World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig. Angel Avila v. Professionals, Docket: 21-mc-102
| Decision Date | 08 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 07-cv-00060,Case Number: 06-cv-01521,Docket: 21-mc-102,Case Number: 06-cv-05285,Case Number: 06-cv-01520,Case Number: 09-CV-00680,Case Number: 07-cv-05283,Case Number: 07-cv-04459,Case Number: 07-cv-01588 |
| Parties | IN RE WORLD TRADE CENTER LOWER MANHATTAN DISASTER SITE LITIGATION ANGEL AVILA and AMMSY AVILA, Plaintiffs, v. ABATEMENT PROFESSIONALS, ET AL., Defendants. RODRIGO CAMPOZANO and ESTHER CAMPOZANO, Plaintiffs, v. 110 CHURCH STREET, ET AL., Defendants. ANDRZEJ CHOJNOWSKI and BOZEMA CHOJNOWSKI, Plaintiffs, v. 110 CHURCH STREET, ET AL., Defendants. MIECZYSLAW DABROWSKI and AGATA DABROWSKI, Plaintiffs, v. 160 WATER STREET, INC., ET AL., Defendants. TADEUSZ KOWALEWSKI and BEATA KOWALEWSKI, Plaintiffs, v. DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS, ET AL., Defendants. JERZY MUSZKATEL, Plaintiff, v. 90 CHURCH STREET LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL., Defendants. WALDEMAR ROPEL and KRYSTYNA ROPEL, Plaintiffs, v. 233 BROADWAY OWNERS LLC, ET AL., Defendants. MAREK SOCHA and HALINE SOCHA, Plaintiffs, v. 110 CHURCH LLC, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING BATTERY PARK CITY AUTHORITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING COMPLAINTS
The eight Plaintiffs identified in the captions sued Battery Park City Authority ("BPCA") to recover damages for injuries they incurred in cleaning up the toxic dust resulting from the collapse on September 11, 2001 of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. Plaintiffs allege that they worked in buildings located on land owned by BPCA, and that BPCA is liable to them for negligence and for violations of sections 200 and 241(6) of the New York Labor Law.
Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed on July 29, 2009, and thereafter, for failure to serve notices of claim within the statutorily required time. Subsequently, the New York State legislature passed legislation, commonly referred to as "Jimmy Nolan's Law," which revived the time-barred claims against BPCA, and provided an additional year within which to file notices of claim as prelude to suit. The eight plaintiffs each took advantage of the new law, and sued BPCA again. BPCA moves for summary judgment to dismiss the eight lawsuits, arguing that Jimmy Nolan's Law violates the New York State Constitution. The New York State Attorney General's Office intervened and filed a brief in defense of the law, after due notice provided to him.
BPCA's motion is granted. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, Jimmy Nolan's law is unconstitutional as applied to BPCA.
The New York State Legislature established BPCA in 1968 as a public benefit corporation. Its purpose was to eliminate urban blight in Manhattan's lower west side and,specifically, the "substandard, insanitary, deteriorated and deteriorating conditions" of its housing. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1971 (McKinney's 2014); see also N.Y. Gen. Constr. Law § 66(4) (McKinney's 2014) (defining a "public benefit corporation" as a "corporation organized to construct or operate a public improvement"). The Legislature charged BPCA with developing low-income housing and carrying out the "clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of such substandard and insanitary areas." N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1971 (McKinney's 2014). The Legislature gave BPCA the power "to sue and be sued," and authorized it to raise money through the issuance of bonds to the "private investing public." Id. §§ 1971, 1974. BPCA is solely responsible for repayment of its bond obligations and neither the City of New York nor the State incurs any liability on such obligations. See N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1979 (McKinney's 2014) ("The bonds, notes and other obligations of the authority shall not be a debt of the state of New York or of the city, and neither the state nor the city shall be liable thereon, nor shall they be payable out of any funds other than those of the authority."). Pursuant to revenue-sharing agreements with the City and the State of New York, BPCA remits portions of rent-generated revenue to the City and State. See, e.g., Hugh L. Carey Battery Park City Authority, Financial Statements: April 30, 2014 and 2013 (Unaudited) at 48 (Aug. 5, 2014), available at http://www.batteryparkcity.org/new/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2014-April-30-and-2013-Financial-Statements.pdf.
