Woronieki v. Pairskiego

• Decision Date: 20 December 1901
• Citation: 74 Conn. 224,50 A. 562
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WORONIEKI v. PAIRSKIEGO.

50 A. 562

74 Conn. 224

WORONIEKI

v. PAIRSKIEGO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 20, 1901.

Appeal from superior court, Hartford county; William T. Elmer, Judge.

Action by Wienzystaw Woronieki against Pszernienia Pairskiego. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Hugh O'Plaerty and David Kempner, for appellant.

Philip J. Markley and Bernard F. Gaffney, for appellee.

BALDWIN, J. The plaintiff's title to the mortgage in suit rests on two assignments. The first was one from the St. Michael Archangel Society, a corporation, which was the mortgagee, to another corporation, the Trustees of the Parish of the Sacred Heart of Jesus; and the second was one from the latter to the plaintiff. Paragraph 3 of the complaint reads thus: "On the 26th day of July, A. D. 1897, the said St. Michael Archangel Society, for value, by an instrument in writing duly executed, sold, assigned, and transferred all its right, title, and interest in and to said mortgage, and to the said note intended to be secured by said mortgage, unto the Trustees of the Parish of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, a corporation duly organized under the laws of this state, and located in said New Britain, which said instrument or assignment is recorded in New Britain land records in Volume 14, page 17, Manuscript Records." This paragraph was denied by the answer, and the main question is whether under such a general denial the defendant could dispute the due execution or delivery of the first assignment.

By Gen. St. § 874, if a defendant intends "to controvert * * * the execution or delivery of any written instrument * * * sued upon," he is required to "deny the same in his answer specifically." Any written instrument is sued upon, within the meaning of this statute, which is set up in the complaint as a link in the chain of title. The first assignment was so pleaded in paragraph 3, and its execution and delivery were admitted by putting in a general denial of the entire paragraph. This contained averments that the assignment was given for value, and properly recorded, and that the assignee was a corporation duly organized. All these facts were, and, but for the statute, the execution and delivery of the paper also would have been, put in issue by the denial. The defendant was bound to single out and specifically deny the execution and delivery, if it desired to controvert them. To claim that right under a general denial would be to frustrate the object for which the statute was enacted. An admission that a deed purporting to be that of a corporation was duly executed necessarily implies that the natural person or persons who assumed to execute it in behalf of the corporation had due authority for that purpose. The...