Workman v. Guthrie
| Decision Date | 01 January 1857 |
| Parties | Workman versus Guthrie. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
S. P. Johnson, for defendant in error.
In considering this case it is very material to bear constantly in mind that the legal title to the premises in controversy was never in the plaintiffs.
James Hannegan, in whom the title had vested, entered into articles of agreement on the 4th of June, 1831, for the sale of it to Samuel Walters, who, on the 10th of September, 1832, assigned the articles to the plaintiffs and their brother, Edmund Workman, as tenants in common, in consideration of $700. Walters paid Hannegan, and the Workmans paid Walters the stipulated purchase-money, and full possession of the land was delivered to the Workmans; but still the legal title remained in Hannegan until the 19th of August, 1847, when he conveyed it to John M. Fleming, who conveyed it, the 25th October, 1848, to the defendant, James W. Guthrie. It is an undisputed fact in the case that Guthrie obtained peaceable possession of the land under a conveyance from Edmund, which was a valid title to an undivided third part.
This action of ejectment, therefore, is to be regarded as a bill in equity by two tenants in common of an equitable estate, out of possession, praying for a decree against their co-tenant in lawful and exclusive possession, and clothed with the legal title, that he be compelled to convey to them that legal title to two undivided thirds of the estate, and admit them to the possession in common with himself.
Their right to have the relief they seek depends on the application of legal and equitable principles, not only to the case they present, but to the facts put in evidence by the defendant; and as these facts are not, all of them, common to both plaintiffs, it will be convenient to consider the rights of the respective plaintiffs separately.
And first, of William B. Workman. By virtue of Walter's assignment of the articles of agreement with Hannegan, William B. Workman became entitled to have, on payment of the purchase-money, the legal title to a third of the land; and whilst he was in possession under those articles, the purchase-money being paid, equity would consider that as done which ought to be done, and would treat him, as against all parties not having a superior equity, as the absolute owner of the legal, as well as equitable estate: Moody v. Vandike, 4 Binn. 41; Vincent v. Huff, 4 S. & R. 301.
But it was alleged, and evidence was given tending to show that William grew tired of the lumbering business, expressed his intention and desire to sell the property, and, in connexion with his brother Edmund, sought a purchaser with a view of saving it from sacrifice at an impending sheriff's sale. The defendant insists that he was induced to purchase as well by William as Edmund; and that, at their joint solicitation, he paid off the judgments against them, which were threatening to sell the property; that they both concurred in putting him in possession; and that the deed executed by Edmund, as well as the order on Hannegan to convey the title, were made in the name of William by his authority in writing; and if they were not so executed, they were ratified and confirmed by his subsequent acts and declarations. The third and fourth points submitted by the defendant present a strong case against the equitable relief sought by William. There was evidence to sustain the facts assumed in these points, and, under the charge of the court, we are to regard the verdict as establishing the facts.
It is apparent, then, that William's equities, so far as they resulted from his taking possession and paying the purchase-money to Walters, were lost when he surrendered the possession to Guthrie as a purchaser, and permitted him to pay off the judgments of Wilson and Barber, and of William H. Lowry. These judgments were against both the brothers, and bound their entire interest in the land. Execution was out, and the sheriff under orders to sell. "William told me," says the witness Andrews, According to Mix, whose credibility, though questioned, was for the jury, How completely William concurred in putting Guthrie in possession, is shown by his advising him to retain Andrews at the mill, who "would do as well as anybody he could get."
Now if it be conceded that there was no competent evidence of William's authority to Edmund to execute a deed in his name, and no sufficient ratification of the conveyance made by Edmund, yet it is a principle of equity that if a man having a title to an estate which is offered for sale, and knowing his title, stands by and encourages the sale, or does not forbid it; and thereby another person is induced to purchase the estate under the supposition that the title is good, the former so standing by and being silent, shall be bound by the sale; and neither he nor his privies shall be at liberty to dispute the validity of the purchase: Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. R. 166; 1 Story's Equity, pl. 385.
It is a maxim of the civil law, Semper, qui non prohibet pro se intervenire, mandare creditur.
As this case was put to the jury, it is abundantly established that William encouraged and concurred in the sale to Guthrie, and that he had knowledge of Edmund's conveyance. Be it that the deed was not so executed as to bind him as a deed; be it, if you please, that no deed whatever was executed; what standing would William still have in a court of equity? Releasing by parol his equities to the holder of the legal title — obtaining a valuable consideration, so timely paid as to avert a sheriff's sale, and of such amount as to save a surplus for himself and brother from the impending wreck — acquiescing for ten years in the defendant's possession thus fairly bought, and suffering him to expend large sums of money in improving the premises without a note of warning or remonstrance, a court of equity is the last place in the world where William should come for relief. Who would have equity must do equity. William cannot be permitted to enjoy the consideration received and to recover the land. It would be a fraud on Guthrie to let the plaintiff recover back premises so well paid for and so extensively improved. It is impossible for a case to be more destitute of merit than William's. Indeed, it is not too much to say that he has no case. Having never acquired the legal title, he is found to have stripped himself of what equities he possessed, and now he is in court without law or equity to sustain him.
But it is complained that the defence rested wholly in parol. The court below, whilst they received and submitted the parol evidence of the defendant, seemed to think it was to be judged by those strict rules which under the statute of frauds and perjuries are applicable to parol transfers of titles; and the argument in this court on the part of the plaintiffs in error, labours under the same impression. The errors assigned, so far as they relate to the ruling that touched William's interest, are all based on the assumption that unless the defendant made out such a case as would be sufficient to ground a decree in his favour, William must recover his undivided third.
It was to point out the fallacy of these views that I was at the pains of stating so precisely the relative positions of the parties before the court. The defendant is asking for no relief. In possession under the legal title — enjoying all he claims — he brings forward his parol proofs, not to ground a decree in his favour, but simply to rebut the equity set up by the plaintiffs. The question in the cause, therefore, is not whether a chancellor would upon such proofs decree a conveyance to Guthrie, but whether such evidence would restrain him from decreeing a conveyance to William. There is a plain distinction taken in the books between the effect of parol evidence when set up to support and when to bar an equity. The leading case is Gorman v. Salisbury, 1 Vernon 239, where the single point was whether an agreement in writing, made since the statute of frauds and perjuries, might be discharged by parol. The Lord Keeper held it might, and therefore dismissed the bill, which was brought to have the agreement executed in specie.
Sir Edward Sugden states the rule in these words: "When equity is called upon to exercise its peculiar jurisdiction, by decreeing a specific performance, the party to be charged is to be let in to show that under the circumstances the plaintiff is not entitled to have the agreement specifically performed." Among the authorities he quotes, is Lord REDESDALE'S criticism on the statute of frauds and perjuries, in 1 Scho. & Lef. R. 39, that it, the statute, does not say a written agreement shall bind, but that an unwritten agreement shall not bind: Sugden on Vendors 164, et seq. At page 176 this author enters into a critical analysis of several cases on the question of a parol discharge of written agreements, and concludes by saying (p. 180) that whether an absolute parol discharge of a written agreement, not followed by any other agreement upon which the parties have...
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