WPW Acquisition Co. v. City of Troy
| Citation | 250 Mich. App. 287,646 N.W.2d 487 |
| Decision Date | 14 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 226224,Docket No. 224813,Docket No. 232132.,Docket No. 224234,Docket No. 228106 |
| Parties | WPW ACQUISITION COMPANY, Great Lakes Real Estate Investment Trust, Home Properties of New York Limited Partnership, Cornerstone Real Estate Advisers Company, Columbia Center Limited Partnership, Troy Realty Holding Company, Inc., Engineering Technology, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF TROY, Defendant-Appellee. Ramco-Gershenson, Inc., Carriage Cove Apartments Association, Biltmore Properties, Inc., Steur and Canvasser, Inc., Meijer, Inc., Dr Group Partnership, Procoil Corp., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Township of Canton, Defendant-Appellee. Home Properties of New York, LP and Parkwood Plaza, LP, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. City of Oak Park, Defendant-Appellee. Bingham Center Associates, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Township of Southfield, Defendant-Appellee. Southfield Techne Center Properties, Inc, Great Lakes Real Estate Investment, A-II Limited Partnership, Lincoln Corp, Horizon Corp, FDN Associates, Essex Centre Associates, Lahser II Limited Partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. City of Southfield, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP (by John S. Kane), Lansing, for WPW Acquisition Company and others.
Lori Grigg Bluhm, Assistant City Attorney, Troy, for city of Troy.
Rose & Bevelheimer, P.C. (by Nevin A. Rose), Westland, for Canton Township.
Shifman & Carlson, P.C. (by John A. Carlson and Laurence A. Berg), Southfield, for city of Oak Park.
Secrest, Wardle, Lynch, Hampton, Truex and Morley (by Derk W. Beckerleg), Farmington Hills, for Southfield Township.
Pollard & Albertson, P.C. (by Neil H. Goodman), Bloomfield Hills, for city of Southfield.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Ross H. Bishop, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General and the State Tax Commission.
Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer & Thall, P.C. (by James W. Porter), Kalamazoo, for Michigan Townships Association.
Before: O'CONNELL, P.J., and WHITE and COOPER, JJ.
In these five cases consolidated on appeal, plaintiffs1 appeal as of right from various trial court orders from the Oakland and Wayne Circuit Courts. In each case, we are asked to decide whether Const. 1963, art. 9, § 3 provides that plaintiffs are entitled to taxable values of real property that, as percentages of true cash value, equal the average ratio of taxable value to true cash value of all other property in the taxing district.2 Because we agree with the trial courts' conclusion in each case that Const. 1963, art. 9, § 3, as amended by Proposal A, imposes no such requirement, we affirm in all cases.3
In Docket No. 224234, plaintiffs appeal as of right from the December 10, 1999, order of the trial court granting summary disposition in favor of defendant city of Troy pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). In Docket No. 224813, plaintiffs appeal as of right from the January 19, 2000, order of the trial court dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' claim against defendant Canton Township.4 In Docket No. 226224, plaintiffs appeal as of right from the March 13, 2000, order of the trial court granting defendant city of Oak Park's motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). In Docket No. 228106, plaintiff appeals as of right from the June 14, 2000, order of the trial court denying plaintiff's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), and granting judgment in favor of defendant Southfield Township pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). Finally, in Docket No. 232132, plaintiffs appeal as of right from the January 4, 2001, order of the trial court finding no cause of action on behalf of plaintiffs and entering judgment in favor of defendant city of Southfield.
Plaintiffs filed the complaints in the Wayne and Oakland Circuit Courts, alleging that the taxable values of plaintiffs' properties were of percentages of true cash value greater than the average percentage of all other properties defendants taxed in the applicable city or township. Plaintiffs further alleged that because Const. 1963, art. 9, § 3 requires uniformity in taxation, defendant's method of taxing plaintiffs' real property violated our state constitution. In the complaints, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment holding that defendants taxed plaintiffs in violation of the state constitution, and a refund for "the unconstitutional portion" of plaintiffs' taxes.
In each case, the trial courts concluded that plaintiffs' argument was without merit. Specifically, the trial courts rejected plaintiffs' assertion that Const. 1963, art. 9, § 3 required uniformity in the ratio of taxable value to true cash value among all real property in the taxing district. The trial courts also recognized that by accepting Proposal A, the electorate provided for a cap on real property tax assessments. Specifically, the courts recognized that taxes are now levied according to a property's taxable value, and because a property's taxable value is contingent on whether its owner retains or sells it, the percentages of taxable value to true cash value among identical pieces of property will not be uniform. Plaintiffs now appeal as of right in all five cases.
In each case, with the exception of the court's ruling in Docket No. 232132,5 the lower courts ruled in favor of defendants in the summary disposition context. This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision regarding a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v. Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). In Docket Nos. 224234, 226224, and 228106, the trial courts observed that summary disposition was granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10).6
A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the basis of the pleadings alone. The purpose of such a motion is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion should be granted if no factual development could possibly justify recovery. [Beaudrie v. Henderson, 465 Mich. 124, 129-130, 631 N.W.2d 308 (2001), citing Spiek, supra at 337, 572 N.W.2d 201.]
Further, in Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 120, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999), our Supreme Court articulated the standard of review for summary disposition motions brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10):
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Moreover, in Docket Nos. 224813 and 228106, the trial courts denied plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition and granted judgment in favor of defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). "`Summary disposition is properly granted [under this rule] to the opposing party if it appears to the court that that party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment.'" Gyarmati v. Bielfield, 245 Mich.App. 602, 604, 629 N.W.2d 93 (2001) (alteration in original), quoting Sharper Image v. Dep't of Treasury, 216 Mich.App. 698, 701, 550 N.W.2d 596 (1996).
Finally, whether the Uniformity of Taxation Clause is violated where the ratio of taxable value to true cash value of plaintiffs' real property is not uniform with the average ratio of taxable value to true cash value for all real property in a city or township is a question of law. This Court reviews de novo such questions of law. See, e.g., TIG Ins. Co., Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury, 464 Mich. 548, 557, 629 N.W.2d 402 (2001).
Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to the Uniformity of Taxation Clause of Const. 1963, art. 9, § 3, they are entitled to taxable values that, as a percentage of the true cash value of their real property, are uniform with the average ratio of taxable value to true cash value for all real property in the city or township where plaintiffs' real property is located. Plaintiffs further claim that they are not seeking to alter the property taxation system in Michigan; rather, they contend that they are only seeking a reduction of their taxable values to the extent that they mirror the average ratio of taxable value to true cash value for all real property in the taxing district.
In response, defendants assert that nothing in the plain language of Const. 1963, art. 9, § 3 requires uniformity in the ratio of taxable value to true cash value; rather, the provision only requires uniformity in assessment. Defendants also argue that because of the cap on property assessments implemented with the passage of Proposal A, taxable values by their nature are inimical to uniformity because they are dependent on how long a property owner has owned the property or how quickly the property rises in value. Defendants also contend that by accepting Proposal A's mandate that property assessments be capped, the electorate could not have intended that taxable values remain uniform. According to defendants, by enacting 1994 PA 415, the Legislature facilitated the electorate's intention to cap the increase in property assessments by adding the term "taxable value" to the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), M.C.L. § 211.1 et seq.
The Attorney General, the State Tax Commission (STC), and the Michigan Townships Association (MTA) support defendants in these appeals. In their briefs on appeal, the Attorney General, the STC and the MTA note that before Proposal A, ad valorem property taxes in Michigan...
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