Wright-Taylor v. Howard University Hosp., No. 07-AA-1173.

CourtD.C. Court of Appeals
Writing for the CourtSteadman
CitationWright-Taylor v. Howard University Hosp., 974 A.2d 210 (D.C. 2009)
Decision Date28 May 2009
Docket NumberNo. 07-AA-1173.
PartiesRona WRIGHT-TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. HOWARD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, Respondent.

Rona Wright-Taylor, pro se.

No brief was filed on behalf of respondent.

Before WAGNER, NEBEKER, and STEADMAN, Senior Judges.

STEADMAN, Senior Judge:

Petitioner, Rona Wright-Taylor, was denied unemployment compensation by the Department of Employment Services (DOES). She appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), but her appeal was "dismissed for lack of jurisdiction" as untimely filed beyond the ten-day limit for such appeals. Before us, petitioner argues that OAH has jurisdiction to review the DOES determination because she mailed her initial request for a hearing before OAH within the ten-day filing period. Because the regulations governing the procedures for timely filing of a notice of appeal at issue here are rule-based and not statutory, and because OAH provided ambiguous notice to petitioner of the appeal process, we reverse and remand the case to OAH for a hearing on the merits.

I.

The final order of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the OAH dismissing petitioner's appeal made the following findings of fact, which we take as given.1 "The DOES Claims Examiner's Determination was certified as mailed to the parties on June 21, 2007.... On Monday, July 2, 2007, Claimant hand carried her request for a hearing to her local U.S. Post Office in Elkins Park, Pennsylvania, and mailed it first class mail, in an envelope addressed to The Office of Administrative Hearings, 941 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite 9100, Washington, DC 20002." This was OAH's correct address.

"Having not heard back from [OAH], Claimant telephoned the Clerk's Office on July 20, 2007, and spoke with a member of the staff who informed her that there was no record of her request for a hearing having arrived [at OAH]. The staff member told Claimant that he would conduct a search and let her know if he found her submission. Claimant again telephoned [OAH] on July 27, 2007, at which time a staff member told her nothing had been found and invited her to send a letter enclosing a copy of her initial request. Claimant mailed a copy of her initial request, together with a cover letter.... Claimant telephoned the Clerk's Office on August 6, 2007, and was told that there was no record of her second mailing arriving [at OAH]. However, on August 7, 2007, a staff member telephoned Claimant advising her that her letter and enclosure had arrived."

On August 13, 2007, OAH served petitioner with an Order to Show Cause why her request should not be dismissed for failure to file in a timely fashion. Petitioner issued a response, and OAH held a hearing.2 On October 4, 2007, the ALJ dismissed petitioner's claim for lack of jurisdiction because she did not file within the statutory ten-day filing period, citing D.C.Code § 51-111(b) (2001). The ALJ at three points expressly acknowledged that petitioner had "testified credibly." He ruled, however, that "a filing is deemed filed when it is date stamped by [OAH] or, if the filing arrives in an envelope bearing a U.S. Postal Service postmark, [OAH] may consider the postmark for determining timeliness. OAH Rules 2805, 2899. Here, Claimant's initial request for a hearing never arrived at [OAH] and thus, there is no postmark to establish timeliness. Accordingly, there is no evidence the appeal was filed within the statutory period." The ALJ concluded that because the appeal was not timely filed within the statutory ten-day period, OAH lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

II.

We begin our analysis by recognizing our consistent holdings that the statutory ten-day period within which a petitioner must file his or her notice of appeal is "jurisdictional." See Chatterjee v. Mid Atlantic Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 946 A.2d 352, 354 (D.C.2008) ("Our decisions repeatedly have affirmed the rule that `[t]he ten day period provided for [administrative] appeals under the Unemployment Compensation Act ... is jurisdictional, and failure to file within the period prescribed divests the agency of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.'") (quoting Calhoun v. Wackenhut Servs., 904 A.2d 343, 345 (D.C. 2006)).3 We also take note, however, of recent Supreme Court cases significantly clarifying the proper use of the word "jurisdictional" in such contexts.

