Workman v. United States

• Decision Date: 29 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 18-CF-1218,18-CF-1218
• Parties: Quinton WORKMAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

255 A.3d 971

Quinton WORKMAN, Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 18-CF-1218

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 13, 2021

Decided July 29, 2021

William Collins, Public Defender Service, with whom Samia Fam and Jaclyn S. Frankfurt, Public Defender Service, were on the briefs, for appellant.

Ann M. Carroll, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Michael Sherwin, Acting United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth Trosman and John P. Mannarino, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Glickman, Thompson, and McLeese, Associate Judges.

McLeese, Associate Judge:

Appellant Quinton Workman challenges his convictions for firearm offenses, arguing that the trial court erroneously permitted the United States to prosecute him on a second indictment after the first indictment was dismissed without prejudice. We affirm.

I.

Except as indicated, the following appears to be undisputed. Police officers arrested Mr. Workman in October 2015 and charged him with offenses including unlawful possession of a firearm. The police swabbed both the firearm and Mr. Workman's cheek for DNA. Mr. Workman was preventively detained in this case pending trial, and he also was detained in a separate case in which he had been on parole at the time of his arrest in this case.

Mr. Workman's trial was initially scheduled for early March 2016, but the originally assigned prosecutor did not submit the DNA evidence for testing until early February 2016. A newly assigned prosecutor requested a continuance to complete DNA testing, but the trial court denied that request. The prosecutor asked the lab to expedite the DNA testing. Two days before the scheduled trial date, the prosecutor received the DNA results and turned them over to the defense. Mr. Workman filed a motion to exclude the DNA results on the ground that the United States had failed to disclose the DNA results to Mr. Workman in a timely manner.

At a hearing on the scheduled trial date, the prosecutor stated that the United States was ready to proceed, with the caveat that some property would arrive later that day. The trial court granted the motion to exclude the DNA evidence, because Mr. Workman would be unduly prejudiced by having to choose "between remaining detained and securing an expert to look at the government's analysis or going forward to trial without being prepared to meet the expert's testimony."

Following that evidentiary ruling, the trial court asked if the United States remained ready to proceed. The prosecutor indicated that the United States was no longer ready to proceed, "because of the lack of property and because of the DNA evidence not being introduced." At the trial court's invitation, defense counsel moved to dismiss the case for want of prosecution. Defense counsel did not ask that the dismissal be with prejudice, which would have barred further prosecution.

United States v. Stephenson , 891 A.2d 1076, 1082 (D.C. 2006). To the contrary, defense counsel appeared to acknowledge that Mr. Workman would likely be reindicted, stating, "I do think the government is announcing not ready to circumvent the Court's order precluding the expert testimony." The trial court dismissed the indictment without prejudice, and defense counsel said, "Thank you, Your Honor." After the dismissal, Mr. Workman was released in the present case, but he initially remained in detention in his other case pending resolution of his parole status. He was later released in the other case.

After the United States reindicted Mr. Workman, Mr. Workman filed a motion to dismiss the second indictment with prejudice, arguing that the United States was harassing him by circumventing the trial court's orders denying a continuance and excluding the DNA evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court explained that, at the time of the original dismissal without prejudice, the United States had the DNA evidence in hand, but the trial court had determined that it would be unduly prejudicial to continue to hold Mr. Workman and require him to choose between a delay in the trial or proceeding to trial without adequate time to respond to the DNA evidence. The trial court further found that the United States had not acted in bad faith. The trial court also noted that the consequence of its initial dismissal had been that Mr. Workman was released in the present case. When defense counsel pointed out that Mr. Workman had initially remained detained in the parole matter, the trial court stated that it had no control over the parole matter.

At trial, the United States introduced evidence that Mr. Workman was stopped for driving a car with stolen tags; that a revolver was in the car's center console; that Mr. Workman could not be excluded as a source of DNA on the revolver; and that the chance of randomly selecting an unrelated person who could not be so excluded was at most one in twenty-two quintillion. The parties stipulated that Mr. Workman had a prior conviction for an offense punishable by more than a year of imprisonment, did not have a license to carry a pistol in the District of Columbia, and had no valid firearm registration in the District of Columbia. The jury found Mr. Workman guilty of two firearm offenses.

