Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O.

Decision Date07 January 1952
PartiesWORTEX MILLS, Inc. v. TEXTILE WORKERS UNION of America, C. I. O. et al.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 851

85 A.2d 851
369 Pa. 359
WORTEX MILLS, Inc.
v.
TEXTILE WORKERS UNION of America, C. I. O. et al.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Jan. 7, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1952.

[369 Pa. 360]

Page 852

Jerome L. Markovitz, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Sidney G. Handler and Douglass, Handler, Rosenberg & Ware, all of Harrisburg, amicus curiae for Penna. Federation of Labor.

Paul Brandeis and Goff & Rubin, all of Philadelphia, for appellee.

[369 Pa. 359] Before DREW, C. J., and STERN, STEARNE, BELL, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.

[369 Pa. 360]

Page 853

BELL, Justice.

Defendants appeal from a decree which restrained and enjoined their picketing. The chancellor found, either separately or in his opinion, the following facts:

The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, manufactures and deals with wool and woolen goods at its principal place of business on the second floor of a building situate at Adams Avenue and Leiper Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. It has 38 employees, none of whom are members of any union nor affiliated with the defendant unions; and there was no strike or labor dispute of any kind between plaintiff and its employees.

The defendant unions are out on a strike with textile manufacturers, other than the plaintiff, in connection with some bargaining arrangements. They have no labor contract with plaintiff or its employees and no proposed contract has been submitted by defendants for the employees of the plaintiff.

The entrance into the building where plaintiff's plant is located consists of a three foot wide doorway. This doorway is not the means of ingress or egress to any other business conducted in said building.

[369 Pa. 361] On February 19, 1951, members of the defendant unions started to picket the three foot wide entrance of plaintiff's plant, causing most of the employees to have to push their way through the picket line and the rest to refuse to enter.

On February 22, 1951, a double line of 150 pickets congregated at this doorway and had an automobile on the street with a loudspeaker which said 'Why go into that two-bit concern? They will fold in a year'.

On February 23, 1951, the pickets of the defendant unions again congregated about the entrance of plaintiff's plant and threatened plaintiff's employees. Most of the employees pushed their way into the plant but many of them were afraid to work as a result of the threats and intimidations of the defendants. There were, however, no acts of violence.

On February 26th plaintiff's bill of complaint and rule for a preliminary injunction was filed. On that day and the next day there were 25 pickets at the three foot wide entrance to plaintiff's plant; the rest of the week, 10 pickets.

The defendant unions also picketed the loading platform at the rear of the building so that truck drivers who were members of other unions refused to unload trucks delivering goods. The defendants likewise interfered with the delivery of raw materials to be used in part for the manufacture of cloth for the Army and Navy.

During the first week of the picketing the production of the plaintiff's plant was reduced by 90 percent of its output and in the second week by 85 percent.

The chancellor further said: 'The unions have called a general strike in the textile field, and in an effort to induce the employees of the plaintiff to become members of the defendant unions and to force the plaintiff to conduct a closed shop a picket line has been [369 Pa. 362] thrown about the plaintiff's plant since February 19, 1951. While the picketing of the plant has produced no acts of violence, acts of intimidation by the assembling of a considerable number of pickcts [together with name calling and threats] * * * the necessity of the employees to force their way through the picket line, the fear manifested by some of the employees, and the refusal of union truck drivers to unload material at the plant together with substantial damage to the business of the plaintiff show that the defendants have conducted themselves contrary to law.'

The chancellor made the following conclusions of law:

1. There is no labor dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants.

2. The employees of the plaintiff have a legal right to refuse to join a labor union.

3. The course of conduct of the defendants was intended to coerce the plaintiff to require its employees to become members of the defendant unions.

4. Peaceful picketing by the defendants is coercive when its intent is to force the plaintiff to require its employees to become memers of the defendant union.

Page 854

5. The coercion of the plaintiff caused it to suffer substantial business losses.

6. The picketing of the plaintiff's plant is unlawful.

7. Equity has jurisdiction in this case.

Defendants contend that (1) their picketing was peaceful; (2) peaceful picketing is lawful when its intent is to organize employees into a union; (3) the fact that picketing results in substantial loss and damage to the employer is immaterial and of no moment; (4) Congress has taken exclusive jurisdiction of the field of labor industrial relationships and therefore equity has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction; and (5) even if equity has injunctive jurisdiction, the [369 Pa. 363] Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act on which it must be predicated, was not complied with.

The defendants' first contention is clearly without merit--mass picketing is illegal; coercion, intimidation and threats are illegal; and where these exist it can not be successfully contended that the picketing was peaceful: Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 353 Pa. 446, 457, 46 A.2d 16, 163 A.L.R. 656; Kirmse v. Adler, 311 Pa. 78, 166 A. 566; Carnegie Illinois Steel Co. v. United Steel Workers of America, 353 Pa. 420, 45 A.2d 857.

Picketing is a form of assembly and of speech and consequently comes within the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and within Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, P.S., both of which guarantee freedom of speech: Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093; Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104; Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 353 Pa. 446, 46 A.2d 16, 163 A.L.R. 656; Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board...

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