Wright-Jones v. Johnson

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Per Curiam
• Citation: Wright-Jones v. Johnson, 256 S.W.3d 177 (Mo. App. 2008)
• Decision Date: 18 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. ED 91368.,ED 91368.
• Parties: Robin WRIGHT-JONES, Respondent, v. Connie L. JOHNSON, Appellant.

256 S.W.3d 177

Robin WRIGHT-JONES, Respondent, v. Connie L. JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. ED 91368.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

June 18, 2008.

Darold E. Crotzer, Jr., Amy J. White, Clayton, MO, for Respondent.

Rufus J. Tate, Jr., Clayton, MO, Anthony D. Gray, Saint Louis, MO, for Appellant.

Before ROY L. RICHTER, P.J., GLENN A. NORTON, J. and KENNETH M. ROMINES, J.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Connie L. Johnson appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of Robin Wright-Jones on Wright-Jones's petition challenging Johnson's qualifications for nomination to the office of state senator for the 5th district, and requesting that Johnson's name be removed from the August 2008 primary election ballot. Johnson also appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of Wright-Jones on Johnson's counterclaims, which sought a declaration that Johnson is qualified to be a candidate for the 5th senatorial district (Count I), and alleged that Johnson's property and liberty interests were violated (Count II). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Johnson and Wright-Jones each filed a declaration of candidacy for the Democratic nomination to the office of state senator for the 5th district, which is located in the City of St. Louis. Thereafter, on April 22, 2008, Wright-Jones filed a petition challenging Johnson's qualifications for nomination to the office on the basis that Johnson did not reside in the district in November 2007.¹ In her petition, Wright-Jones requested that Johnson's name be removed from the August 2008 primary election ballot. Additionally, Wright-Jones prayed that the court "set th[e] matter for hearing so that she may leave to produce proof of [Johnson's] failure to meet the residency requirements."

On April 23, 2008, Wright-Jones filed a motion to set a hearing on her petition "at [a] reasonable time for discovery to be accomplished." On that same date, Johnson objected to the trial court holding a hearing on Wright-Jones's petition later than April 29, 2008, on the grounds that section 115.531 RSMo Supp.2008² required the court to hear the petition within five days of being filed. Thereafter, the trial court ruled all discovery should be completed by May 8, 2008, and set Wright-Jones's petition for trial on May 9, 2008.

Johnson filed an answer and two counterclaims to Wright-Jones's petition on April 28, 2008. Count I, a request for declaratory judgment, sought a declaration that Johnson is qualified to be a candidate for the 5th senatorial district. Count II alleged that Johnson's property and liberty interests were violated because: (1) Johnson is qualified to be a candidate for the 5th senatorial district; and (2) the trial court failed to hear Wright-Jones's petition within five days of being filed in accordance with section 115.531. On May 2, 2008, the trial court entered an order ruling that it would "not hear or consider or rule on [Johnson's] counter-claims until some time after [the] parties have had time to fully reply to the claims and have reasonable time to conduct discovery."

Johnson filed a motion requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 73.01(c).³ The trial court held a bench trial on Wright-Jones's petition on May 9, 2008.

On May 15, 2008, the trial court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in favor of Wright-Jones. First, based on the evidentiary record,⁴ which Johnson did not contest, the trial court found that Johnson was not a resident of the 5th senatorial district in November 2007. Thus, the court concluded that Johnson is not qualified to be a candidate for nomination to the office of senator for the 5th district pursuant to section 21.070 because she was not a resident of the district for one year immediately prior to the November 2008 general election. The court ruled that, "[Johnson's] name shall not be printed on the official ballot." Secondly, the trial court addressed Johnson's argument that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Wright-Jones's petition because it failed to hold a preliminary hearing within five days of the petition being filed in accordance with section 115.531. The trial court reasoned that Johnson's jurisdictional argument lacked merit because:

[T]he instant suit is a challenge to [Johnson's] qualifications, as authorized by Section 115.526, and not a suit contesting the results of a primary election under Section 115.531. This distinction was deemed critical in Dally v. Butler, 972 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Mo.App. S.D.1998). None of the cases relied upon by [Johnson] stand for the proposition that the procedures in Section 115.531, dealing with the contest of the results of a primary election, are applicable to a challenge to the qualifications of a candidate, as provided in Section 115.526.