II.

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 48(a)(2) requires leave of the court before the government may dismiss an indictment. Relying on that provision, Mr. Workman argues that the trial court erred in allowing the United States to prosecute him under the second indictment. The United States argues, however, that Rule 48(a)(2) does not apply, because that rule applies to government motions to dismiss, and this case involves defense motions to dismiss. Mr. Workman responds by arguing that the United States failed to preserve this point in the trial court and that, in any event, the United States in effect moved to dismiss on the original trial date, by declaring that it was not ready to proceed with trial. We need not decide the latter two issues. Instead, we assume without deciding that this case is governed by Rule 48(a)(2). We similarly assume that Mr. Workman adequately preserved an objection in the trial court, although Mr. Workman moved for dismissal of the original indictment without explicitly asking that the dismissal be with prejudice and did not explicitly object at the time to dismissal without prejudice.

Given those assumptions, it appears to be undisputed that we review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion. Cf., e.g. , Rinaldi v. United States , 434 U.S. 22, 32, 98 S.Ct. 81, 54 L.Ed.2d 207 (1977) (per curiam) (reviewing trial-court ruling under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) for abuse of discretion); Martin v. Santorini Cap., LLC , 236 A.3d 386, 393 n.3 (D.C. 2020) (when interpreting local rule, court looks to federal decisions interpreting similar federal rule for guidance); Ferrell v. United States , 990 A.2d 1015, 1020 n.4 (D.C. 2010) (relying on federal cases interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a), because "federal Rule 48(a) functions in a manner similar to our local rule"). We see no abuse of discretion in this case.

As previously noted, Rule 48(a)(2) permits the government to dismiss an indictment with leave of the court. "Such a dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise stated." Super. Ct. Crim. R. 48(a)(2). Ordinarily, the government can reindict the defendant after a dismissal without prejudice. E.g. , United States v. Hector , 298 A.2d 504, 504-05 (D.C. 1972). The trial court has the responsibility, however, to prevent dismissals without prejudice and subsequent reindictments that constitute "harassment" of a defendant. United States v. Kennedy , 220 A.2d 322, 323 (D.C. 1966) ; see also, e.g. , 3B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 801 (4th ed. 2021) (under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a), trial court should deny motion to dismiss without prejudice if motion is made for "improper purpose, such as harassment of the defendant").

A.

Mr. Workman argues for a flat rule that the government engages in impermissible harassment any time it dismisses an indictment in the hope of later reindicting the defendant under more favorable circumstances. There is support for that view. See, e.g. , United States v. Pitts , 331 F.R.D. 199, 204 (D.D.C. 2019) ("[T]he government is not free to indict, dismiss, and reindict solely to achieve a more favorable prosecutorial posture."); cf. Kennedy , 220 A.2d at 323 (stating generally that "[t]he purpose of Rule 48(a) was to prevent the harassment of a defendant caused by charging, dismissing and recharging him without placing him in jeopardy"). For several reasons, however, we conclude that the flat rule advocated by Mr. Workman would be both unwarranted and contrary to the weight of authority.

First, as a textual matter, Rule 48(a)(2) provides that dismissals on a government motion will be without prejudice unless the trial court states otherwise. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 48(a)(2) ("Such a dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise stated."). That default seems incompatible with Mr. Workman's position that the government is flatly barred from dismissing a case without prejudice in the hope of possibly resuming prosecution later under more favorable circumstances.

Second, it therefore should not be surprising that decisions of this court and many other courts have frequently used much narrower language when describing the kinds of government dismissals that should be prohibited under Rule 48(a). See, e.g. , Ferrell , 990 A.2d at 1015 n.4 (citing with approval case explaining that "the principal purpose of the leave of court requirement of Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) is to protect a defendant from the government's harassing him by repeatedly filing charges and then dismissing them before they are adjudicated") (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted); District of Columbia v. Weams , 208 A.2d 617, 618 (D.C. 1965) (prosecutor may not dismiss...