Work v. State of Louisiana

• Decision Date: 23 November 1925
• Docket Number: No. 5,5
• Citation: 269 U.S. 250,46 S.Ct. 92,70 L.Ed. 259
• Parties: WORK, Secretary of the Interior, v. STATE OF LOUISIANA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

269 U.S. 250

46 S.Ct. 92

70 L.Ed. 259

WORK, Secretary of the Interior,

v STATE OF LOUISIANA.

No. 5.

Argued Oct. 6, 1925.

Decided Nov. 23, 1925.

Mr. Harry L. Underwood, of Washington, D. C., and the Attorney General, for appellant.

Messrs. S. L. Herold, of Shreveport, La., and F. W. Clements, of Washington, D. C., for the State of Louisiana.

Mr. Justice SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit in equity brought by the State of Louisiana against the Secretary of the Interior in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, seeking a restraining order and mandatory injunction relating to its prosecution of a swamp land claim under the Acts of March 2, 1849, c. 87, 9 Stat. 352, and September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519. A motion by the Secretary to dismiss the bill was overruled; and upon his election to plead no further, a decree was entered awarding an injunction. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District. Fall v. Louisiana 53 App. D. C. 22, 287 F. 999.¹ This appeal was allowed in April, 1923.

By the Act of 1849 (sections 1, 2), there was 'granted' to the State of Louisiana, to aid it in the reclamation of the swamp and overflowed lands therein, 'the whole of those swamp and overflowed lands,² which may be or are found unfit for cultivation'; and it was provided that, upon the request of the Governor, the Secretary of the Treasury (afterwards the Secretary of the Interior³) should cause an examination of all such lands to be made by deputies of the surveyor general: 'a list of the same to be made out, and certified by the deputies and surveyor general, to the Secretary, * * * who shall approve the same, so far as they are not claimed or held by individuals; and on that approval, the fee simple to said lands shall vest in the said State.'

By the Act of 1850 (sections 1, 2, 4) there was 'granted' to the State of Arkansas, for a like purpose, 'the whole of those swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation,' which then remained unsold; and it was provided that the Secretary of the Interior should make out and transmit to the Governor accurate lists and plats of such lands 'and, at the request of said Governor, cause a patent to be issued to the State therefor; and on that patent, that fee simple to said lands shall vest in the said State.' It was further provided that 'the provisions of this Act be extended to, and their benefits be conferred upon, each of the other States of the Union in which such swamp and overflowed lands * * * may be situated.' The general provisions of this Act were carried into section 2479 et seq., of the Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 4958 et seq.).

We assume, without deciding, that, in accordance with the practice of the Land Department, the claims of Louisiana to the swamp and overflowed lands may be allowed under either the special Act of 1849 or the general Act of 1850. See Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U. S. 70, 76, 29 S. Ct. 31, 53 L. Ed. 92; Cross Lake Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632, 635, 32 S. Ct. 577, 56 L. Ed. 924.

The material facts shown by the bill and exhibits are: The lands in question, with others, were surveyed in 1871 by a deputy surveyor general. They were identified and returned as swamp and overflowed lands by his plat of survey, which was filed and approved by the Surveyor General. At that time they were not known to contain minerals of any character. In 1901 the register of the state land office requested that they be listed and approved to the State as swamp lands. Various homestead entries were thereafter made in the local Land Office; some, if not all, of which were allowed, subject to the swamp land claim of the State. In 1910 they were included in a Petroleum Withdrawal made by a Presidential order under the Pickett Act.⁴ Finally, in 1919, after various intermediate proceedings, the Commissioner of the General Land Office, in an administrative decision, 'found from the field notes of the survey of 1871 that the lands * * * are swamp or overflowed, and, if nonmineral in character, inure to the State under its grant, and may be patented pursuant thereto when the record has been cleared of adverse claims.' And he thereupon ruled that unless the State should, within a specified time, apply for a hearing-in which the homestead entrymen might participate-and show that the lands were non-oil and non-gas in character, its claim would be rejected and the lands held for disposition under the public land laws. On an appeal by the State, the Secretary affirmed this decision; and he later denied a motion by the State for a re-hearing the grounds of his decision being that mineral lands did not inure to the State under the swamp land grants; that the mineral character of land claimed as swamp and overflowed was open to investigation until the inchoate title of the State had been perfected by the Secretary's approval under the Act of 1849 or the issue of a patent under the Act of 1850; that these lands had been impressed with a prima facie mineral character by the petroleum withdrawal; and that the State had been accorded due opportunity to show that they were not mineral bearing, failing in which its claim must stand rejected. 48 Land Dec. 201, 203.

