Worthington v. Worthington
Decision Date | 02 May 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 39448,39448 |
Citation | 440 P.2d 478,73 Wn.2d 759 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | Robert E. WORTHINGTON, Respondent, v. Janet Main WORTHINGTON, Appellant. |
Burns & Schneiderman, Seattle, for appellant.
Trena Belsito Worthington, Olympia, for respondent.
*
The defendant appeals from a decree dividing the property and granting each party a divorce. The only issues raised on this appeal center around the property division and evaluation of real estate made by the trial court.
The precipitating cause of the action was defendant's failure to respond to an ultimatum by the plaintiff, husband, that, unless the defendant, wife, returned to their Quilcene home to live with him, he would seek a divorce. 1
The parties were married in 1932, left the state almost immediately, and spent the first 12 years of their marriage in New Haven, Connecticut, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Columbus, Ohio. Mr. Worthington had a degree in forestry and spent those years, first, in graduate training in forestry and, thereafter, in the employ of the United States Forestry Service. In 1944, the parties returned to Washington, where they opened a checking account with the proceeds from the sale of their Columbus home. From 1936 through 1966, Mr. Worthington received an annual distribution of funds from his father's estate which amounted to a total of $77,574 over the years of marriage. These funds, along with plaintiff's earnings, which averaged only $2,673 for the years of the marriage, were deposited in the same checking account. In 1947, a home in Quilcene was purchased from the estate of plaintiff's father for a consideration which included cash in the sum of $5,000, plaintiff's one-seventh interest in the property, and a second one-seventh interest in the property which was contributed as a gift by plaintiff's sister.
During the later 1940's plaintiff had little gainful employment but was engaged principally in seeking out, investigating, and purchasing timberlands. The most recent purchase of such property was made in 1960. At the time this action was commenced, plaintiff and his brother owned, as tenants in common, 34 parcels of cutover timberland comprising approximately 1,600 acres. The trial court found the value of plaintiff's interest in these tracts to be $40,000. The trial court found that the plaintiff owned 11 additional parcels of cut-over timberland amounting to approximately 500 acres. The court evaluated the 500 acres at $125 an acre for a total of $62,500. The total purchase price paid by plaintiff for his interest in all of the 45 parcels was approximately $18,593. Cuttings of timber at various times returned in excess of $34,000 as plaintiff's share of the proceeds. This money found its way into the same checking account from which all expenditures were met, including living expenses, timber purchases, and home improvements.
At the time this action was commenced, the parties' two children had reached their majorities, plaintiff was 66 years of age, and the defendant was 57 years of age. The court found, without stating any further facts or details, that both were 'physically disabled to a certain degree,' and the 'each of the parties hereto have treated the other in a cruel manner rendering life burdensome.' Neither of these findings is challenged, but we have reviewed the record and conclude that a consideration of the 'respective merits of the parties' justified what the trial court did; namely, attempt to make a fairly equal division of the property. Both parties suffer from somewhat serious disabilities and handicaps, but, from the record, we cannot say that one party is more seriously handicapped than the other, and considering, as the trial court must, 'the condition in which they will be left by such divorce,' 2 we find nothing which could justify the trial court in making anything except a fairly equal division of the total assets. We do not believe that the case law of this state will be in any manner aided by a detailed recital of the disabilities from which each party suffers or is likely to suffer in the future, or by a lengthy discussion of the acts of cruelty inflicted by each party against the other over the years.
The challenge which the defendant makes to the valuation placed by the court on the items of property awarded to the parties requires a statement of the facts relating to those particular items. We see no need to discuss any other items of property or the disposition which the court made of such other property in its decree. The defendant challenges the valuation placed by the court on only three items of property. These will be referred to as the Wa Wa Point property, the home property, and the cut-over timberlands.
Defendant possessed property which, all agreed, was inherited property. The trial court so found and placed a value of $129,800 on these assets. All of this property was awarded to Mrs. Worthington. She contends that part of this property, the Wa Wa Point property, was evaluated 'on the high side.' We find that her position is without merit. The property included 660 feet of waterfront on Hood Canal, and the $75,000 figure set by the trial court was within the range of the evidence. Competent appraisers set the value at both higher and lower figures. This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on a disputed factual issue. This includes the evaluation of property. Meeks v. Meeks, 61 Wash.2d 697, 379 P.2d 982 (1963).
Defendant claims undervaluation of the Quilcene home, awarded to the plaintiff, and the 32-acre tract of land on which it was situated. The home and its site were appraised at $27,400 by plaintiff's expert, and at $35,000 by defendant's expert. The court set a $27,000 valuation. We are unable to say that the court had no substantial evidence in the record upon which to support its determination. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 58 Wash.2d 288, 362 P.2d 352 (1961). The record shows that, even though the home was well kept, it was very old, it was too large for the average family, upkeep was expensive, and it would be difficult to sell in an area such as Quilcene. Exhibit 10--A, which consisted of plaintiff's answers to defendant's interrogatories, was admitted into evidence. In these answers, he valued the Quilcene home and land at $27,000. An owner may testify as to the value of his property and the weight to be given to it is left to the trier of fact. Ingersol v. Seattle-First Nat. Bank, 63 Wash.2d 354, 387 P.2d 538 (1963); Cunningham v. Town of Tieton, 60 Wash.2d 434, 374 P.2d 375 (1962).
