Wren v. REDDICK COMMUNITY FIRE PROTECTION

• Decision Date: 26 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 3-02-0214, No. 3-02-0226.
• Citation: 271 Ill.Dec. 858,785 N.E.2d 1052,337 Ill. App.3d 262
• Parties: Lisa R. WREN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The REDDICK COMMUNITY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT and William R. Mikeska, Defendants-Appellees (Lucretia A. Moulton, Defendant). Cathy J. Foiles, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William R. Mikeska and the Reddick Community Fire Protection District, Defendants-Appellees (Lucretia A. Moulton, Defendant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

785 N.E.2d 1052

337 Ill. App.3d 262

271 Ill.Dec. 858

Lisa R. WREN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The REDDICK COMMUNITY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT and William R. Mikeska, Defendants-Appellees (Lucretia A. Moulton, Defendant).

Cathy J. Foiles, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William R. Mikeska and the Reddick Community Fire Protection District, Defendants-Appellees (Lucretia A. Moulton, Defendant).

Nos. 3-02-0214, 3-02-0226.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

February 26, 2003.

Joseph R. Yurgine (argued), Kankakee, for Lisa R. Wren.

John E. Rambo, Law Offices of John E. Rambo, Joliet, Demetrios N. Dalmares, Orland Hills, for Cathy J. Foiles.

Mark E. Hanson, Garrison, Fabrizio & Hanson, Ltd., Joliet, Taylor F. Johnson, Johnson & Taylor, Pontiac, for Reddick Community Fire Protection District.

Stephen H. DiNolfo (argued), Shawn P. Flaherty, Ottosen, Trevarthen, Britz, Kelly & Cooper, Ltd., Wheaton, for William R. Mikeska, Reddick Fire Protection District. Joseph A. Mueller, Cortina, Mueller & O'Brien, Morris, J. Dennis Marek, Dana Meyer, Ackman, Marek & Boyd, Ltd., Kankakee, for Lucretia A. Moulton.

Christopher W. Bohlen, Barmann, Kramer & Bohlen, P.C., Kankakee, for William R. Mikeska, Jr.

Justice SLATER delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs Lisa Wren and Cathy Foiles, volunteer firefighters, filed suit after the fire truck they were riding on was involved in an accident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Reddick Community Fire Protection District (the District) and William Mikeska. Plaintiffs' appeals were consolidated by this court. We reverse and remand.

Facts

On September 27, 1998, a brush fire was reported in Livingston County, Illinois. The District, along with other area fire departments, responded to the fire. Soon after arriving, one of the District's fire trucks left due to the apparently mistaken belief that the truck needed more water to fight the fire. Defendant Mikeska drove the truck while Wren and Foiles stood on the running boards along the side of the truck. The fire truck was subsequently involved in a collision at an intersection with a car driven by defendant Lucretia Moulton. Wren and Foiles filed suit against the District, Mikeska and Moulton seeking damages for their injuries sustained in the accident.

Soon after the accident, plaintiffs' medical bills began to be paid by the District's workers' compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Liberty eventually paid $33,974.37 to 15 medical providers on behalf of Wren, and $49,344.18 to 22 medical providers on behalf of Foiles. Foiles also received temporary total disability (TTD) payments for 64 5/7 weeks, totaling $9,568.68.

Wren filed her initial complaint against defendants, alleging negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct, in February of 1999; Foiles filed her complaint in March of 1999. Both plaintiffs also filed claims for workers' compensation benefits shortly before the statute of limitations for such claims was about to expire: Wren filed on August 30, 2001; Foiles filed on September 25, 2001.

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the basis, inter alia, that plaintiffs' complaints were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendants' motions, stating:

"THE COURT: Now as to Miss Foiles she acknowledges applying for and has received benefits under the [workers' compensation] act. And since she gets no alternative relief by virtue of willful and wanton on the parties defendant, she has no standing to pursue a common law claim. And the motion for summary judgment entered by the Defendants involving Miss Foiles is allowed.

Now we take a look at Miss Wren. There has been suggested that there is a genuine issue of material fact in the Wren case as to whether or not she's employed. That's not really the issue here. Did Miss Wren apply for and receive Workers' Comp Act benefits? If she applied and it's suggested that she applied only to protect her potential rights, well maybe so, maybe not. But she did accept approximately $34,000 in medical benefits from the employer's insurer. Did she give it back? I don't think so. She accepted benefits, albeit not TTD, but she did get her meds, 34 thousand in change worth. She didn't give it back. Maybe she didn't apply until sometime during or after having received these meds, but I don't think that that's really critical in this particular instance. Because she, too, has filed for, chronology notwithstanding, and accepted medical benefits. And having done so, I suggest that her employee status is not at issue. She took the money." (Emphasis added.)

