Worthington v. A.G. Rhodes & Son Co.

• Citation: 145 Ala. 656,39 So. 614
• Parties: WORTHINGTON v. A. G. RHODES & SON CO.
• Decision Date: 23 November 1905
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

39 So. 614

145 Ala. 656

WORTHINGTON v. A. G. RHODES & SON CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 23, 1905

Appeal from City Court of Montgomery; A. D. Sayre, Judge.

"Not officially reported."

Action by the A. G. Rhodes & Son Company against J. B. Worthington. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

George Stowers, for appellant.

L. A Sanderson, for appellee.

DENSON J.

Action of detinue, commenced before a justice of the peace, to recover a watch which was particularly described in each of the three counts of the complaint. From a judgment rendered by the justice in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant carried the case by appeal to the city court. In that court the value of the property being less than twenty dollars, the cause was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and the court on the evidence submitted rendered judgment for the plaintiff. From that judgment the defendant appealed to this court. Only two grounds of error are contained in the assignment of errors. Each of them challenge the correctness of the judgment rendered on the facts.

One insistence of the appellant is that there was no evidence before the court to show that the person who made the demand on the defendant for the watch before the suit was commenced had any authority from the plaintiff to make the demand. The answer to the insistence is that proof of demand was not necessary to the maintenance of the action. Demand is not necessary to maintain detinue, unless it is necessary to render the detention unlawful, as where it is necessary to terminate the relation of bailor and bailee. Brock v Headen, 13 Ala. 370; Lawson's Adm'r v Lay's Ex'r, 24 Ala. 184. The plaintiff claimed title to the watch under a conditional sale contract in writing made with it on the 12th day of July, 1902, by William Jones. A copy of the contract is set out in the bill of exceptions. Under the contract the plaintiff was the vender and William Jones was the vendee. By its terms, if default was made in payment of the purchase price, or if the vendee sold the watch without the written consent of the vender, the vender was authorized to resume possession of the watch. Default in payment was shown, and it was also shown that William Jones sold the watch to the defendant. The defendant claimed the watch, not as bailee, but asserted title to it in his own right and antagonistic to plaintiff's title. Defendant, having...