Defendant claims that the per-acre evaluation of $125, placed by the court on the 11 tracts of separately owned, second-growth timberland, is too low. At several points during the course of the trial, the court requested that the focus of attention be centered upon the issue of valuation of the timberland. The only evidence introduced by the defendant on this vital issue was the testimony of a Port Townsend realtor, who estimated the value of timberland in the county where the parcels were located to be $250 to $500 an acre, but who testified on cross-examination:
Q. * * * (D)o you know if the Worthingtons have any wild land without any timber on it? A. I do not know. I haven't checked into Mr. Worthington's land at all. Q. Have you ever sold him any land? A. No, I have not. Q. Have you ever sold anybody else land that belonged to him? A. No, I have not. Q. And you are not in a position to say what the Worthington land is worth? A. No, I would not be competent and I would not want to say at the present time that I was qualified, because of the fact that I am not a timber cruiser. Q. In fact, you don't know anything about the worth of the land? A. That is correct.
We agree with the witness' self-appraisal that he was neither competent nor qualified to evaluate the timberland owned by the Worthingtons.
Defendant offered no other testimony of value, even though the court had required plaintiff to put a $1,250 bank account at the disposal of the defendant for the purpose of allowing her the funds necessary for the preparation of her case for trial. The funds were not expended, and were eventually included in the assets awarded to the defendant out of the property which the court concluded was community property. The findings and conclusions refer to this $1,250 amount as 'in the approximate amount of $1,000.00.'
All other expert testimony on the value of the timberland was presented by the plaintiff. Defendant asks the court to give considerable weight to the testimony of a real-estate broker, called to place a valuation on the Wa Wa Point property. He testified that the Wa Wa Point property was worth $85,000. In the course of his testimony, he stated that the timber on the Wa Wa Point property was valued at $500 per acre, and, on cross-examination, stated that he would value timberland in Jefferson County at that figure. He had never seen the Worthingtons' cut-over land, and, from his testimony, it was impossible to determine whether by 'timber land' he referred to old-growth or second-growth timberland. He established no qualification to appraise timberland generally. It was the function and duty of the trial court to give this testimony such weight as he deemed it merited.
Plaintiff evaluated the timberland at approximately $50 per acre. The Jefferson County assessor testified that the actual value of the timberland was between $125 and $150 per acre. Plaintiff's brother, the owner of an undivided one-half interest in 34 of the parcels, described the land as 'cut-over or reforestation land,' and valued it at $135 an acre. The trial court, in its supplemental memorandum opinion, stated that there were approximately 500 acres separately owned by the parties to this action, and 800 acres represented plaintiff's share of the 34 parcels owned in common with his brother. The court, consistent with this...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
White v. White
...Wash.2d 649, 656, 565 P.2d 790 (1977); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash.2d 293, 305, 494 P.2d 208 (1972); Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wash.2d 759, 768-69, 440 P.2d 478 (1968) (quoting Webster v. Webster, 2 Wash. 417, 419, 26 P. 864 (1891)); In re Marriage of Leland, 69 Wash. App. 57, ......
-
Marriage of Olivares, Matter of
...94 Wash.2d 1025 (1980). However, the status of the property as community or separate is not controlling. Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wash.2d 759, 768, 440 P.2d 478 (1968). Rather, the trial court must ensure that the final division of the property is " 'fair, just and equitable under all......
-
Marriage of Sedlock, Matter of
...valuation findings are within the range of the credible evidence, and that is all that is required. See Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wash.2d 759, 764-65, 440 P.2d 478 (1968). We agree with Certainly there are some logical inconsistencies in the trial court's "hybrid" approach to these val......
-
Burrows v. Degon
...We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on the disputed factual issue of valuation. Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wn.2d 759, 762, 440 P.2d 478 (1968). "[W]hen the parties offer conflicting evidence in valuation, the court may adopt the value asserted by either party......
-
Table of Cases
...Woolery v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 25 Wn. App. 762, 612 P.2d 1 . . . . . . . . . 28.06[1][b]; 58.02[2] Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wn.2d 759, 440 P.2d 478 (1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.03[3]; 31.05[1] Wright v. Johanson, 132 Wash. 682, 233 P. 16 (1925) . . . . . . . . ......
-
§ 5.06 SUSPENSION AND DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE OR THE REGISTERED DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP BY THE PARTIES
...in which, despite the mischaracterization, the division of property is fair, just, and equitable. See, e.g., Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wn.2d 759, 768, 440 P.2d 478 (1968); In re Marriage of Griswold, 112 Wn. App. 333, 48 P.3d 1018 (2002), review denied, 148 Wn.2d 1023 (2003); In re Mar......
-
Table of Cases
...Video, Inc. v. City of Tukwila, 117 Wn.2d 382, 816 P.2d 18 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 986 (1992): 11.2(3) Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wn.2d 759, 440 P.2d 478 (1968): 12.9(3) Wright v. Woodard, 83 Wn.2d 378, 518 P.2d 718 (1974): 21.3(2) Y ______________________________________________......
-
§ 12.9 Standard of Review Applied to Specific Issues: Family Law Cases
...of Griswold, 112 Wn. App. at 346; In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn.2d 649, 655-56, 565 P.2d 790 (1977); Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wn.2d 759, 768-69, 440 P.2d 478 (1968). When the trial has mischaracterized an item of property, the trial court's overall distribution of property, if it ap......