Worthington v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 27 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 24807.,24807.
• Citation: Worthington v. Thomas, 134 Idaho 433, 4 P.3d 545 (Idaho 2000)
• Parties: K. Diane WORTHINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry F. THOMAS, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

4 P.3d 545

134 Idaho 433

K. Diane WORTHINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry F. THOMAS, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 24807.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, December 1999 Term.

April 27, 2000.

Rehearing Denied July 12, 2000.

Alexanderson, Davis, Rainey & Whitney, Caldwell, for appellant. Ronald P. Rainey argued.

Robinson & Walker, PLLC, Caldwell, for respondent. Bryan K. Walker argued.

KIDWELL, Justice.

Diane Worthington appeals from the magistrate and district courts' determination that interest on delinquent child-support payments should not be awarded when arrearages are consolidated into a final judgment. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 12, 1972, appellant Diane Worthington and respondent Larry Thomas were married. Three children were born of the marriage, which ended by divorce on August 4, 1982. The 1982 divorce decree incorporated the parties' settlement agreement for the disbursement of property and custody and support of the children. The settlement agreement gave Worthington custody of the children and provided that Thomas pay child support until the children reached the age of majority.

Due to changes in the actual physical custody of the children and disputes arising from prior agreements of the parties, Thomas filed a motion to modify and consolidate any past owing child support.¹ A trial was held on December 20 and 22, 1989. The magistrate court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 6, 1990.

The magistrate court found that as of December 20, 1989, Thomas owed Worthington $10,611.67, "as a principal balance of accrued but unpaid child support." In this action to consolidate past owing support into one judgment, the magistrate found that interest should be applied at the statutory rate on "all sums applicable to this case."

The court ordered Thomas's counsel to prepare "an appropriate judgment based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." Thomas's counsel complied, and on May 15, 1990 the magistrate entered a judgment which stated that amounts owed to Worthington from Thomas for past child support would accrue "interest thereon from the date thereof at the judgment rate as provided by law."

On May 29, 1990, Worthington moved the magistrate to amend the judgment to include pre-judgment interest on her award, thus allowing her to collect interest on each of the monthly amounts due prior to the December 1989 hearing. The motion was not heard by the magistrate court for nearly seven years.²

On March 27, 1997, the magistrate held a hearing on Worthington's motion to amend the judgment. While the majority of the hearing was continued until June, the magistrate rendered an order from the hearing, that "child support payments draw interest from the date they each individually come due."

On June 26, 1997, the magistrate court again took up the motion to amend the May 16, 1990 judgment. During that hearing, the magistrate pointed out that Worthington was not entitled to interest on accrued child support prior to December 1989 because she had failed to prove the amount she was entitled to at the 1989 hearing. In a subsequent written order, the magistrate confirmed that Worthington was only entitled to interest on accrued child support from the 1990 judgment forward and not for any time prior to that.

In an order resulting from a hearing on June 26, 1997, the magistrate denied Worthington's motion for a writ of execution. Worthington had sought the writ to collect the interest on payments due prior to the December 1989 hearing.³ Worthington appealed the magistrate's decision that she was not entitled to a writ of execution nor to any interest prior to December 1989. The appeal was heard by the district court, which issued its written decision on May 19, 1998. The district court held that because Worthington had failed to present evidence of the amount of interest owed to her prior to the 1989 hearing, she was barred from collecting under the doctrine of res judicata. Thus, Worthington could execute on the 1990 judgment for post-judgment interest (from 1990 forward) but not for pre-judgment interest (anything before the 1990 judgment).

Worthington appeals from both the magistrate and district courts' decisions.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When this Court reviews a case appealed from a district court's appellate review of a magistrate's decision, this Court will review the decision of the magistrate court, independently of, but with due regard for, the decision of the district court. In Re Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 822-23, 907 P.2d 794, 799-800 (1995). Where the magistrate court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, the magistrate's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731, 734, 963 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1998). However, this Court freely reviews issues of law. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. A Writ of Execution Can be Used for Collecting Accrued Interest On Past-Due Child Support Payments.

