Workman v. Goldford
| Decision Date | 16 June 1967 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 66--56 |
| Citation | 86 Ill.App.2d 403,230 N.E.2d 574 |
| Parties | Olga WORKMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dave GOLDFORD, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Wagner, Conner, Ferguson, Bertrand & Baker, East St. Louis, John B. Gunn, East St. Louis, of counsel, for appellant.
Jones, Ottesen & Fleming, Belleville, Robert A. Hayes and Patrick J. Fleming, Belleville, of counsel, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois, in favor of the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries.
The evidence indicates that the plaintiff, Olga Workman, slipped and fell as she was leaving the apartment building in which she and her husband were renting an apartment. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant-lessor negligently failed to keep the common hall-way leading to the front door lighted properly and that, as a result of his failure, she fell, sustaining the injuries for which suit was brought. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and answered a special interrogatory, finding that she was free from contributory negligence. The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict after denying the defendant's post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
With regard to the liability aspects of this case, the defendant's sole contention is that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In the alternative, he contends that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial, since there was an unauthorized communication between the bailiff and the jury.
The plaintiff testified that on the evening the accident occurred, she left her apartment to take her dog outside; that the dog went down the stairs ahead of her; that the stairs and the hallway were not lighted; that when she arrived at the bottom of the stairs, she did not see the dog; that she could see the glass front door since there was a gleam from a wash house at the rear end of the the hallway; that she pushed open the front door with both hands; that she could not see anything on the surface of the porch; and that she then stepped out with her right foot, took a step with her left foot, started to slide, and fell.
The defendant argues that the plaintiff knew the stairs and hallway were not lighted and failed to take any light with her; that she knew the porch surface was wet with drizzle and was icy; that she did not hold onto the grab bar on the front door; and that since she had lived in the building for seven months, she should have been thoroughly familiar with the area.
The question of contributory negligence ordinarily and preeminently presents a question of fact. It can become a question of law only when from the undisputed facts, all reasonable minds, in the exercise of fair and honest judgment, would be compelled to reach the conclusion that there was contributory negligence. (Lasko v. Meier, 394 Ill. 71, 67 N.E.2d 162; Jines v. Greyhound Corp., 33 Ill.2d 83, 210 N.E.2d 562; Simaitis v. Thrash, 25 Ill.App.2d 340, 166 N.E.2d 306.) After a review of all the testimony, we do not believe that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because of an improper communication between the bailiff and a juror. The testimony of the bailiff, adduced in support of the defendant's post trial motion, reveals that the members of the jury 'had (the bailiff) come up and they said 'we have got everything all figured out, the one part is finished, but we are a little confused on the other,' and the foreman did say 'come on in, we're all finished"; that a woman member of the jury then followed him outside and asked something to the effect whether 'the jury could sign the special interrogatory 'yes' and still...
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