Worrell v. Beach

• Decision Date: 29 June 1939
• Docket Number: No. 1435.,1435.
• Citation: Worrell v. Beach, 63 R.I. 95, 7 A.2d 666 (R.I. 1939)
• Parties: WORRELL v. BEACH et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

7 A.2d 666

WORRELL

v. BEACH et al.

No. 1435.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 29, 1939.

Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Mortimer A. Sullivan, Judge.

Petition by Lee A. Worrell, trustee, against Minnie F. Beach and others for directions concerning trustee's actions under a certain trust deed. From a decree directing the trustee regarding his actions under the trust deed, Minnie F. Beach appeals.

Cause remanded to the superior court, with instructions to enter an order, dismissing the petition without prejudice.

Lee A. Worrell, of Providence, pro se.

Edwards & Angell and Elmer E. Tufts, Jr., all of Providence, for John H. Clifford.

Tillinghast, Collins & Tanner and Russell P. Jones, all of Providence, for Rhode Island Hospital Nat. Bank.

William A. Needham and J. Melvin Koppe, both of Providence, for Minnie F. Beach.

FLYNN, Chief Justice.

This proceeding in equity was commenced by the trustee's "petition for directions" concerning his actions under a certain trust deed. It is before us on the appeal of Minnie F. Beach, one of the alleged respondents, from a decree entered by the superior court, granting the prayers of the petition and advising and directing the trustee regarding his actions under the trust deed.

Counsel for the parties have briefed and argued certain allegedly relevant questions of probate law involving the effect, if any, of statutory provisions of limitation on suits upon claims that have been duly filed against estates and have not been disallowed. However, they have overlooked entirely the fundamental question of practice and jurisdiction. The record and papers in the cause show that the trustee merely filed a petition for instructions and directions relative to his actions as trustee under a deed of trust; that no subpoena was prayed for, and that the only process to issue was merely a citation to the alleged respondents. No answer or other pleadings were filed by any of the alleged respondents; and no evidence was introduced in the usual way which is pertinent to a bill of complaint.

However, a so-called stipulation was filed which was signed by the attorneys for petitioner and for only one of the alleged respondents. The declared purpose of this stipulation was that "the following facts may be introduced at the hearing of said cause, with the same effect as though they had been proved in the usual way, without limiting the right of either of said parties to present admissible testimony and evidence in addition thereto but not in contradiction thereof."

Upon this rather novel proceeding and record, a justice of the superior court entertained the petition, filed a written decision, and entered a decree granting the prayers of the petition and advising and directing the trustee in connection with certain matters relating to his actions as trustee under the trust deed. From this decree Minnie F. Beach, one of the alleged respondents, has filed a claim and reasons of appeal, as from a final decree in an ordinary equity cause.

Assuming that the trustee was entitled to seek such directions as to his actions as trustee, we think that he must have intended that his proceeding be considered as one relative to a trust deed according to sec. 35, chap. 339, G.L.1923, rather than one "under its general equity jurisdiction", as the petition alleged.

But we are aware of no authority by which the superior court, under its general equity jurisdiction or under its statutory equity jurisdiction, has the right to determine upon a mere petition the questions involved in this proceeding. The usual and uniform procedure to obtain any relief under the equity court's general equity jurisdiction is by a bill of...