Wootten v. Ivey
| Decision Date | 19 September 2003 |
| Citation | 877 So.2d 585 |
| Parties | Jeffrey WOOTTEN and Marty Wootten v. Toney IVEY et al. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Toney Ivey et al. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
William W. Lawrence and Blake Lazenby of Wootten, Thornton, Carpenter, O'Brien, Lazenby & Lawrence, Talladega, for appellants Jeffrey Wootten and Marty Wootten.
Michael C. Quillen of Walston, Wells, Anderson & Bains, LLP, Birmingham; and Albert L. Shumaker of Shumaker & Rice, Centre, for appellant Gold Kist, Inc.
M. Clay Ragsdale IV, Birmingham, for appellees.
Jeffrey Wootten, Marty Wootten, and Gold Kist, Inc., appeal from an order of the DeKalb Circuit Court restraining and enjoining them from restocking their hog farm pending the submission of an odor-management plan that meets the court's approval. We reverse and remand.
On September 7, 1999, Toney Ivey, Brenda Ivey, and Casey Ivey sued Jeffrey Wootten, Marty Wootten, and Gold Kist, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the defendants"), alleging that their land had been damaged as a result of the defendants' operation of a hog farm near the Iveys' property. The Iveys alleged, among other things, that the defendants' operation of the hog farm created a nuisance, and they sought money damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. The Iveys' complaint included a general demand for a jury trial. On January 31, 2000, the complaint was amended to add 16 plaintiffs who also claimed to have suffered damage from residing in close proximity to the defendants' hog farm.
On October 2, 2000, a jury trial was conducted and the trial court submitted the nuisance claim and the request for money damages to the jury for deliberation. The trial court gave the jury the following instructions:
(Emphasis added.)
On October 12, 2000, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants as to each plaintiff's claim for nuisance. Based on the jury's verdict, the trial court, on October 13, 2000, entered a judgment in favor of each of the defendants and against all of the plaintiffs as to the nuisance claim seeking money damages. The plaintiffs filed various posttrial motions, and on January 24, 2001, the trial court amended its October 13, 2000, judgment to add the following statement: "This [October 13, 2000] judgment shall be, and is hereby, deemed a judgment on the damage[s] claims only, and not a judgment on the claims for equitable relief asserted in this case." The court stated that it would determine whether equitable relief was warranted in this case by considering the evidence presented at trial, "together with such other evidence as may be presented by the parties at the hearing hereinafter scheduled." The court explicitly stated that the October 13, 2000, order was not a final order and scheduled an additional hearing to allow the plaintiffs to again attempt to prove to the trial court that the defendants' hog-farming operation constitutes a nuisance.
The trial court then conducted hearings at which additional evidence was presented that had not been presented at trial. The trial court then appointed a special master to monitor the operation of the defendants' hog farm, and the judge and the special master made personal visits to the hog farm. On January 9, 2002, the trial court entered a judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief, finding that the defendants' hog farm constituted a nuisance and enjoining, as of April 1, 2002, the defendants from restocking their hog farm until the defendants submitted an odor-management plan to the trial court and received court approval of the plan. On January 23, 2002, the defendants filed motions to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's January 9, 2002, judgment.
On February 8, 2002, the defendants submitted an odor-management plan to the trial court. On February 22, 2002, the trial court informed the defendants by letter that their proposed plan, which consisted of approximately 54 pages of material, was insufficient and that they needed to produce more information and detail as to their proposals for odor management. On March 5, 2002, the trial court entered an order postponing from April 1, 2002, to May 1, 2002, the deadline after which the defendants were prohibited from restocking, because of scheduled hearings in the case. On March 21, 2002, the defendants provided the court with supplemental information concerning their proposed odor-management plan. On March 26, 2002, the trial court denied the defendants' motion to alter, amend, or vacate the court's January 9, 2002, judgment. The court then certified its October 13, 2000, judgment and its January 9, 2002, judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The defendants appealed.
The defendants argue that the trial court, by determining that a nuisance existed after the jury had already determined that one did not exist, deprived them of their right to a trial by jury. Specifically, the defendants assert that they were entitled to a jury trial as to the plaintiffs' claim for money damages, although they acknowledge that they did not have a right to a jury trial as to the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief. The defendants further contend that, because whether a nuisance existed is a factual issue common to both the legal claim for money damages and the equitable claim for injunctive relief, this factual issue was decided by the jury when it decided the legal claim for money damages. Thus, according to the defendants, because the issue whether a nuisance existed was properly submitted to and decided by the jury, the jury's findings on that issue are binding on the trial court in determining whether to grant equitable relief. We agree.
This Court has long recognized that Article I, § 11, Constitution of Alabama of 1901, provides the right to a jury trial in those cases that involve purely legal claims.1 See Ex parte Thorn, 788 So.2d 140, 142 (Ala.2000)(quoting W & H Mach. & Tool Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 291 Ala. 517, 520, 283 So.2d 173, 175-76 (1973)(citing in turn Tillery v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 241 Ala. 653, 4 So.2d 125 (1941); Alford v. State, 170 Ala. 178, 188, 54 So. 213, 215 (1911); Montgomery & Florida Ry. v. McKenzie, 85 Ala. 546, 549, 5 So. 322 (1888))); see also Rule 38, Ala. R. Civ. P. It is equally well settled that the constitution does not provide a right to a jury trial for the resolution of factual issues for parties alleging equitable claims. See Ex parte Thorn, 788 So.2d at 143 (citing Finance, Inv. & Rediscount Co. v. Wells, 409 So.2d 1341, 1343 (Ala.1981)(citing in turn Pugh v. Calloway, 295 Ala. 139, 325 So.2d 135 (1976))). However, since the merger of law and equity in 1973 with the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rule 2, Ala. R. Civ. P., courts have been presented with cases that contain both issues to be tried by a jury and issues to be tried by the court. In those cases, the test for determining whether a party has a right to a trial by jury is: "`[I]f an issue is of a sort which [before the adoption of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure] would have been tried to a jury, then the party has a constitutional right ... to have it tried to a jury under the merged procedure." Ex parte Thorn, 788 So.2d at 143 (quoting Committee Comments to Rule 38, Ala. R. Civ. P.). When legal and equitable claims are presented in one action, the trial court must resolve the equitable claims in a way that does not impinge on a party's right to a jury trial as to the legal claims. See Ex parte Taylor, 828 So.2d 883 (Ala.2001); Ex parte Thorn, 788 So.2d at 140. Purely legal claims, as well as factual issues common to the legal and equitable claims, must be determined by a jury; the remaining issues are then to be decided by the trial court. See Ex parte Taylor, 828 So.2d at 883; Ex parte Thorn, 788 So.2d at 140.
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