Word v. State, 569S120
| Decision Date | 20 August 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 569S120,569S120 |
| Citation | 261 N.E.2d 225,254 Ind. 542 |
| Parties | Huston WORD, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Hall Cochrane, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Aaron T. Jahr, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
De BRULER, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for Second Degree Burglary in the Marion Criminal Court, Division One. The appellant was charged by affidavit with the crime of Second Degree Burglary. The affidavit reads in part as follows:
'* * * that Huston Word, Jr., on, or about the 21st day of June, A.D., 1968, at and in the County of Marion in the State of Indiana, did then and there unlawfully and burglariously break and enter into the 1967-FORD AUTOMOBILE OF STEVEN J. GLASSBURN, then and there situate at 2000 BLOCK OF NORTH NEW JERSEY STREET, a public street, City of Indianapolis, County of Marion, State of Indiana, which said automobile was not a place of human habitation, with the intent to commit a felony therein, to-wit: to unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly obtain and exert unauthorized control over property of said STEVEN J. GLASSBURN and to deprive said STEVEN J. GLASSBURN permanently of the use and benefit of said property, then and there being * * * contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.'
The Crime of Second Degree Burglary is defined in Acts 1941, ch. 148, § 4, being Burns Ind.Stat.Ann. § 10--701 which reads in part as follows:
'* * * (b) Whoever breaks and enters into any * * * automobile, * * * with the intent to commit a felony therein, shall be guilty of burglary in the second degree, and upon conviction shall be imprisoned not less than (2) two nor more than (5) five years * * *'
The appellant appearing in person and through counsel, waived trial by jury and the cause was submitted to trial by the court. The appellant was adjudged guilty as charged in the affidavit. Appellant's Motion for New Trial was overruled which brings about this appeal. The appellant urges two grounds for reversal: 1) The verdict of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence. 2) The verdict of the court is contrary to law. In this case these allegations raise substantially the same questions. The appellant in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is alleging that the state has failed to prove two necessary elements of the crime of Second Degree Burglary, those elements being the 'breaking' and the 'intent to commit a felony therein'.
In reviewing these allegations this court will not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility, but will look to that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom which support the verdict of the trial court. Glover v. State (1970), Ind., 255 N.E.2d 657. The conviction will be affirmed if from that viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Fair v. State, (1969), Ind., 250 N.E.2d 744.
A fair statement of the evidence reveals that at approximately 4:30 a.m. on the morning of June 21, 1968, Indianapolis Police Officers Milligan and Thomas were sitting in an unmarked police car at the corner of Twentieth and New Jersey in Indianapolis, Indiana. They saw a 1967 Ford, Four-Door Hardtop Automobile, later shown to be owned by one Glassburn, park on the west side of New Jersey and then saw Glassburn and two women get out of the car and go into a house. Immediately thereafter the appellant got out of a car parked directly across the street and went up to Glassburn's car and began to pry on the window. He was seen to have inserted something between the front and rear windows on the driver's side of the car. The appellant then opened the door on the same side and got into the car. The officers approached the car and found the appellant lying across the front seat with his right hand in the glove compartment. They observed a yellow-handled screwdriver and a flashlight lying on the floorboard, and papers and a map...
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Smith v. State
...door or raising an unlocked window can constitute a "breaking." See, Willard v. State, (1980) Ind., 400 N.E.2d 151; Word v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 542, 261 N.E.2d 225; Davis v. State, (1968) 251 Ind. 133, 239 N.E.2d 601. However, he asserts in this case the record does not show he walked th......
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Estep v. State
...Whether or not the intended felony is accomplished is immaterial. Combs v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 294, 295 N.E.2d 366; Word v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 542, 261 N.E.2d 225. ISSUE On re-direct examination of its witness, Phillip Beeks an accomplice of the defendant, the state was permitted to ......
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A Person Under Eighteen Years Of Age. K.O. v. State Of Utah
...a vehicle unlocked in a private driveway makes it “open to the public” so that entering it cannot be unlawful. Cf. Word v. State, 254 Ind. 542, 261 N.E.2d 225, 227 (1970) (applying the common law “breaking and entering” element, which connotes a more forceful means of intrusion than Utah's ......
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Chappell v. State
...a theft. This intent can be proved even if no actual theft was completed. Shropshire v. State (1971), Ind.,279 N.E.2d 219; Word v. State (1970), Ind., 261 N.E.2d 225. The evidence that showed appellant broke and entered with intent to commit a theft was as Officer Harry Martin, West Lafayet......