Worcester Vocational Teachers Ass'n v. City of Worcester
Decision Date | 05 January 1982 |
Citation | 13 Mass.App.Ct. 1,429 N.E.2d 718 |
Parties | , 1 Ed. Law Rep. 1246 WORCESTER VOCATIONAL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al. 1 v. CITY OF WORCESTER et al. |
Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Joan Entmacher, Asst. Atty. Gen., for interveners.
Bennett S. Gordon, Asst. City Sol., for the City of Worcester.
Sandra C. Quinn, Boston, for plaintiffs.
Before HALE, C. J., and GRANT and GREANEY, JJ.
This action was brought by the Worcester Vocational Teachers Association and other interested parties against the city of Worcester, the city manager, the members of the city council, and the city's board of trustees for vocational education (board). The action sought a declaration that the board's decision on April 9, 1981, to eliminate all physical education programs for the approximately 1600 students attending the city's two vocational secondary schools violated G.L. c. 71, § 3, as appearing in St.1979, c. 81. That section provides, in pertinent part, that "(p)hysical education shall be taught as a required subject in all grades for all students in the public schools for the purpose of promoting the physical well-being of such students." 2 The plaintiffs also sought an injunction restoring physical education classes to the curriculum of those schools and prohibiting the discharge of all six physical education teachers.
On what were treated as cross-motions for summary judgment (see Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 56(a), 365 Mass. 755-756, 824 (1974); Brookline v. Medical Area Serv. Corp., 8 Mass.App. 243, Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. (1979) 1673, 1675-1676 n.7, 392 N.E.2d 1070 (1979)), a judge of the Superior Court entered a judgment which declared that "the (b)oard's vote to discontinue the physical education program in the Worcester (v)ocational schools is legal and effective." The judge based his decision primarily on two grounds. First, he was of the opinion that G.L. c. 74 was meant to be exclusive in governing the requirements of a vocational school curriculum, and that if physical education was to be required in a vocational school, a specific provision to that effect would have been included therein, or in G.L. c. 71, § 3. Second, he thought that the words "public schools" as used throughout G.L. c. 71 include only schools under the supervision of an elected school committee, and were not meant to include vocational schools like Worcester's which are managed by a local board of trustees under G.L. c. 74, § 3. 3 On this point, the judge viewed the provisions of G.L. c. 71, § 37, 4 as particularly significant, and he read the words emphasized in note 4, supra, as investing local boards of trustees with discretion to decide whether physical education should be taught in vocational schools under their supervision.
After the judgment was entered, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of Education, and the State Board of Education were allowed to intervene in the action under Mass.R.Civ.P. 24, 365 Mass. 769-770 (1974), and the initial judgment was vacated. After hearing further arguments from the interveners, the judge reaffirmed his earlier decision. A new judgment was entered which again declared that the board's action was proper in all respects. The plaintiffs and interveners appealed and the case was expedited for appellate review. We reverse.
1. The dispositive question is whether the words "public schools" in the first sentence of G.L. c. 71, § 3, include vocational schools managed by a local board of trustees under G.L. c. 74. We think it clear that they do. In our view, a decision to the contrary would defeat the legislative purpose embodied in G.L. c. 71, § 3. Our reasons follow.
The Supreme Judicial Court stated some time ago in Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass 94, 97-98 (1869), that " '(p)ublic schools,' as those words are used in the Constitution and laws of Massachusetts ... includ(e) all schools, from those lower than grammar schools to those commonly known as high schools, established and maintained in the several cities and towns as part of the general system of popular education." The Jenkins opinion also advised that "schools supported by taxation must be town schools ... designed for the general education of all the people" and that "what are understood by town schools must be determined by an honest application of the rules of good sense in ascertaining the meaning of these well known terms, by long established and approved usage, and the well known policy of the (L)egislature." Id. at 98-99. The words "town schools" in the foregoing quotation are synonymous with "public schools." See id. See also 16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 46.02a, at 612 (3d ed. 1979). For the background of our public school system, see Cushing v. Newburyport, 10 Met. 508 (1845).
