Wright v. Blakeslee

• Decision Date: 06 March 1925
• Citation: 102 Conn. 162,128 A. 113
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WRIGHT v. BLAKESLEE ET AL.

128 A. 113

102 Conn. 162

WRIGHT v. BLAKESLEE ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 6, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Isaac Wolfe, Judge.

Action by Catherine Wright against Clarence Blakeslee and others. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. No error.

Robert J. Woodruff, of New Haven, for appellants.

Walter J. Walsh and Thomas J. Ryan, both of New Haven, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and BEACH, CURTIS, KEELER, and MALTBIE JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and the jury might reasonably have found, the following facts: The defendants on June 1, 1923, were contractors, engaged in making and laying a pavement on Campbell evenue, which was a highway in West Haven, and in doing such work had excavated the easterly half of this avenue and placed loose stone thereon. Traffic was suspended on this half of the street, but the trolley cars continued operating in the center of the street. Defendants left a water pipe lying across the easterly sidewalk of this avenue and directly in the pathway that one would ordinarily take when passing to the easterly sidewalk of this avenue after alighting from a trolley car that was proceeding southerly. Plaintiff at 9:30 in the evening of this day, when it was dark, alighted from a trolley car at this point, crossed the easterly side of Campbell avenue, and in the exercise of reasonable care stepped onto the curb, and had proceeded a few steps upon the easterly sidewalk when she caught her foot under this pipe and fell and suffered the injuries for which she sues to recover damages. Defendants' appeal from the denial of the motion to set aside the verdict is based upon their claim that there was no evidence before the jury from which they could have found that the defendants had placed or maintained this pipe over which plaintiff alleges she tripped and fell, or that the injury from which the plaintiff suffered at the time of the trial was occasioned by her falling over this pipe, or that plaintiff was herself free from negligence essentially contributing to her injuries. None of defendants' claims have merit. The verdict of the jury is fully supported by the evidence. There seems to have been no reasonable ground of appeal from the denial of the motion to set aside the verdict.

Defendants' counsel criticize the charge in a number of particulars, chief of which is its alleged failure to properly instruct the jury as to defendants' duty towards plaintiff as respects this pipe. Their sole duty, they maintain, was to exercise reasonable case to place such warnings or barriers in the vicinity of the street on which they were working as would warn the public that the street was closed to traffic. This claim is predicated upon the fact that Campbell avenue was closed to traffic. In fact, it was open as to passengers alighting from trolley cars. Likewise the claim that the plaintiff who went upon a highway closed for traffic and undergoing repair did so at her own risk is predicated upon the fact that Campbell avenue was a closed street, which was not the fact. The court's instruction that the defendants owed to the plaintiff " the duty of using reasonable care in the performance of the work that they were carrying on, so as not to create and maintain an obstruction upon the sidewalk that was a source of danger, or likely to prove a menace, or cause an injury to persons who are lawfully using such highway, and who are in the exercise of due care," was correct under the circumstances of this case. His instruction as to the duty owed by the plaintiff was equally correct:

" A traveler upon a highway has a right to presume that the highway will be free from dangerous pitfalls until the contrary appears. It was the plaintiff's duty to be watchful of her surroundings and of the way in which she was going, and to exercise ordinary care, both to avoid dangers known to her, and to discover dangers or conditions of danger to which she was exposed."

Reasons of appeal 8, 9, 10, and 11, assign as error recognized principles of law which the court presented to the jury in unexceptionable form. Reasons of appeal 4, 12, and 13, which assign error in parts of the charge wherein some of the facts are claimed to have been incorrectly stated, in such way as to have prejudiced the jury, do not find support in the record. Reasons of appeal 19, 20, and 21 assign as error the refusal to charge, as requested by defendants, that plaintiff was bound under the circumstances presented in this case to exercise a high degree of care. The duty resting upon the plaintiff, a traveler upon the highway, was to exercise reasonable care, and this the court charged. Reasons of appeal 16, 17, and 18 obviously furnish no ground for discussion, except the phrase at the conclusion of reason 18, " and that there was no warning light or barrier there, and that it was totally dark at said point stands uncontradicted." Defendants' contention is that there was no foundation in the evidence for the statement that it was " totally dark" at the time and place of this accident. Plainly the evidence would have warranted the court in saying it was very dark, and so much so that one could not...