Wright v. Attorney Gen.
| Decision Date | 22 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:10-cv-942-Orl-31GJK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | MICHAEL J. WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, et al., Respondents. |
Petitioner initiated this action for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254 (Doc. No. 5). Upon consideration of the amended petition, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why the relief sought in the amended petition should not be granted. Thereafter, Respondents filed a response to the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus in compliance with this Court's instructions and with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Doc. No. 16). Petitioner filed replies to the response (Doc. Nos. 18, 19, 22, & 23).
Petitioner alleges six claims for relief in his habeas petition: (1) the arresting officer engaged in unlawful conduct in relation to his arrest, (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by prosecuting Petitioner in light of the officer's unlawful conduct, (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by waiving Petitioner's right to speedy trial and by conspiring with the State to convict him, (4) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to submit the records from another person's criminal case, (5) the trialjudge was not impartial, and (6) his right to speedy trial was violated and the arresting officer did not have a search warrant resulting in an illegal search and seizure. For the following reasons, the petition is denied.
Petitioner was charged by information with one count of possession of cocaine. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to dismiss based on the defense of entrapment, and the motion was heard the morning that the trial was scheduled to begin. The state court denied the motion to dismiss, and Petitioner subsequently entered a plea of no contest but reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 237 days, time served. Petitioner, through counsel, appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed per curiam.
Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The state court denied the motion. Petitioner appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed per curiam.
Petitioner filed a second amended Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. The state trial court denied the motion as procedurally barred and without merit. Petitioner appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed per curiam. Petitioner filed a Notice to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction with the Supreme Court of Florida, which dismissed the notice for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Belated Appeal of his conviction, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida summarilydenied the petition. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Florida, which dismissed the case based on lack of jurisdiction.
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase "clearly established Federal law," encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
"[S]ection 2254(d)(1) provides two separate bases for reviewing state court decisions; the 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses articulate independent considerations a federal court must consider." Maharaj v. Secretary for Dep't. of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). The meaning of the clauses was discussed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2001):
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme Court] has on a set of materiallyindistinguishable facts. Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the United States Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Even if the federal court concludes that the state court applied federal law incorrectly, habeas relief is appropriate only if that application was "objectively unreasonable." Id.
Finally, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." A determination of a factual issue made by a state court, however, shall be presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Parker, 244 F.3d at 835-36; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient and "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"; and (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.1 Id. at 687-88. The prejudice requirement of the Strickland inquiry is modified when the claim is a challenge to a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). To satisfythe prejudice requirement in such claims, "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59.
A court must adhere to a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. "Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. at 690; Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir.1989).
As observed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the test for ineffective assistance of counsel:
has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial. Courts also should at the start presume effectiveness and should always avoid second guessing with the benefit of hindsight. Strickland encourages reviewing courts to allow lawyers broad discretion to represent their clients by pursuing their own strategy. We are not interested in grading lawyers' performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Under those rules and presumptions, "the cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between." Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994).
In claim one, Petitioner asserts that the officer who arrested him engaged in unlawful conduct. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the officer seized crack cocaine from Joseph Malo2 ("Malo") and then immediately proceeded to give the cocaine to Petitioner.3 Petitioner maintains that this violated his right to due process and was entrapment because the officer could not use the cocaine in such a manner without a court order pursuant to Sections 893.12(4)4 and 932.702,5 Florida Statutes. Similarly, in claim two,Petitioner argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by prosecuting him in light of the fact that an order was not entered in Malo's criminal case authorizing the officer to use the cocaine.6
The record reflects that Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss prior to trial raising the argument asserted in claim one. The trial court heard arguments on the motion. Petitioner argued that the charge against him should be dismissed based on the arresting officer'smisconduct in failing to obtain an order from the court allowing him to use the seized cocaine in a sting operation. Petitioner maintained that the officer had violated the State's contraband statutes, and thereby committed an illegal act. Relying on state law, the state court denied Petitioner's motion, reasoning that the delivery of a controlled substance in a reverse sting operation is not a violation of state law. See App. C at 17-18 ( State v. Bass, 451 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)).
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court's ruling is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. Pursuant to Section 893.13(9)(h), Florida Statutes, the offense of possession of cocaine is "not applicable to the delivery to, or actual or constructive possession for . . . purpose only of controlled substances by, persons . . .,...
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