The bill, which was then filed, alleged that the Secretary had exceeded his authority and jurisdiction in making the unlawful requirement imposing upon the State the burden of showing that the lands had no minerals and denying its right to them because it had not undertaken to discharge the burden thus illegally put upon it; and prayed that he be enjoined from taking further action in enforcement of this ruling and be required to vacate and set it aside.

1. It is urged that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the bill, upon the grounds that it was prematurely brought, before the Secretary had exercised his jurisdiction to determine the character of the lands and while the claim was still in the process of administration; and that both the United States and the homestead entrymen were necessary and indispensable parties. These objections are based upon a misconception of the purpose of the suit. It is not one to establish the tile of the State, as in Louisiana v. Garfield, supra, and New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U. S. 52, 37 S. Ct. 348, 61 L. Ed. 588, nor one to quiet its title, as in Minnesota v. Lane, 247 U. S. 243, 38 S. Ct. 508, 62 L. Ed. 1098. The bill does not seek an adjudication that the lands were swamp and overflowed lands or to restrain the Secretary from hearing and determining this question but merely seeks an adjudication of the right of the State to have this question determined without reference to their mineral character, and to require the Secretary to set aside the order requiring it to establish their nonmineral character or suffer the rejection of its claim. In short, it is merely a suit to restrain the Secretary from rejecting its claim, independently of the merits otherwise, upon an unauthorized ruling of law illegally requiring it, as a condition precedent, to show that the lands are not mineral in character.

It is clear that if this order exceeds the authority conferred upon the Secretary by law and is an illegal act done under color of his office, he may be enjoined from carrying it into effect. Noble v. Union River Railroad, 147 U. S. 165, 171, 172, 13 S. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123; Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U. S. 249, 261, 262, 29 S. Ct. 62, 53 L. Ed. 168; Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525, 540, 34 S. Ct. 965, 58 L. Ed. 1440; Payne v. Central Pacific Railway, 255 U. S. 228, 238, 41 S. Ct. 314, 65 L. Ed. 598; Santa Fe Pacific Railroad v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197, 199, 42 S. Ct. 466, 66 L. Ed. 896; Colorado v. Toll, 268 U. S. 228, 230, 45 S. Ct. 505, 69 L. Ed. 927. A suit for such purposes is not one against the United States, even though it still retains the legal title to the lands, and it is not an indispensable party. Garfield v. Goldsby, supra, pages 260, 262 (29 S. Ct. 62); Lane v. Watts, supra, page 540 (34 S. Ct. 965). Neither are the homestead entrymen indispensable parties. Lane v. Watts, supra, pages 537, 540 (34 S. Ct. 965). In this latter respect the cases of Litchfield v. The Register, 9 Wall. 575 (19 L. Ed. 681), in which it was sought to enjoin the Department from acting upon pending applications to prove pre-emption rights to the land, New Mexico v. Lane, supra, in which it was sought to set aside an entry made by one who had purchased and paid for the land and to enjoin the issuing of a patent to him, and Brady v. Work, 263 U. S. 435, 44 S. Ct. 168, 68 L. Ed. 375, in which it was sought to enjoin the issuing of a patent to a person to whom the Department had adjudged the right to the land, are clearly distinguishable.

2. This brings us, on the merits, to the consideration of the question whether the order exceeded the authority conferred upon the Secretary, and attached to the prosecution of the claim of the State, without warrant of law, the condition that it must show that the lands are not mineral in character.

The grants of swamp lands made by the Acts of 1849 and 1950 were in praesenti and gave the States an inchoate title to such lands that became perfect, as of the dates of the Acts, when they had been identified as required and the legal title had passed by the approval of the Secretary under the Act of 1849 or the issuing of a patent under the Act of 1850. This has long been the settled construction of the Act of 1850. Rogers Locomotive Works v. Emigrant Co., 164 U. S. 559, 570, 17 S. Ct. 188, 41 L. Ed. 552; Little v. Williams, 231 U. S. 335, 339, 34 S. Ct. 68, 58 L. Ed. 256.

Each of these Acts made a broad and unrestricted grant of the swamp lands. Neither contained any exception or reservation of mineral lands.

It is urged that such a reservation should be read into the grants by reason of a settled policy of the United States of withholding mineral lands from disposal save under laws specially including...