Originally, this broad view was not applied to vocational schools. When vocational (then called "industrial") schools were initially established in Massachusetts in the late nineteenth century, they were not considered to be part of the public education system. See St. 1872, c. 86, which provided that "(a) town may establish and maintain one or more industrial schools ... (but) attendance upon any such school shall not take the place of attendance upon public schools required by law." See also Commonwealth v. Connecticut Valley St. Ry., 196 Mass. 309, 311-312, 82 N.E. 19 (1907), which held that vocational schools were not "public schools" within the meaning of a statute requiring street railways to transport "pupils of the public schools" to and from school at a reduced fare. This exclusion, however, appears to have been based more on the novelty of the subject matter taught in vocational schools and on prevailing attitudes about the nature of a proper education than on the usefulness of training in work related subjects. As familiarity with the teaching methods and curricula of vocational schools built confidence, earlier dispositions were replaced by a more practical policy which recognized that vocational training (supplemented by exposure to traditional courses) would provide an adequate education and that full time attendance at approved vocational schools should satisfy the requirements of the compulsory attendance laws.
Ultimately, by comprehensive legislative enactment, prior statutes providing for the management of vocational schools were repealed, and the schools were placed under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Education. See St. 1911, c. 471, § 2 5 (later codified in G.L. c. 74). In this manner, the vocational schools became "part of the (Commonwealth's) general system of popular education." Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. at 98. The vocational schools which now exist in considerable number throughout the State 6 continue to be an integral part of that system today. It is therefore no accident of terminology that cases subsequent to the Connecticut Valley St. Ry. decision freely refer to vocational schools as "public schools." See e.g., Fulgoni v. Johnston, 302 Mass. 421, 421, 19 N.E.2d 542 (1939) ( ); Kaczmarski v. Mayor of Springfield, 346 Mass. 432, 434, 193 N.E.2d 574 (1963) ( ). Nor is it accidental that other statutes include vocational schools within the meaning of public schools. See G.L. c. 70, § 1, as appearing in St.1978, c. 367, § 70C, St.1980, c. 261, § 35 ( ); § 2, as appearing in St.1966, c. 14, § 40 ( ), and as appearing in St.1978, c. 367, § 70C, St.1980, c. 261, § 35 ( ). See also G.L. c. 32, § 1 ( ). Thus, the vocational schools, including the two schools in Worcester, clearly meet all of the usual criteria for schools which are public, as distinguished from private: they are (a) publicly owned; (b) publicly supported by local, State and Federal funds 7 (cf. § 2 of art. 18 of the Amendments to the Constitution of Massachusetts; G.L. c. 70); (c) publicly managed (see note 6, supra); (d) under the general supervision of the State Department of Education (G.L. c. 74, § 2); (e) free to the public; (f) within the requirements for public transportation (G.L. c. 71, §§ 7A, 7B; G.L. c. 74, § 8A); and (g) viewed as providing a structured curriculum (603 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 4.09, 4.11 (1978)) which may satisfy the compulsory attendance laws, G.L. c. 76, § 1.
Considering this background, we think it obvious that G.L. c. 71 is a comprehensive statute dealing generally with the "public schools," that G.L. c. 74 addresses certain special requirements of vocational schools, and that both statutes constitute component parts of the larger statutory scheme of public education in this Commonwealth. Accordingly, G.L. c. 71 and c. 74 are "statutes relat(ing) to the same subject matter (which) should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose." Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513-514, 333 N.E.2d 450 (1975), and cases cited. The Legislature's purpose in enacting G.L. c. 71, § 3, is unambiguously stated on the face of the statute itself (see Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37, 364 N.E.2d 1215 (197...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Martin v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge
...Foundation, Inc. v. Russell Management, Inc., 380 Mass. 212, 214, 402 N.E.2d 501 (1980); Worcester Vocational Teachers Assn. v. Worcester, 13 Mass.App. 1, 7-8, 429 N.E.2d 718 (1982). Second, an exception from the coverage of a statute is ordinarily to be construed narrowly so as to prevent ......
-
School Committee of Worcester v. Worcester Div. of Juvenile Court Dept.
...v. Board of Educ., 362 Mass. 417, 445, 287 N.E.2d 438 [410 Mass. 839] (1972). See also Worcester Vocational Teachers Ass'n v. Worcester, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 8, 429 N.E.2d 718 (1982). The case is remanded to single justice. A judgment shall be entered directing the Juvenile Court to vacate th......
-
Commonwealth v. Soldega
...reason.” Commonwealth v. Griswold, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 461, 462, 459 N.E.2d 142 (1984), quoting from Worcester Vocational Teachers Assn. v. Worcester, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 7–8, 429 N.E.2d 718 (1982).4 2. The prosecutor's closing argument. The defendant claims that the prosecutor committed reversi......
-
Com. v. Anderson
...and renders it an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason." Worcester Vocational Teachers Assn. v. Worcester, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 7-8, 429 N.E.2d 718 (1982). We need not resort to dictionary definitions to conclude that the statute does not apply to the d......