Immediately thereafter, counsel for Wren asked the court whether the court was making a finding that Wren and Foiles were "employees" under the Workers' Compensation Act. The court responded:

"THE COURT: The Court would rule that by virtue of both of them having accepted benefits under the Workers' Comp Act that I would classify both of them without further ado as employees.

MR. YURGINE [Wren's counsel]: Okay, because of the fact that they accepted benefits.

THE COURT: Exactly.

* * *

THE COURT: They both accepted benefits and they both applied for benefits. And the willful and wanton issue doesn't have to be dealt with. The exclusivity clause bars any common law claim even for willful and wanton conduct. That's my ruling and I would ask the movant's to prepare the appropriate orders."

Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admission, affidavits and exhibits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998): Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill.2d 17, 241 Ill.Dec. 627, 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999). Because it is a drastic means of disposing of litigation, summary judgment should not be allowed unless the moving party's right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill.2d 325, 214 Ill.Dec. 831, 662 N.E.2d 397 (1996). A trial court's ruling granting summary judgment is subject to de novo review. Petrovich, 188 Ill.2d 17, 241 Ill.Dec. 627, 719 N.E.2d 756; Busch, 169 Ill.2d 325, 214 Ill.Dec. 831, 662 N.E.2d 397.

We initially note that, perhaps because of the trial court's comment that it would "classify both [plaintiffs] without further ado as employees," most of the parties' efforts and arguments on appeal have been misdirected. The issue is not whether plaintiffs, as volunteer firefighters, are employees of the District for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. The determination of whether there is an employer-employee relationship is ordinarily a question of fact (Saldana v. Wirtz Cartage Co., 74 Ill.2d 379, 24 Ill.Dec. 523, 385 N.E.2d 664 (1978); Pearson v. Industrial Comm'n, 318 Ill.App.3d 932, 252 Ill. Dec. 817, 743 N.E.2d 685 (2001)), unless there is no conflict in the evidence and only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn (Pearson, 318 Ill.App.3d 932,252 Ill.Dec. 817,743 N.E.2d 685). Although the fact that plaintiffs are unpaid volunteers weighs heavily toward a finding that plaintiffs are not employees (see Board of Education of City of Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 Ill.2d 167, 290 N.E.2d 247 (1972) (employer-employee relationship generally does not exist in the absence of payment or consideration in some form)), "[t]he courts have repeatedly held that there is no single fact that controls the existence or nonexistence of an employment relationship" (Village of Creve Coeur v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 Ill.2d 430, 432, 206 N.E.2d 706, 708 (1965)). A proper determination of employee status requires consideration of such additional factors as the right to control the manner in which the work is done, the right to discharge, the skill required to do the work, and the furnishing of tools, material and equipment. Creve Coeur,32 Ill.2d 430,206 N.E.2d 706.

Accordingly, a ruling by the trial court that plaintiffs were employees simply because they accepted workers' compensation benefits would be erroneous as a matter of law. Of course, such a ruling would also be inconsistent with the court's earlier comments that employee status was "not at issue." Nevertheless, it is the correctness of the court's decision, not its rationale, that is at issue on appeal. In re Marriage of Lange, 307 Ill.App.3d 303, 240 Ill.Dec. 414, 717 N.E.2d 507 (1999). Here, that decision was to grant summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that plaintiffs had applied for and accepted workers' compensation benefits. A substantial body of case law exists supporting such a ruling. See Fregeau v. Gillespie, 96 Ill.2d 479, 71 Ill.Dec. 716, 451 N.E.2d 870 (1983); Rhodes v. Industrial Comm'n, 92 Ill.2d 467, 66 Ill.Dec. 83, 442 N.E.2d 509 (1982); Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 81 Ill.2d 229, 41 Ill.Dec. 776, 408 N.E.2d 198 (1980); Wells v. Enloe, 282 Ill.App.3d 586, 218 Ill.Dec. 425, 669 N.E.2d 368 (1996); Zurowska v. Berlin Industries, Inc., 282 Ill.App.3d 540, 217 Ill.Dec. 499, 667 N.E.2d 588 (1996); Vance v. Wentling, 249 Ill. App.3d 867, 189 Ill.Dec. 201, 619 N.E.2d 902 (1993); Miller v. Miller, 167 Ill.App.3d 176, 118 Ill.Dec. 161, 521 N.E.2d 229 (1988). As explained in Wells:

"Our supreme court has clearly ruled that an injured employee who applies for and accepts workers' compensation benefits, whether through a settlement or an award, cannot thereafter also recover civil damages from the employer for the same injury. Where an injured employee collects benefits on the basis that his injures are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, that employee cannot thereafter properly allege that those same injuries fall outside the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. [Citation.] The

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