Worthington claims that the district court erred when it denied her writ of execution for the interest which was due her prior to the December 1989 judgment. In support of her claim, Worthington cites the Court of Appeals case of Hunsaker v. Hunsaker, 117 Idaho 192, 194, 786 P.2d 583, 585 (Ct.App. 1990).

In Hunsaker, the delinquent payor argued to the Court of Appeals that in order to accrue statutory interest each past due child support payment must first be reduced to a judgment. Hunsaker, 117 Idaho at 194, 786 P.2d at 585. After considering cases from this Court and Idaho Code statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that "interest accrues at the judgment rate from the due date on delinquent child support installments." Id. The Court of Appeals then explained the proper procedure for a payee to collect judgment interest on past due child support payments.

The court noted that, "Although each support installment acquires the status of judgment when it comes due, it would be unwise to place a burden on court clerks to compute daily interest on every child support payment." Id. The court continued that, "The better approach, in our view is for court clerks simply to maintain records of support payments due and payments received." Id. The correct procedure for collecting interest on support payments, reasoned the court, is for the payee to "seek and obtain from the court a writ of execution based upon an affidavit which sets forth a calculation of interest include[ing] the amount due under the judgment." Id. at 194-95, 786 P.2d at 585-86 (internal citations omitted).

In the present case, there is no dispute as to the holding of Hunsaker. Both of the parties, the magistrate court, and the district court agree that once child support payments become due and owing, interest at the statutory rate begins to accrue. Therefore, it was not necessary to reduce the past owing child support payments to a judgment in order for judgment interest to begin accruing. However, in the present case we are faced with a situation where the past due child support payments were consolidated into a single judgment.

Worthington claims that, even though the payments were consolidated into a single judgment, she should still be able to collect interest on the delinquent payments through a writ of execution.

In Davis v. Davis, 114 Idaho 170, 755 P.2d 3 (Ct.App.1988), the Court of Appeals considered a similar issue. In Davis, after the magistrate court determined that the payor was delinquent, the parties entered into "a stipulation providing the manner in which future support payments would be made and the delinquency would be discharged." Davis, 114 Idaho at 171,755 P.2d at 4. Two years after the stipulation had been incorporated into a judgment, the payee sought to modify the judgment to include judgment interest on the delinquent payments which had been incorporated into the judgment. Id. When the magistrate court declined to modify the judgment, the payee appealed to the district court. Id. at 172, 755 P.2d at 5. When the district court dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds, the payee appealed.

The case was heard by the Court of Appeals which held that "all such obligations, and any interest that might have accrued thereon, were merged into the magistrate's order adjudicating the amount of the delinquency in June 1984, and prescribing the manner in which it would be paid." Id. In both the present case and Davis, the parties had the opportunity to raise the issue of interest prior to the entering of the magistrate's order. In both cases, the parties attended, and were represented by counsel, at evidentiary hearings on the amount of the arrearages. The parties all had the full and fair opportunity to raise the issue of interest prior to the entering of the magistrate's order.

Therefore, we hold that, like Davis, when the magistrate court consolidated the past due support obligations into a single judgment, any claim to interest Worthington had was merged into the consolidated judgment. While Worthington properly sought to modify the judgment of the magistrate court to include interest, for the reasons stated below we hold that she is now barred from collecting.

B. The Rule of Res Judicata Can be Applied to Bar the Procedural Matter of Post-Judgment Interest.

Worthington argues that interest on delinquent child support payments is post-judgment interest because the Court of Appeals held that once a support installment becomes due it becomes a judgment. Hunsaker, 117 Idaho at 194, 786 P.2d at 585. She further asserts that since post-judgment interest is a procedural matter, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied.

In this argument, Worthington attempts to convince this Court that the doctrine of res judicata is being applied to the post-judgment interest itself, thus depriving her of post-judgment interest she is entitled to. However, actually,...