Finally, the court denied Johnson's counterclaims on the grounds that they were moot in light of its rulings on Johnson's qualifications and Johnson's jurisdictional argument. Johnson appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Our review of a court-tried case is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). This Court will affirm the trial court's judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law. Id. We defer to the trial court's findings of facts because of its superior ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. Sheppard v. East, 192 S.W.3d 518, 522 (Mo.App. E.D.2006). However, we review questions of law de novo. Id.

B. The Trial Court had Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Statutory Authority to Hear and Enter Judgment on Wright-Jones's Petition

In her first, second, third, and fifth points on appeal, Johnson asserts that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and statutory authority to hear and enter judgment on Wright-Jones's petition challenging Johnson's qualifications. In those points, Johnson alleges that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and statutory authority to hear and enter judgment on Wright-Jones's petition after the passage of five days from the date it was filed.

1. The Election Contest Statutes Govern the Trial Court's Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Proceedings Over Wright-Jones's Petition Brought Pursuant to Section 115.526

As an initial matter, we note that the right to contest an election is conferred by statute only; it is not a common law or equitable right. Missouri ex rel. Bouchard v. Grady, 86 S.W.3d 121, 123 (Mo. App. E.D.2002). Sections 115.526 to 115.601 govern election contests ("election contest statutes"). Under the election contest statutes, primary election contests can take three forms. First, before a primary election is held, the election may be contested on the basis of a candidate's qualifications for nomination to office under section 115.526. See Section 115.575.1 (providing that "all contested elections" include elections "contested on the basis of qualification"). Wright-Jones's petition challenging Johnson's qualifications for nomination to the office of state senator for the 5th district is this type of primary election contest. Secondly, after an election is held, the returns or results may be contested on the grounds that irregularities occurred in the election pursuant to sections 115.527, 115.531, or 115.553. Finally, section 115.601.1 provides that after an election is held, a contestant who was defeated by less than one percent of the votes cast "shall have the right to a recount of the votes cast for the office...."

A party seeking relief pursuant to one of the election contest statutes must bring herself strictly within its terms. Dally v. Butler, 972 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. App. S.D.1998). Strict compliance with the election contest statutes is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court. Hockemeier v. Berra, 641 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Mo. banc 1982); State ex rel. Wilson v. Hart, 583 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Mo.App. E.D.1979). Once a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a party's petition, the court may only grant relief that is specifically authorized by the election contest statutes. Missouri ex rel. Bouchard, 86 S.W.3d at 123. Accordingly, the election contest statutes govern the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and proceedings over Wright-Jones's petition brought pursuant to section 115.526.

2. Our Review of the Election Contest Statutes Involves Statutory Construction and Questions of Law

Because the facts are uncontested in this case, whether the election contest statutes conferred subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court involves statutory construction, and is a question of law that we review de novo. See Powell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 245 S.W.3d 864, 865 (Mo.App. E.D.2008); Garza v. Valley Crest Landscape Maintenance, Inc., 224 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Mo.App. E.D.2007). Whether the election contest statutes authorized the trial court's proceedings over Wright-Jones's petition brought pursuant to section 115.526 also involves statutory construction, and is a question of law that we review de novo. See Garza, 224 S.W.3d at 64.

The primary rule of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the legislature from the language used and give effect to that intent. Missouri ex rel. Bouchard, 86 S.W.3d at 123. The words used are given their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We construe statutes in such a way as to avoid unreasonable, oppressive, or absurd results. Id. "The entire legislative act must be construed together, and if reasonably possible, all provisions must be harmonized." Id.

3. The Election Contest Statutes Conferred Subject Matter Jurisdiction upon the Trial Court to Entertain Wright-Jones's Petition Brought Pursuant to Section 115.526

In her first point on appeal, Johnson maintains that the election contest statutes did not confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the...