Wright v. Bernstein

• Decision Date: 28 January 1957
• Docket Number: No. A--51,A--51
• Citation: 129 A.2d 19,23 N.J. 284
• Parties: Constance WRIGHT and Augustus Wright, Jr., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Samuel BERNSTEIN and Walbern Manufacturing Co., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 284

23 N.J. 284

129 A.2d 19

Constance WRIGHT and Augustus Wright, Jr., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Samuel BERNSTEIN and Walbern Manufacturing Co., Defendants-Appellants.

No. A--51.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Nov. 19, 1956.

Decided Jan. 28, 1957.

Robert Shaw, Newark, for appellants (Shaw, Pindar, McElroy & Connell, Newark, attorneys; William T. McElroy, Newark, on the brief).

Theodore D. Parsons, Red Bank, for respondents (Parsons, LaBrecque, Canzona & Combs, Red Bank, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OLIPHANT, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff-respondent Constance Wright in the sum of $75,000 for personal injuries and in favor of the plaintiff-respondent, her husband, in the sum of $7,000 for property damage to his automobile and Per quod. We certified this appeal here on our own motion, R.R. 1:10--1(a).

The action was one in negligence and arose out of an automobile accident involving an intersectional collision when the car driven by the plaintiff-respondent Mrs. Wright, was struck by the car driven by the defendant-appellant Bernstein. Mrs. Wright received unusually severe injuries.

Since we have concluded that the judgment must be reversed because of infirmities in the manner in which the jury was impaneled, we find it unnecessary to detail the proofs as to the nature of the collision and the extent and severity of the injuries, although the argument is advanced on this appeal that the judgments are excessive and contrary to the weight of the evidence.

The trial below was commenced on May 21, 1956, on which day 12 persons were selected to fill the jury box and counsel for the plaintiff proceeded to interrogate each juror individually with respect to his or her occupation; Juror No. 6, Charles L. Shibla, stated he was an electronics engineer employed at the Signal Corps Laboratories at Fort Monmouth. Counsel then addressed general questions to this panel as to whether they would be prejudiced against a person who sued to recover damages for personal injuries, or whether or not they would be prejudiced by the fact that the plaintiff had been divorced from her first husband and then remarried; then followed a series of general questions as to whether any of the jurors had been represented by counsel or any member of his firm, or whether they were friends or related to any of the party litigants. Jurors Nos. 9 and 10 were excused by consent because they were personal friends of the plaintiffs. Each side used a number of peremptory challenges to excuse certain members of the panel then defense counsel addressed the following question to the panel:

'Mr. Pindar: Have any of you ever been involved or close members of your family been involved in an accident out of which lawsuit arose?'

Several jurors raised their hands, and counsel then interrogated Juror No. 6, Charles L. Shibla, as follows:

'Q. How about you? A. Oh, three or four years ago. My mother.

'Q. Seriously? A. She was not injured. It was property damage.

'Q. I see.'

After one or two more excuses the selection of the jury was completed and it was sworn, and the court recessed until the next morning.

On Tuesday, May 22, 1956, when the court recovened, it developed that Juror No. 5 had to be excused because of illness, and as a result of this a mistrial was declared, the entire jury discharged and returned to the jury room. The panel returned and a new jury was put in the box. Counsel noted that there were a number who had been selected or rejected from the jury impaneled and sworn the preceding day. Counsel for both parties, as well as the court, merely noted the fact, the those previously accepted remained and those excused were again excused.

Then counsel for the plaintiff directed the following questions to Shibla, who was now Juror No. 5:

'Q. Mr. Shibla, you are--well, you were accepted yesterday, weren't you? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. I thought I recognized your face, but I didn't get the name.'

Mr. Parsons, counsel for the plaintiff questioned the jury generally as follows:

'Mr. Parsons: There are several of you members of the jury as you are now constituted to whom we addressed questions yesterday. Because there are new members I desire to ask you all if any of you have any answers to these questions will you please speak up, because as the Court has indicated it's a case of importance to the plaintiffs and the Court has indicated an importance to the defendant. May I ask you, in the first place, as was indicated yesterday, and some of you sat, but to you new members sitting on this jury, have any of you any prejudice of any kind against a person who is injured in an automobile accident and then brings suit for the damages for the injuries they have sustained? If there is any latent prejudice I wish you would speak up so we could know. Then, I said yesterday, and I think, because I know people have occasionally some bias against it, but do any of you have any prejudice or would you have any prejudice against Mrs. Wright because some 13 or 14 years ago she divorced her husband?'