The Supreme Court first distinguished mandatory jurisdiction rules from claim-processing rules in Kontrick v. Ryan. 540 U.S. 443, 453, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (holding that bankruptcy rules prescribed by the Supreme Court "do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction.") (internal citation omitted); see also Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15-16, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (holding that claim-processing rules setting forth time limits for a defendant's motion for a new trial grounded on a reason other than newly discovered evidence are not jurisdictional). In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Court emphasized that "time prescriptions, however emphatic, are not properly typed jurisdictional." 546 U.S. 500, 510, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, in Bowles v. Russell, the Court's most recent decision regarding jurisdiction limitations under claim-processing rules, the Court distinguished statutory time limits from rule-based time limits for taking an appeal, the former being truly jurisdictional and the latter being subject to equitable exceptions to their formal requirements. 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The operative statutory provision that is usually cited as setting the ten-day time limit for unemployment compensation appeals is D.C.Code § 51-111(b) (2001), formerly codified at D.C.Code § 46-112(b) (1981) and D.C.Code § 46-311(b) (1973). See Burton v. NTT Consulting, LLC, 957 A.2d 927, 929 (D.C.2008) ("D.C.Code § 51-111(b) (2001) sets forth the deadline for filing an administrative appeal for unemployment compensation."). It does so, admittedly, in a somewhat backhanded and confusing way. Subsection (b) provides that "an agent of the Director" (now called the claims examiner) shall make an "initial determination" of eligibility. It then provides that "the claimant and interested parties shall be given notice thereof and permitted to appeal therefrom to the Director and the courts as is provided in this subchapter for notice of, and appeals from, decisions of appeal tribunals."4 Subsequently, subsection (b) provides that "[t]he Director shall promptly notify the claimant and any party to the proceeding of its determination, and such determination shall be final within 10 days after the mailing of notice thereof to the party's last-known address or in the absence of such mailing, within 10 days of actual delivery of such notice." This quoted passage is the only reference in subsection (b) to a ten-day period, and makes no mention of an appeal.5 We do note that subsection (d) provides for an appeal tribunal, and subsection (e) provides for appeals from such tribunals to the Director, and in that regard states: "Unless a petition for such appeal is filed within 10 days of mailing of the decision of an appeal tribunal ... the decision of the appeal tribunal shall constitute the decision of the Director and shall be effective as such. Any decision of an appeal tribunal which is not ... so appealed within such 10-day period is final for all purposes, except as provided in § 51-112 [providing for appeals to this court]." In any event, it is settled that the statute requires that an appeal from an initial determination must be filed within ten days of the mailing of notice of the determination. See Gaskins, supra note 3, 315 A.2d at 568.

The Office of Administrative Hearings Establishment Act of 2001 calls on OAH to perform the administrative review conducted formerly by DOES, which is now done by one administrative law judge, with a direct appeal therefrom to this court.6 D.C.Code § 2-1831.03(b)(1) (2001) (granting OAH jurisdiction over appeals from DOES). That Act does not contain a provision governing the timely filing of a notice of appeal in an unemployment compensation case.7 See D.C.Code §§ 2-1831.01 to -.18. Under Bowles, supra, therefore, the only statutory provisions that can be considered strictly jurisdictional and outside the realm of waiver for equitable purposes are those quoted above contained in § 51-111. 551 U.S. at 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360.

Statutes, of course, are subject to interpretation and their general provisions often need to be spelled out by detailed regulations. Here, for example, questions may arise as to when an appeal is "filed," how the ten-day period is computed, what constitutes a "mailing," what is the form of "notice," and so forth, as well as questions of proof of the relevant facts. In that regard, we give deference to any reasonable interpretation of the statute by OAH. See Smith v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 548 A.2d 95, 97 (D.C. 1988) ("Where an administrative agency is delegated broad authority to administer a statutory scheme ... we defer to a reasonable construction of the statute made by the agency.") (internal citations omitted).

The OAH Rules of Practice and Procedure do not mention explicitly the ten-day filing period. 1 DCMR §§ 2800 to -2899 (2006). The OAH Rules of Practice and Procedure do, however, contain detailed provisions relating to various aspects of the appeals process, including provisions regarding time computation and what constitutes filing. 1 DCMR §§ 2811.3, 2899. With specific relevance to the case now before us, 1 DCMR § 2805.8 provides that "[a]ny request for a hearing under this Rule appealing a determination regarding unemployment compensation shall be filed with this administrative court in order for the case to be commenced before this administrative court."8 Then, in its...

Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI

Get Started for Free

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
5 cases
  • Dist. of D.C. Dept. of Mental Health v. Hayes
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • September 20, 2010
    ...that such an appeal had to be filed within ten calendar days of the mailing of the notice of the determination. Wright-Taylor v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 974 A.2d 210, 213 (D.C.2009); see D.C.Code § 51-111(b). On July 23, 2010, however, The Unemployment Compensation Reform Amendment Act, D.C. La......
  • Yates v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • November 23, 2016
    ...the Notice of Appeal Rights was so ambiguous under Calhoun v. Wackenhut Servs. , 904 A.2d 343 (D.C. 2006), and Wright–Taylor v. Howard Univ. Hosp. , 974 A.2d 210 (D.C. 2009), that Petitioner should be deemed to have filed her appeal on time. If the ALJ still finds that Petitioner did not fi......
  • Dist. of D.C. Dep't of Employment Serv. v. Smallwood, 09–AA–719.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • August 18, 2011
    ...appeals], which is now done by one administrative law judge, with a direct appeal therefrom to this court.” Wright–Taylor v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 974 A.2d 210, 213 (D.C.2009) (citing D.C.Code § 2–1831.03(b)(1) (2001) (granting OAH jurisdiction over appeals from DOES)).5 OAH exercises that ad......
  • In re Riley
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts – District of Columbia Circuit
    • March 5, 2018
    ...the envelopes from the mail box until the next day, November 21, 2017. The debtor relies on decisions like Wright-Taylor v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 974 A.2d 210 (D.C. 2009), in arguing that the date of retrieval from the mail box controls because a mark from a private postal meter cannot establ......
  • Get Started for Free