Worthley v. Sch. Comm. of Gloucester

• Decision Date: 12 April 2023
• Docket Number: 22-cv-12060-DJC
• Parties: JEFFREY T. WORTHLEY, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF GLOUCESTER and BEN LUMMIS, in his official and personal capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

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JEFFREY T. WORTHLEY, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF GLOUCESTER and BEN LUMMIS, in his official and personal capacities, Defendants.

No. 22-cv-12060-DJC

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

April 12, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DENISE J. CASPER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I.Introduction

On November 14, 2022, DefendantsSchool Committee of Gloucester and Ben Lummis(“Lummis”), Superintendent of Gloucester Public Schools (collectively “Defendants”) issued a no trespass order (“the November 14^thOrder”) against PlaintiffJeffrey T. Worthley(“Worthley”).D 1-2 ¶ 42;id. at 39.Worthley moved to enjoin the November14^th Order. D. 8.After the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, D. 21, the Court gave the parties time to attempt to resolve or narrow their dispute.Although the parties did not resolve the matter, on January 13, 2023, Defendants issued a modified no trespass order (“the January 13^thOrder”) against Worthley, D. 28-1, which excised a number of the prohibitions that Worthley had challenged in the November 14^th Order.On January 24, 2023, the Court allowed Worthley's motion for injunctive relief as to the November 14^thOrder, D. 29, as Worthley continued to press that challenge.D. 25.Worthley has now moved for injunctive relief as to the January13^thOrder. D. 43.For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the motion except that it ALLOWS it only as to the provision barring Worthley from representing himself as a representative of, or being involved in, Gloucester Public School-sponsored volunteer events.

II.Standard of Review

Preliminary injunctive relief remains an “extraordinary and drastic remedy.”Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc.,645 F.3d 26, 32(1st Cir.2011)(quotingMunaf v. Geren,553 U.S. 674, 689-90(2008)).On a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court must consider “[1]the movant's likelihood of success on the merits of [his] claims; [2] whether and to what extent the movant will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is withheld; [3] the balance of hardships as between the parties; and [4] the effect, if any, that an injunction (or the withholding of one) may have on the public interest.”Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Harnett,731 F.3d 6, 9(1st Cir.2013)(citingRoss-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc.,102 F.3d 12, 15(1st Cir.1996)).

III.The Court's Ruling on the Prior Motion for Injunctive Relief

In its Memorandum and Order, D. 29, the Court ruled that Worthley was reasonably likely to succeed in showing that the breadth of the November 14^th Order--barring him from all school-sponsored events or activities at Gloucester High School (“GHS”), regardless of whether they were open to the public or traditionally attended by members of the Gloucester City Council(of which Worthley is a member)--substantially burdened more of his speech than was necessary given the articulated concern that he obtained a minor's (“KF”) cell phone number and texted her without the permission of an adult.D. 29 at 11.The Court also ruled that Worthley's loss of First Amendment freedoms constituted irreparable harm, that this harm outweighed Defendants' alleged public safety concern and that protecting Worthley's free speech rights served the public interest.Id. at 15-16.

IV.Factual and Procedural Background

The Court incorporates by reference the factual background from its Memorandum and Order, D. 29, regarding Worthley's first motion for injunctive relief from the November 14^thOrder.Id. at 2-7.Here, the Court will address the sequence of events leading to the issuance of the January 13^thOrder, D. 28-1, and the prohibitions contained therein that Worthley challenges.

Worthley's first motion for injunctive relief, D. 8, was based on the November 14^th Order, which barred him from “appear[ing] on or enter[ing] the premises of [GHS] during school hours or at any school sponsored event or activity” for the entirety of the 2022-2023 school year.D. 12at 39.Worthley claimed that under the November 14^th Order, he could not see his son perform at events held at GHS, engage his constituents at school-sponsored events that city councilors customarily attend or utilize school-sponsored events and activities to recruit members of the community to join his volunteer corps project.D. 1-2 ¶¶ 45, 54, 63.

