Wright v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 12 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19-cv-3230-AGF |
| Parties | PETE WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. BILL ANDERSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court upon the filing of a second amended complaint by self-represented plaintiff Pete Wright, a civilly committed resident at the Sexual Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services Center ("SORTS") in Farmington, Missouri. (ECF No. 7). The Court previously granted plaintiff in forma pauperis status and reviewed his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 4). Based on that review, the Court directed plaintiff to file a second amended complaint on a Court-provided form and in compliance with the Court's instructions. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's claims against defendants Bill Anderson, Dr. Kimberly Bye, and Denise Hacker pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff is in the custody of the Missouri Department of Mental Health ("MDMH") and is being detained at SORTS. On December 9, 2019, plaintiff filed his original complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Bill Anderson, Unit Manager at SORTS. (ECF No. 1).
On June 8, 2020, plaintiff filed a seventy-five-page handwritten amended complaint accompanied by thirty-three pages of exhibits. (ECF No. 3). Named as defendants in the amended complaint included Bill Anderson and five additional defendants: Mark Stringer (Director, MDMH); Dr. Kimberly Bye (Director of Treatment, SORTS); Cynthia Hackathorn (Director of Treatment Program, SORTS); Kyle Pinkley (Nurse Supervisor, SORTS); and David Schmitt (Chief Operating Officer, SORTS). Plaintiff brought his claim against all defendants in their official and individual capacities.
Plaintiff's claims related to numerous separate events that allegedly occurred from "September 10, 2018 to beyond filing this civil action." Among his many claims, plaintiff alleged that Schmitt, Bye, and Anderson permitted his legal materials to be confiscated without notice; denied his requests for additional time to access a computer for the purpose of conducting legal research; failed to inform him that SORTS had "video-court" capabilities; obstructed plaintiff from attending hearings; and failed to provide him with requested legal materials.
As to Stringer, Schmitt, Bye, Anderson, Hackathorn and Pinkley, plaintiff alleged they had a custom and policy of not providing him with written SORTS procedures; improperly permitted staff members to watch him shower, masturbate, and sleep; allowed "behavioral worksheets" to be issued against him in violation of unpublished rules; and denied him a personal television, DVD player, indoor fitness program, flash drive, art supplies, and other benefits.
As to Stringer and Hackathorn only, plaintiff alleged they failed to hire, train or supervise competent employees and engaged in a conspiracy with the Missouri Department of Corrections to "ignore . . . the opinion that plaintiff does not a have a mental abnormality." Plaintiff repeatedly stated that modern DNA testing would exonerate him from guilt, although it was not apparent from the complaint that he intended to allege false arrest or habeas corpus relief.
Plaintiff further alleged that all defendants improperly placed him on "total ward restriction" which denied him access to indoor or outdoor recreation without notice and failed to establish "screening procedures and devise a systematic, authoritative mechanism to authenticate a jury's decision." Plaintiff alleged that those actions amounted to disparate treatment. Plaintiff further stated that in 1985 he co-founded an R&B musical act named "Kinfunk," and subsequently released a vinyl record. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated his due process rights by "obstruct[ing] [his] ability to purchase and possess musical equipment and instruments." Plaintiff also claimed that his First Amendment rights were being violated by "denying him [the] right to order magazines directly from a publisher and restricting CD purchases." The complaint continued with numerous additional claims and allegations.
For relief, plaintiff sought over $6,000,000 in compensatory damages, $15,000,000 in punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiff requested a different amount of damages from each individual defendant.
On July 9, 2020, the Court reviewed plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and determined that it was subject to dismissal for failure to comply with Rules 8(a) and 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 4). Specifically, the Court found that the amended complaint failed to include "a short and plain statement of the claim" and improperly advanced "numerous claims against multiple defendants concerning unrelated events that occurred over approximately a two-year period." (Id. at 4-5). Because plaintiff was self-represented, the Court entered an order giving him the opportunity to file a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies. In that order, the Court provided plaintiff with clear instructions about how to prepare his complaint. (Id. at 6-7).
Plaintiff has now filed a second amended complaint, which the Court reviews pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a "mere possibility of misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must "accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements. Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) ().
When reviewing a complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A "liberal construction" means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even self-represented complainants are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (). In addition, affording a self-represented complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
On July 24, 2020, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against three of the seven defendants named in his first amended complaint: Bill Anderson (Unit Manager, MDMH and SORTS); Dr. Kimberly Bye (Director of Treatment Services, SORTS); and Denise Hacker (Chief Operating Officer, MDMH and SORTS). (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff brings his claims against all defendants in their official and individual capacities.
Plaintiff alleges that between September 10, 2018 and July 15, 2020 he was "denied liberty and his property without notice" in violation of his due process rights when Anderson and Bye ordered MDMH staff to "confiscate plaintiff's legal materials while he was litigating several active cases," "limit personal property without a rational connection to a safety or security concern," and "physically restrained plaintiff under a procedure called 'total ward restriction.'"
Plaintiff further alleges that from July 2019 to March 3, 2020, Hacker "directed plaintiff's incoming and outgoing mail withheld without notice to him." Plaintiff states that he filed letters and grievances with Anderson, Bye, and Hacker "requesting copies or citations of published procedures that authorized confiscation of property and physical restraint." Plaintiff claims that Anderson "stated in several responses, he did not have to provide policy or procedure to plaintiff for any reason." Plaintiff asserts that "state statutes mandate procedures be written and provided to patients on site, at the facility." Plaintiff also asserts that "state statute allows plaintiff to communicate, associate and meet privately with persons of his choice and to send and receive his personal mail unopened."
Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent defendants from further confiscation of his legal materials and denial of his personal property. Plaintiff also seeks $2,000,000 in compensatory damages.
Having carefully reviewed and liberally construed plaintiff's allegations, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court must dismiss plaintiff's claims.
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