'May I ask you if any of you have been sued in accident cases? And to save time Mr. Pindar will ask you if any of you have brought suit in accident cases? I believe you answered yesterday.

'Juror Number Seven (Thomas L. LaRare): Yes.'

Thereafter counsel for the defense, Mr. Pindar, inquired:

'I think you just told Mr. Parsons none of you have been involved in accident cases, you or any close member of your family, is that correct?'

The entire panel, including Juror No. 5, Mr. Shibla, remained silent. The jury was finally drawn and sworn with Shibla a member as Juror No. 5.

The evidence of the plaintiff and defendant was presented on Tuesday, May 22, 1956, and on Wednesday, May 23, 1956; and the morning of May 24, 1956 was devoted to summation by counsel and the charge of the court. The jury then retired to commence their deliberations and a new case was called.

That case turned out to be the case of Olive P. Shibla v. Benjamin A. Crate, which involved a suit by Mrs. Shibla for personal injuries arising out of a fall in a store. At that time counsel for the defendants-appellants here, Mr. Pindar, was informed that the plaintiff, Olive P. Shibla, in the case then before the court was the mother of Juror No. 5, Charles L. Shibla, who had remained silent on his Voir dire when he was asked whether he or any member of his family had been involved in an accident case, and it appeared that his mother at the very time he was being examined on the Voir dire was sitting in the court room.

Counsel for the defendants immediately made a motion for a mistrial, but because the transcript of the Voir dire was not available the trial court reserved decision on this motion. The jury later returned with the verdict as above. On the very same day, in the case of Shibla v. Crate, counsel for the defendant Crate made a motion for a mistrial in that case which was granted by the court.

Subsequent to the entry of the judgment the defendants made a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive. This motion was returnable on June 8, 1956, on which day the motion for the mistrial was argued and denied.

Three days later the trial court sent for Mr. Shibla and interviewed him In camera, counsel for the respective parties not being present. Shibla's position was that he understood the question relating to accident as referring to an automobile accident and that it was not directed to accidents generally. He said, 'But my mother's case didn't even enter my mind because it was plainly and purely an automobile accident that was being tried to me and it had no bearing whatsoever. It didn't even enter my mind, sir.' Again he stated, 'As far as this other accident stuff, to me it seems synonymous, automobile accident and accident, and that is the way I felt. * * * Accident to me in this case was an automobile accident.' He then testified that on the first three polls of the jury he and another juror had voted in favor of the defendants on the ground the plaintiff has contributed to the accident, and for a considerable length of time he was dead set against any ruling in her favor, but that eventually he was persuaded to go along with the verdict.

The trial court denied the motion for a new trial on the ground the verdict was not the result of mistake, passion or prejudice, and he likewise denied the motion for a mistrial on the authority of Springdale Park v. Andriotis, 30 N.J.Super. 257, 104 A.2d 327 (App.Div.1954), and said the defendant was under the burden to establish he was harmed or prejudiced by what had happened; that there was a complete lack of proof that the juror in question was guilty of any conduct indicating that his vote for the verdict returned was in any way prejudiced or biased and that there was nothing except conjecture to establish such proposition. He said that even if the alleged fact the juror misled defense counsel in his efforts to ascertain their qualifications was true, that alone would not require a new trial and the defendant still had the burden of establishing that he was harmed.

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a mistrial. Our Constitution guarantees that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, Art. I, par. 9, and the right to peremptory challenge is an incident of that trial. While at common law there existed no right of peremptory challenge in civil actions, in this State the right to peremptory challenges in civil actions was given by L.1911, c. 151, p. 222, now N.J.S. 2A:78--7, N.J.S.A.; Roberts v. Saunders, 118 N.J.L. 548, 554, 194 A. 1 (E. & A.1937). This right of challenge is further implemented by N.J.S. 2A:78--4, N.J.S.A., which, Inter alia, provides that on the trial of any cause, civil or criminal, all parties may interrogate a person summoned as a juror before he is sworn, to...