Plaintiffs originally filed their lawsuits against BPCA between 2006 and 2009. Under New York law, as a condition precedent to filing suit, Plaintiffs were required to serve BPCA with notice of their claims within 90 days after their claims had accrued. See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(1)(a) (McKinney's 2014); N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1984 (McKinney's 2014).
Plaintiffs failed to file timely notices of claim. As a result, by Order dated July 29, 2009, I dismissed five of their complaints.1 See Summary Order Regarding City Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Battery Park City Authority's Motion to Dismiss, 21-mc-102, ECF No. 3462 (July 29, 2009). For various reasons, BPCA did not move to dismiss the actions commenced by Socha, Muszkatel, and Ropel, prior to the instant motion, for failure to file timely notice of claim.2
On September 16, 2009, the New York Legislature enacted Jimmy Nolan's Law, which amended section 50-1 of the New York General Municipal Law to provide:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, including any other subdivision of this section, section fifty-e of this article, . . . any cause of action against a public corporation for personal injuries suffered by a participant in World Trade Center rescue, recovery or cleanup operations as a result of such participation which is barred as of the effective date of this subdivision because the applicable period of limitation has expired is hereby revived, and a claim thereon may be filed and served and prosecuted provided such claim is filed and served within one year of the effective date of this subdivision.
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-i(4)(a) (McKinney's 2014). The bill sponsors stated that the recovery workers "should not be denied their rights to seek just compensation simply because they were provided incorrect information about their work conditions, did not immediately recognize the causal connection between their injuries and their exposure, or were unaware of the applicable time limitations." N.Y. State Assembly Mem. Supp. Legislation, reprinted in Bill Jacket for 2009 A.B. 7122, Ch. 440, at 6 (July 17, 2009). The legislation passed without opposition, and Plaintiffs subsequently served notices of claim on BPCA within the enlarged allotted time. BPCA nowmoves for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims on the ground that Jimmy Nolan's Law violated its due process rights guaranteed by the New York State Constitution.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Overton v. N.Y. State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 373 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2004), and must "resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought," Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 391 F.3d at 83.
Plaintiffs who wish to sue public defendants, including public benefit corporations such as BPCA, must serve such defendants with a notice of claim within 90 days of the accrual of their claims. See N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1984 (McKinney's 2014); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(1) (McKinney's 2014). At the time Plaintiffs' claims accrued, they were required to commence their lawsuit within three years of accrual. See L. 1990, c. 804, § 72 (eff. Aug. 24, 1990) (providing no abbreviated limitations period within which commencement of suit required).3 The accrual date, generally, is the date a plaintiff's injury occurred. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney's 2014); Snyder v. Town Insulation, 81 N.Y.2d 429, 432-33 (1993). However, if a claim arises from thelatent effects of exposure to a harmful substance, the claim accrues, not when the injury occurred, but "on the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or on the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence the injury should have been discovered, whichever is earlier." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c(3) (McKinney's 2014) (emphasis added). Upon timely motion, a court "may extend the time to serve a notice of claim." N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(5) (McKinney's 2014). If not extended, failure to serve a timely notice of claim, or timely seek leave to serve a late notice of claim, requires dismissal of a plaintiff's claims. See 423 S. Salina Street, Inc. v. City of Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 494 (1986).
None of the eight Plaintiffs served a timely notice of claim on BPCA prior to filing their original actions.4 It is not disputed that absent revival of Plaintiffs' claims by Jimmy Nolan's Law, the claims would be barred for failure to serve timely notices of claim. Accordingly, the viability of Plaintiffs' actions turns on the constitutionality of Jimmy Nolan's Law.
The Attorney General argues that BPCA lacks capacity to challenge the constitutionality of Jimmy Nolan's Law. New York follows the traditional rule that "municipalities and other local governmental corporate entities and their officers lack capacity to mount...
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