During the January 5, 2023 hearing on Worthley's motion for preliminary injunction with respect to the November 14^th Order, the Court noted that it would take the matter under advisement but would delay ruling on the motion to allowthe parties some time to see if they could reach a resolution of the matter.SeeD. 21.On January 12, 2023, counsel for both parties submitted statements to the Court.D. 23;D. 24.Defendants stated that they proposed several modifications to the November 14^th Order, that the “[t]he parties continue[d] to engage in good faith negotiations” and that Defendants would “provide the Court with a further update by January 19, 2022” regarding these efforts.D. 23 ¶¶ 3-4.Worthley indicated that he rejected the proposed modifications because they did not address any of his requirements and raised “significant new First Amendment issues” and asked the Court to grant the injunctive relief that he had sought.D. 24at 1.On January 19, 2023, Defendants notified the Court that they issued the January 13^th Order which superseded the November 14^thOrder, D. 28-1, against Worthley.D. 28 ¶ 4.On January 19, 2023, Worthley filed a motion indicating that he still sought resolution of his original motion for injunctive relief as to the November14^th Order. D. 25.

The January 13^th Order eliminates several of the restrictions that were contained in the November 14^th Order.Under the January 13^th Order, Worthley may appear at school-sponsored events which are generally open to the public (provided that he adheres to certain Gloucester Public School policies), enumerated events to which “Gloucester City Councilors are customarily invited” and events or activities that relate to his “parental duties as the parent of a rising eighth grader.”D. 28-1 at 2.Like the November 14^th Order, however, the January 13^thOrder otherwise prohibits Worthley from entering GHS “while school is in session from January 12, 2023 to the end of the 2022-2023 school year.”Id. at 3.The January 13^th Order also imposes new restrictions, barring him from “represent[ing][himself] as being a representative of, or involved in, Gloucester Public school-sponsored volunteer events to students, their families, or Gloucester Public School staff” and from “solicit[ing] personal information from [GHS] students while on [GHS] property.”Id.Worthley now seeks to enjoin the January 13^th Order.^[1]D. 43.

V.Discussion

Worthley brings 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims premised on violations of his free speech rights under the First Amendment(Count I) and his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment(Count II).D. 1-2 at 13-15.Worthley also asserts claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”)(Counts III and IV), Mass.Gen. L. c. 12, § 11I^[2] D. 1-2 at 15-16.The Court first turns to his First Amendment free speech claim.

A. Worthley's Likelihood of Success on the Merits

1.Worthley's First Amendment Free Speech Challenge to the January 13^thOrder

As the standard of review of the January 13^th Order is the same as it was for the November 14^th Order, the Court repeats the relevant parts of that standard here.D. 29at 8-9.Although, as the movant, Worthley bears the burden of establishing that a preliminary injunction should issue, Defendants shoulder much of the burden when it comes to the merits of Worthley's First Amendment claim.SeeUnited States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc.,529 U.S. 803, 816(2000)(noting“[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions”)(citation omitted).

“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,452 U.S. 640, 647(1981).Under the prevailing constitutional framework, the extent to which a “government can restrict speech turns on the category to which property is assigned.”Curnin v. Town of Egremont,510 F.3d 24, 28(1st Cir.2007).The Supreme Court has “identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum.”Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc.,473 U.S. 788, 802(1985);Curnin,510 F.3d at 28.

The traditional public forum consists of “places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate” such as streets and parks.Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Loc. Educators' Ass'n,460 U.S. 37, 45(1983).In a traditional public forum, content-based government regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, that is, they are permissible only where “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to serve that end.”Id.Content-neutral time, place or manner restrictions, on the other hand, are permissible if they are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”Id.“In order to be narrowly tailored, a time, place, or manner restriction must not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.”Ward v. Rock Against Racism,491 U.S. 781, 799(1989).

A school during school hours is typically a nonpublic forum.Nurre v. Whitehead,580 F.3d 1087, 1093(9th Cir.2009).A school can become a public forum, however, “if school...