Wornick Co. v. Casas, D-1847

• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Writing for the Court: PHILLIPS; HECHT; ENOCH; DOGGETT; GAMMAGE
• Citation: 856 S.W.2d 732
• Parties: 127 Lab.Cas. P 57,575, 8 IER Cases 1058 WORNICK COMPANY, Ron Wornick, Bill Barth, Executive Vice President, Right Away Foods Corporation, Valerie Hutchins Woerner, President, MRE Division, Petitioners, v. Diana CASAS, Respondent.
• Docket Number: No. D-1847,D-1847
• Decision Date: 30 June 1993

Page 732

856 S.W.2d 732 127 Lab.Cas. P 57,575, 8 IER Cases 1058 WORNICK COMPANY, Ron Wornick, Bill Barth, Executive Vice
President, Right Away Foods Corporation, Valerie
Hutchins Woerner, President, MRE
Division, Petitioners,
v.
Diana CASAS, Respondent. No. D-1847. Supreme Court of Texas. June 30, 1993.

Page 733

John E. McFall, Dallas, for petitioners.

Brinkley L. Oxford, Edinburg, for respondent.

OPINION

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice.

The issue presented is whether the manner in which Diana Casas was discharged by her employer constituted "outrageous conduct" necessary to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We hold that the employer's conduct was as a matter of law not outrageous. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, 818 S.W.2d 466, and we render judgment that Casas take nothing.

I

We must determine whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper if the movant establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 675-79 (Tex.1979). A defendant who conclusively negates one of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action is therefore entitled to summary judgment. See Rodriguez v. Naylor Industries, Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.1989). In reviewing a summary judgment, we must accept all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in favor of the non-movant. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Tex.1987).

Under that standard of review, the record reflects the following: Diana Casas was employed by Right Away Foods Corporation ("RAFCO"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Wornick Company, from December 1979 until her discharge on April 22, 1986. Casas was assigned to RAFCO's "M.R.E." (Meals Ready to Eat) division, which assembled military rations for sale to the United States Department of Defense. Casas was hired as personnel manager for the M.R.E. division, and at the time of her discharge served as its director of human resources. Casas' firing was sudden and unexpected. She was approached by her supervisor, Valerie Hutchins Woerner, in the hall at the RAFCO offices at approximately 3:45 p.m. and asked to come to Woerner's office. There, Woerner said that she had some "bad news," that Casas was being terminated. No one else was present at this meeting and the office door was closed. The reasons given by Woerner were that Casas had been disloyal to the company, had exhibited a bad attitude by "snapping at people," and had failed to perform certain assigned tasks. Prior to this time, however, Casas had received favorable job-performance reviews, and she believed that RAFCO fired her to prevent her from revealing information to government auditors concerning unethical practices of RAFCO employees. ¹ Woerner refused Casas' request for further explanation and told her to leave the property immediately. Although Woerner appeared nervous, her demeanor was normal, and she did not raise

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her voice. The entire meeting lasted only about four minutes.

Upon leaving Woerner's office, Casas was approached by a security guard, who explained that he was to escort her off the premises. In the hallway, Casas then saw Bill Barth, president of RAFCO, and asked to speak with him. The two went to Barth's office, where Casas explained what had just happened. Barth's door was closed during this meeting, and the security guard waited outside. Barth did not seem surprised, but he asked whether Casas disputed Woerner's allegations. When Casas replied that she did, Barth advised her not to say or do anything, promising that they would "all" discuss the matter when Barth returned from a trip a few days later. Barth led Casas to believe that she would be on leave of absence, rather than terminated, pending that meeting. Barth was "very pleasant," and Casas' conversation with him lasted no more than ten minutes.

Casas and the security guard then proceeded to Casas' office, where Joe Sepulveda, the security supervisor, was waiting. Sepulveda, who had been on vacation, told Casas that Woerner had called him at home to come escort Casas off the property. Sepulveda was "uneasy" with the situation. He gave her a box in which to pack her belongings. Another person then came to the office and told Sepulveda that Woerner wanted Casas off the property within five minutes. They then walked to Casas' car, with Sepulveda carrying Casas' box. Sepulveda placed the box in the car, and, shortly after 4:30 p.m., Casas drove away. Neither Sepulveda nor the original security guard were rude or offensive in any way. It was standard company procedure for security guards to escort terminated hourly employees off the property, but not terminated salaried employees such as Casas.

Barth did not set up the promised meeting to discuss Casas' termination, and he did not return her phone calls or correspondence. Casas was removed from the payroll soon after her meeting with Woerner, and she was not allowed to return to the company premises.

Casas subsequently sued RAFCO, the Wornick Company, Woerner, Barth, and Ron Wornick, chairman of the board of the Wornick Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as "RAFCO"), alleging 1) a violation of the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a, 2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, 3) wrongful discharge under Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.1985), and 4) breach of an alleged duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from the employment relationship. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court of appeals reversed as to Casas' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but otherwise affirmed the judgment of the trial court. As only RAFCO sought review in this Court, the sole issue before us is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding each element of Casas' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

II

We recently recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, adopting the elements set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1993). To recover under this tort, the plaintiff must prove that 1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, 2) the conduct was "extreme and outrageous," 3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional distress, and 4) the resulting emotional distress was severe. Id. at 621.

We conclude that the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that RAFCO's conduct was not "outrageous," an essential element of the intentional infliction tort. Outrageous conduct is that which "[goes] beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Restatement § 46, cmt. d. "It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery...." Id., cmt. h.

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Subject to certain narrow exceptions, employees in Texas may be terminated at will and without cause. Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex.1985); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888). The trial court and court of appeals rejected Casas' contentions that her firing fell within exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, and Casas has not challenged those findings here. RAFCO therefore acted within its legal rights in discharging Casas. Therefore, the fact of discharge itself as a matter of law cannot constitute outrageous behavior. See Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 462 (6th Cir.1986) (no liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress where an actor does no more than insist on its legal rights).

Casas argues, however, that even if the firing was not outrageous, the manner in which she was fired was outrageous. We have previously observed that there may be instances where a termination is accompanied by outrageous behavior. See Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.1992). In this case, however, the record conclusively establishes that RAFCO's conduct fell short of the...