Worley v. Ewing, Case No. 2:19-cv-00543
| Decision Date | 12 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-00543 |
| Parties | RONNIE WORLEY, Plaintiff, v. DAVID EWING, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending before the court are the Motions to Dismiss filed by defendants David Ewing [ECF No. 32] and Charles Johnston (who was incorrectly identified in the Amended Complaint as "Charles Johnson") [ECF No. 46]. By Standing Order, this matter was referred to the Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings and a recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For reasons appearing to the Court, it is hereby ORDERED that the referral of these motions to the Magistrate Judge is WITHDRAWN and the undersigned will proceed to rule thereon.
This matter is proceeding on the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 12], filed by the plaintiff, Ronnie Worley ("Worley"), on September 25, 2019. According to the Amended Complaint, on January 23, 2019, Worley was strip searched in his cell at the Mount Olive Correctional Complex ("MOCC") by correctional officers David Ewing ("Ewing") and Charles Johnston ("Johnston") prior to being escorted to the medical unit for a pre-segregation assessment. Worley claims that the location of his cell "left him in a direct line of site to the pod officer, the Unit Team office, exterior windows, [and] the front area of the pod" while he was strip searched. [Id. at 6]. When Worley complained that such exposure constituted a violation of the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA"), 34 U.S.C. § 30301 et seq., standards, Ewing allegedly responded, [Id.]
Following the strip search, Ewing and Johnston applied mechanical restraints to Worley's hands behind his back, allegedly without engaging the double-locking mechanism, and then escorted him to the medical unit. [Id. at 7]. Worley alleges that, as they walked down the hallway, Ewing and Johnston made belittling and humiliating comments about him in front of other officers and inmates. [Id.] When Worley told him to "shut up," Ewing allegedly tightened his grip on Worley's right arm and said, "don't tell me to shut up you punk ass bitch." [Id.] Worley states that when he turned his head to ask Ewing why he was using such language, Ewing and Johnston "violently slammed him down into the mud and gravel." [Id. at 7-8].
Worley alleges that his head hit the gravel, cutting his left eyebrow, and causing ringing in his left ear. He further claims that "the defendant C.O.'s [believed to be Ewing] weight was placed on his lower back" causing "long-lasting injury" and that the handcuffs "tightened to the point of numbness in his right hand," which has allegedly continued since that time. [Id. at 8]. Worley alleges that, when he arrived at the medical unit, he attempted to report this incident, but was told to "be quiet andgo to your hearing." [Id.] He further suggests that Ewing and Johnston falsified their subsequent incident reports. [Id. at 6]. His Amended Complaint further states:
The two corrections officers . . . (a) violated the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) standards prior to placing the Plaintiff into custody; (b) verbally abused the Plaintiff; (c) employed unreasonable and excessive force while maintaining custody of the Plaintiff; and (d) composed fraudulent incident reports in an attempt to validate their actions, all in violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Fifth, Eighth, [and] Fourteenth Amendments and the PREA standards.
[Id. at 6].1
The defendants' motions to dismiss assert that, in their official capacities, they are not "persons" who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are further entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Additionally, the defendants contend that the Amended Complaint fails to state any plausible claim upon which relief can be granted against them in their individual capacities and that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Worley's claims against them. Worley responded to each motion [ECF Nos. 40 and 49] and the defendants each filed a reply [ECF Nos. 41 and 50]. The motions are ripe for adjudication.
The defendants' motions are filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or pleading. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). A pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that thepleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). When "faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . courts must . . . accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To achieve facial plausibility, the plaintiff must plead facts allowing the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable, moving the claim beyond the realm of mere possibility. Id. Mere "labels and conclusions" or "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Additionally, "[t]he Fourth Circuit has not resolved whether a motion to dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment is properly considered pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], but the recent trend appears to treat Eleventh Amendment immunity motions under Rule 12(b)(1)." Jeffers v. W. Va. Div. of Corr. & Rehab., No. 3:19-cv-0462, 2020 WL 521851, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 31, 2020), citing Chafin v. W. Reg'l Jail, No. 3:13-cv-01706, 2013 WL 3716673, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. July 12, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Demetres v. East West Constr., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015). A defendant may challenge subject matter jurisdiction facially or factually. See Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). In a facial challenge, a defendant asserts that the allegations, taken as true, are insufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. See id. The court then effectively affords a plaintiff "'the same procedural protection as he would receive under a rule 12(b)(6) consideration," taking the facts as true and denying the Rule 12(b)(1) motion if the complaint "alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). In a factual challenge, a defendant asserts that the jurisdictional allegations are false, and the court may look beyond the complaint to resolve the disputed jurisdictional facts without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192-93.
Mitchell v. Winston-Salem State Univ., No. 1:19-cv-130, 2020 WL 1516537, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2020). Thus, although not specifically pled by the defendants, the court will address their argument for dismissal as a Rule 12(b)(1) facial challenge as well.
The defendants' motions to dismiss further assert that these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on all of Worley's claim against them. Qualified immunity "shields government officials from liability for civil damages provided their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights within the knowledge of a reasonable person." Haze v. Harrison, 961 F.3d 654, 660 (4th Cir. 2020); Meyers v. Baltimore Cty., 713 F.3d 723, 731 (4th Cir. 2013). The following test is used to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity: (1) taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) was that right clearlyestablished such that a reasonable person would have known that their conduct was unlawful. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2017). A defendant is "entitled to a qualified immunity defense so long as 'the law did not put the [defendant] on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful.'" See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
"To determine if the right in question was clearly established, we first look to cases from the Supreme Court, this Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state in which the action arose." Thompson v. Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d 89, 99 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 279 (4th Cir. 2004)). Absent "directly on-point, binding authority," courts may also consider whether "the right was clearly established based on general constitutional principles or a consensus of persuasive authority." Booker, 855 F.3d at 543; Owens, 372 F.3d at 279 () The "nonexistence of a case holding the defendant's identical conduct to be unlawful does not prevent denial of qualified immunity [because] 'qualified immunity was never intended to relieve government officials from the responsibility of applying familiar legal principles...
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