Worley v. United States
| Decision Date | 14 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:15-CR-12 (10),No. 2:15-CV-305,2:15-CR-12 (10),2:15-CV-305 |
| Parties | TERRI LYNN WORLEY, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Petitioner Terri Lynn Worley's pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 293],1 her amended §2255 motion to vacate [Doc. 319], for which she was granted leave to file [Doc. 315], and a proposed second amended § motion to vacate [Doc. 326]. The United States responded in opposition to Petitioner's first two submissions [Docs. 311, 321]. Petitioner replied to the Government's first response [Doc. 314].
The Court finds the materials thus submitted, together with the record of the underlying criminal case, conclusively show that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the claims asserted in her motions. Accordingly, the Court will decide this matter without an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1993). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will find that Petitioner's § 2255 motion and amended § 2255 motions are without merit and, thus, will DENY and DISMISS the motions WITH PREJUDICE.
On February 10, 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Petitioner and nine co-defendants with various offenses [Doc. 3]. Those offenses involved a scheme to file fraudulent federal income tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), using stolen identities and falsely claiming entitlement to refunds [Id.]. For her part in the scheme, Petitioner was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of conversion of money from the United States, and one count of money laundering (Counts 1, 9, 10) [Id.]. On June 11, 2015, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to Count 9, i.e., conversion of money from the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, as charged in the indictment [Doc. 99, Plea Agreement, ¶ 1.a], with the remaining counts to be dismissed at sentencing [Id., Plea Agreement, ¶ 2]. As a factual basis for her pleas, Petitioner stipulated that the offense occurred between January 1, 2008, through March 1, 2012, and to the following additional facts:
Petitioner acknowledged that she had been recruited in the offense by two co-defendants who asked her to provide Social Security numbers, addresses, and other personal identifying information of other individuals so that the co-defendants could prepare and submit false federal income tax returns to the IRS [Id., Plea Agreement, ¶ 4(b)]. Petitioner admitted that she knowing prepared and electronically submitted false federal income tax returns to the IRS and that these returns generated illegitimate federal income tax refunds paid by the Department of the Treasury and electronically transferred to bank accounts at three separate banks (one of which was Bank of America), which Petitioner controlled [Id., Plea Agreement, ¶ 4(c)].
When the funds were deposited to her bank accounts, Petitioner withdrew them in cash and gave the cash to the two co-defendant recruiters and to other persons that they designated, or retained it for herself [Id., Plea Agreement, ¶ 4(d)]. Sometimes, Petitioner also received paymentfor the services she provided in connection with the transactions [Id.]. Petitioner admitted that she knew that the funds involved in an electronic transfer of $ 9,999 to her Bank of America account on October 6, 2010, belonged to the United States and that she knowingly converted those funds to the use of another [Id., Plea Agreement, ¶ 4(e), (f)]. Petitioner stipulated that the offense caused a loss in excess of $120,000, but less than $200,000, and that it involved more than ten victims, but fewer than fifty [Id. Plea Agreement, ¶ 8(b), (c)]. The plea agreement provided that, in exchange for her guilty plea, Petitioner waived her right to file a § 2255 motion or a collateral attack on her conviction or sentence, excluding claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel [Id., Plea Agreement, ¶ 14(b)].
On June 25, 2015, two weeks after entry of the plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to the § 641 money-conversion-charge in Count 9 of the indictment [Doc. 113]. The Court accepted Petitioner's guilty plea and allowed her to remain free on bond [Id.]. Thereafter, the United States Probation Office issued a Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") to assist the Court in sentencing Petitioner [Doc. 173, PSR (sealed)].
Using the amount of loss and the number of victims stipulated in the plea agreement [Id., PSR, ¶ 8(b)(c)], the probation officer who prepared the PSR determined that Petitioner's base offense level was 18 [Id., PSR ¶¶29-31, 35]. A three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility yielded a total offense level of 15, which, along with a criminal history category of II, resulted in an advisory Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months [Id., PSR ¶¶ 33, 44, 58]. However, because Petitioner's bond was revoked based on violation of the conditions of her pretrial release [Doc. 183], the United States moved to deny Petitioner a one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, leaving intact the two-level reduction contained in the PSR [Doc. 195].
The absence of the one-level reduction would increase Petitioner's total offense level to 16. The Court overruled Petitioner's objections to the PSR (, to the probation officer's determination that her criminal history placed her in a category II); granted the government's motion to deny her a one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility; dismissed the remaining counts upon oral motion of the government; and imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment—the lowest sentence in Petitioner's Guidelines range—and a 3-year term of supervised release [Doc. 244 (Judgment); Doc. 245 (Statement of Reasons) (sealed)].
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. Instead, she submitted this pro se § 2255 motion to vacate and two amended pro se motions to vacate [Docs. 293, 319, 326].
To obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner must demonstrate "(1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law . . . so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid." Short v. United States, 471 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003)). To warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because of constitutional error, the error must be one of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (citation omitted) (§ 2254 case); Jefferson v. United States, 730 F.3d 537, 549 (6th Cir. 2013) ().
To warrant relief for a non-constitutional error, petitioner must show a fundamental defect in the proceeding that resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious error that violated due process. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994); Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 828, 831 (6th Cir. 2000). A petitioner "must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would existon direct appeal" to secure collateral relief. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982); Regalado v. United States, 334 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Frady, 456 U.S. at 166).
When a defendant files a § 2255 motion, she must set forth facts which entitle her to relief. Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1972); O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir. 1961). "Conclusions, not substantiated by allegations of fact with some probability of verity, are not sufficient to warrant a hearing." O'Malley, 285 F.2d at 735 (citations omitted). A motion that merely states general conclusions of law without substantiating allegations with facts is without legal merit. Loum v. Underwood, 262 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 1959); United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 167, 171 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
Claims other than those of ineffective assistance of counsel are procedurally defaulted if not raised on direct appeal. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998); Peveler v. United States, 269 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2001). "In the case where the defendant has failed to assert h[er] claims on direct appeal and thus has procedurally defaulted, in order to raise them in a § 2255 motion [s]he also must show either that (1) [s]he had good cause for h[er] failure to raise such arguments and [s]he would suffer prejudice if unable to proceed, or (2) [s]he is actually innocent." Regalado, 334 F.3d at 528; see also Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622-23. The hurdle a petitioner faces to overcome a procedural default is "intentionally high[,]...for respect for the finality of judgments demands that collateral attack generally not be allowed to do service for an appeal." Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882, 884 (6th Cir. 2000).
As noted earlier in this opinion, in paragraph 14(b) in the plea agreement [Doc. 35], Petitioner waived her right to file a motion to vacate, except as to claims of ineffective assistanceand prosecutorial misconduct. It is well recognized that a party may waive a provision intended for her benefit in a contract or statute. Shutte v. Thompson, 82 U.S. 151, 21 L.Ed. 123, 15 Wall. 151 (1872). Even fundamental constitutional rights may be waived, and the waiver is enforceable if it is made knowingly and voluntarily. "[A] defendant's informed and voluntary waiver of the right to collaterally attack a conviction and sentence is enforceable." In re Acosta, 480 F.3d 421, 422 (6th Cir. 2007); accord Davila v. United States, 258 F.3d 448, 450-52 (6th Cir. 2001); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1999). Therefore, if Petitioner understood the terms of the plea agreement and made...
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