroom.

A. What amount of the original purchase price, if any, should Lightburn return to Wooten in order to do justice between the parties?

                       $____________________
                

Please go on to the next question.

B. We find that Wooten is entitled to prejudgment interest on its damages to be calculated as of ______, 20____ [insert date].

The advisory jury answered each question affirmatively and found in favor of Wooten as to each count. Specifically, the advisory jury made a finding of damages in Wooten's favor totaling $390,244.75, plus interest to be calculated as of May 16, 2007.

According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1), "[i]n an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately." (emphasis added). Although the defendant has filed a traditional Rule 50(b) motion, which is applicable after a verdict has been entered, because this case was tried before an advisory jury, with the ultimate decision left to the undersigned, the defendant's arguments will be considered in the context of the court's determination of whether to adopt the advisory jury's findings. The court notes that in conforming with the requirements of Rule 52, the undersigned "need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters," as there is no need for "over-elaboration of detail or particularization of facts." See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1946 Amendments; see also Torres-Lazarini v. United States, 523 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir.2008); OCI Wyoming, L.P. v. PacifiCorp, 479 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir.2007); Richardson v. Blanton, 597 F.2d 1078, 1085 (6th Cir.1979). Accordingly, I will set forth my findings and conclusions so as to specifically address the remaining relevant disputes in fact outlined in the Report and Recommendations, as well as those questions contained in the special advisory verdict form which were presented to the advisory jury.

II. Findings of Fact

On July 24, 2006, Wooten entered into a contract with Lightburn to purchase approximately 1,977.13 acres of unimproved land located in Washington County, Virginia. According to the terms of the written contract, the purchase price was $4,250,000.00. Specifically, paragraph two of the contract provided:

This price shall be adjusted to an exact Purchase price of $2,150.00 Dollars per (acre). The exact area to be determined by a survey, to be made by a registered surveyor and paid for by the "Purchaser." At his option, Purchaser may waive said survey. The Purchaser shall pay to "Seller" at settlement the Purchase Price in cash or by cashier's or certified check.

The parties do not dispute that the contract called for a purchase price per acre. In particular, Wooten testified that he agreed to a price term of $2,150.00 per acre, noting that the essence of the deal was a sale by the acre to be determined by a survey. Furthermore, Wooten testified that he and Lightburn agreed to honor the "up and down nature" of paragraph two, which meant that the price would be adjusted to $2,150.00 per acre. At no point in the record or in his testimony did Lightburn dispute the notion that the land was to be sold by the acre. Thus, based upon the contractual...