Wray v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 96-C-1295.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-C-1295.,96-C-1295.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin
• Parties: Jessie E. WRAY and Mary A. Wray, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a Amtrak, Defendant.

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10 F.Supp.2d 1036

Jessie E. WRAY and Mary A. Wray, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a Amtrak, Defendant.

No. 96-C-1295.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

June 23, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lisa C. Paul, Croen & Barr, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiffs.

Kevin P. Whaley, Susan R. Maisa, Jennifer M. Tenhaeff, Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, WI, Dennis M. Moore, National R.R. Passenger Corp., Washington, DC, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ADELMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Jessie and Mary Wray filed this action claiming disability discrimination under Titles II and IV of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), after defendant, National Railroad Passenger Corp. ("Amtrak"), refused to allow them to sit in the disability seating section of a train traveling from Chicago to Memphis. Plaintiffs claim that defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) of the ADA by coercing or interfering with the exercise of their rights under the ADA. Plaintiffs also bring a supplemental state law claim alleging negligence on the part of Amtrak in connection with its treatment of them.

The court has jurisdiction of the ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343, and of the supplemental claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper because Amtrak does business here. Before me now is defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 9, 1995, plaintiffs traveled via Amtrak from Milwaukee to Memphis, via Chicago. Both plaintiffs are elderly and suffer from a variety of medical conditions. Their trip from Milwaukee to Chicago was uneventful. Amtrak personnel assisted them in getting on and off the train. Plaintiffs' problems began when they got to Chicago. The train from Chicago to Memphis consisted of two-level cars, one of which was accessible to disabled passengers. This car had thirteen disability-accessible seats on the lower level. Amtrak assigns the disability-accessible seats to passengers who reserve them when purchasing tickets. Plaintiffs did not make such reservations.

When plaintiffs boarded the train in Chicago a train attendant permitted them to sit in two of the thirteen disability-accessible seats. As the train prepared for departure, however, a train attendant ascertained that six passengers, including plaintiffs, were sitting in disability-accessible seats without reservations, thereby preventing passengers with reservations from sitting in them. The conductor, Thomas Pleasants, attempted to resolve the problem by asking passengers in the disability-accessible seats to volunteer to move upstairs. When no one volunteered, he asked two passengers who appeared to be in relatively good physical condition to move upstairs, and they agreed to move. He then approached two other passengers who also agreed to move. The conductor then approached plaintiffs, who appeared to him to be relatively able, and twice requested that they move upstairs. Plaintiffs refused to move, claiming that they had requested disability services and seating from Amtrak. The conductor checked the train manifest which disclosed that plaintiffs had not reserved disability-accessible seats. He then firmly requested that plaintiffs move, stating that if they refused he would call the police. Ultimately, plaintiffs moved to the upper level of the car.

Apparently plaintiffs had no further contact with the conductor or with other train attendants for the rest of the trip. For plaintiffs the rest of the trip was quite unpleasant. Mrs. Wray has arthritis and took medication requiring her to use the bathroom frequently. The restroom was on the lower level and, since the stairs were narrow and steep, she urinated several times before reaching the bathroom causing her discomfort and humiliation. Plaintiffs also allege that they were injured when Amtrak failed to help them alight from the train and carry their luggage. Additional facts will be stated where appropriate.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party has set forth its affidavits and portions of the record that demonstrate the lack of any issue of material fact, the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth a specific showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In considering the defendant's motion for summary judgment, this court must ascertain whether, if the record of the summary judgment motion were the trial record, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the plaintiff. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572-73 (7th Cir.1989). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The subjective beliefs of the plaintiff are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. McMillian v. Svetanoff, 878 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir.1989). Summary judgment is proper, even if issues such as motive and intent are at stake, where the party alleging intentional misconduct presents no evidence of motive or intent supportive of their position. See, e.g., Powers v. Dole, 782 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir.1986); Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir.1985); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir.1989).

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "However, we are not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record — only those inferences that are reasonable." Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir.1991). Moreover, neither the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, nor the demonstration of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, will sufficiently demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. In that regard, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Plaintiffs' ADA Claim

This is a relatively unusual type of ADA case because it involves a claim of discrimination against Amtrak in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12161 et. seq. The claim falls under Title II, Part B, subpart II, and Title IV of the ADA, which prohibit discrimination by companies engaged in intercity and commuter rail. Section 12161(3) defines "`intercity rail transportation'" as transportation provided by Amtrak.

To establish a violation of these provisions, the plaintiffs must show that (1) they are qualified individuals with disabilities; (2) Amtrak denied them the benefits of its services or otherwise discriminated against them; and (3) such discrimination was by reason of their disabilities. Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 857 F.Supp. 800, 817 (D.Kan.1994). A plaintiff has a "disability" for the purposes of the ADA if he (1) has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities," (2) has "a record of such an impairment," or (3) is "regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). For purposes of the summary judgment motion defendant does not contest that both plaintiffs are disabled.

With respect to the second material element, that Amtrak discriminated against plaintiffs, defendant argues that 42 U.S.C. § 12162(a)(1) provides the appropriate legal standard. This provision requires Amtrak to have at least "one passenger car per train" that is disability-accessible.

Amtrak assigns the thirteen disability-accessible seats in a non-discriminatory way to those who reserve them at the time they purchase tickets. The disability-accessible seats were reserved in advance by persons other than plaintiffs. Although Mr. Wray states that he advised Amtrak of his and his wife's disabilities, the record shows that he did not reserve disability-accessible seats, and that plaintiffs' names were not on the list of people with reservations maintained by Amtrak. Thus, defendant complied with the one-car-per-train rule and had a neutral reservation system for allocating the thirteen disability-accessible seats in the car.¹

It is undisputed that when the conductor entered the disability-accessible car in Chicago all thirteen seats were occupied, some by people, including plaintiffs, without reservations. Mrs. Wray testified to this effect as did conductor Pleasants. The statement of another passenger that at some subsequent time on the trip not all disability-accessible seats were occupied does not contradict this evidence.

Plaintiffs concede that defendant complied with the one-car-per-train rule but argue that defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b), which makes it unlawful to "coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of" any right protected by the ADA. Plaintiffs' principal argument in support of their claim of discrimination is that when conductor Pleasants asked them to move out of the disability-accessible seats, he "coerce[d]" them in violation of § 12203(b). Most of the cases interpreting § 12203 are "retaliation" cases arising in an employment context. The language of the statute and what case law there is, however, make clear that to establish a violation of § 12203 plaintiffs must show that when the coercion took place they were exercising or enjoying a right protected by the ADA. Roth v. Lutheran Gen....