Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 96-71886.

• Decision Date: 15 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-71886.,96-71886.
• Citation: 930 F. Supp. 300
• Parties: Jennifer WRIGHT, as Personal Representative of Estate of James Malcolm Wright, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff, v. BOND-AIR, LTD., a Michigan corporation for profit; the Cessna Aircraft Company, a foreign corporation for profit; and Teledyne Continental Motors, a division of Teledyne, Inc., a foreign corporation for profit, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

930 F. Supp. 300

Jennifer WRIGHT, as Personal Representative of Estate of James Malcolm Wright, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff, v. BOND-AIR, LTD., a Michigan corporation for profit; the Cessna Aircraft Company, a foreign corporation for profit; and Teledyne Continental Motors, a division of Teledyne, Inc., a foreign corporation for profit, Defendants.

No. 96-71886.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

July 15, 1996.

David Katzman, Broomfield, CO, for Plaintiffs.

Richard Durden, Grand Rapids, MI, Kathryn Humphrey, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

EDMUNDS, District Judge.

This action arises out of a February 5, 1995 airplane crash that killed James M. Wright, Jr. who was piloting a twin engine Model 310L aircraft manufactured and sold by Cessna in October 1967. Plaintiff filed her wrongful death and product liability lawsuit against Defendants in state court alleging claims of negligence and breach of express and implied warranties. Defendants Cessna and Teledyne removed the action to this court claiming it "arises under" federal law, i.e., the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 Note (West 1996) ("GARA"), thus conferring this court with subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.¹ This matter comes before the court by way of this court's order to Defendants to show cause why this matter should not be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and by way of Plaintiff's motion to remand.

Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff's state law claims do not "arise under" federal law. GARA does not create a federal cause of action, and Plaintiff's state law cause of action does not present a substantial federal question. GARA creates a national statute of repose and serves a gatekeeping function for Plaintiff's state law action. GARA is narrowly drafted to preempt only state law statutes of limitation or statutes of repose that would permit lawsuits beyond GARA's 18 year limitation period in circumstances where its exceptions do not apply. It does not preempt a state's substantive law regarding negligence or breach of warranty claims. Accordingly, this court concludes consideration of the federal issue presented in Plaintiff's state law action is not sufficiently substantial to confer federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

I. Standard of Review

The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests "clearly upon the defendants as the removing party." Alexander v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir.1994) (citing Gafford v. General Electric Co., 997 F.2d 150, 155 (6th Cir. 1993)). The court is required to "`look to the complaint as it existed at the time the petition for removal was filed to determine' the matter of federal jurisdiction raised by the defendant's notice of removal." Alexander, 13 F.3d at 949 (quoting Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1277 (6th Cir.1991)).

Federal courts are authorized to hear only cases that "arise under" federal law, and courts determine what claims arise under federal law by referencing the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807-08, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 3232, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). "Since a defendant may remove a case only if the claim could have been brought in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), ..., the question for removal jurisdiction must also be determined by reference to the `well-pleaded complaint.'" Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808, 106 S.Ct. at 3232.

Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint; not a defense or allegations in the complaint that anticipate a defense. Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). There are two exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule: (1) the "complete preemption" doctrine permits removal when the state law the complaint is based upon has been totally preempted by federal law,² and (2) the "artful pleading" doctrine permits removal when the plaintiff has "artfully" pled her complaint to avoid stating the federal law claim her complaint is necessarily based upon. Defendants here do not rely on complete preemption for removal. Instead, they rely on the artful pleading doctrine and claim Plaintiff artfully pled her complaint to disguise its federal nature.

II. Analysis

The United States Supreme Court has observed that, although there is "no `single, precise definition'" for the phrase "arising under federal law," two inquiries have evolved to help the courts identify cases where federal question jurisdiction exists. The first asks whether federal law creates the cause of action. If the answer is yes, federal question jurisdiction exists. The vast majority of federal question jurisdiction cases fall in this category. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808, 106 S.Ct. at 3232.

If state law creates the cause of action, a second federal-question inquiry applies. This asks whether "the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on some construction of federal law." Id. at 809, 106 S.Ct. at 3232. Or, as stated by the Court in Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13, 103 S.Ct. at 2848, whether "it appears that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims."³ Defendants admit GARA does not create a federal cause of action. Instead, they point to the second inquiry and argue Plaintiff's state-created cause of action presents a substantial federal question and therefore "arises under" federal law.

A. The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994

GARA, which establishes a federal statute of repose, was enacted to revitalize the general aviation industry by protecting manufacturers from liability lawsuits arising out of accidents involving general aviation aircraft or component parts that are more than 18 years old. H.R.Rep. No. 103-525, 103d Congr.2d Sess., pt. 2 (1994), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1644, 1994 WL 422719, at *5-6 (hereinafter "1994 H.R. Rep."). See also Altseimer v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 919 F.Supp. 340, 342 (E.D.Cal.1996). Unless one of GARA's four exceptions applies,⁴ GARA "supersedes any state law to the extent that such law permits a civil action ... to be brought after the applicable limitation period ..." GARA, § 2(d).⁵ One of the exceptions is relevant here.

The 18 year limitation does not apply if plaintiff (1) pleads with specificity facts, and (2) proves that (a) the manufacturer knowingly misrepresented, concealed or withheld from the Federal Aviation Administration, (b) required information, (c) that is material and relevant to the performance, maintenance, or operation of the allegedly defective aircraft or component part, and (d) that misrepresentation, concealment or withholding is causally related to the harm allegedly suffered.⁶ Defendants Cessna and Teledyne point out that Plaintiff's complaint, without referencing GARA, alleges facts in an attempt to satisfy GARA's § 2(b)(1) exception requirements. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff's artful pleading does not conceal the fact that her complaint presents a federal question sufficient to confer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

B. Substantial Federal Question

In Merrell Dow, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that "the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813, 106 S.Ct. at 3234. Rather, the Court cautioned, federal question jurisdiction exists only where the federal issue raised in a state cause of action is "substantial." The Court observed that its decision in Franchise Tax Bd. demonstrated this point; "the central issue presented in that case turned on the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), but we nevertheless concluded that federal jurisdiction was lacking." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809, 106 S.Ct. at 3233.

The Court in Merrell Dow addressed the propriety of removing plaintiff's negligence action, based in part on the theory the defendant drug manufacturer violated the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), to federal court. It concluded that "a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim `arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'" Id. at 817, 106 S.Ct. at 3237 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331).

When determining whether the federal issue in a state law cause of action is sufficiently "substantial" so as to confer federal-question jurisdiction, the Merrell Dow Court instructed that the court should consider the nature of the federal interest at stake, be sensitive with regard to "judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system", and be cognizant of the "need for prudence and restraint in the jurisdictional inquiry". Id. at 810, 106 S.Ct. at 3233. Consistent with these mandates, the focal point of the Court's analysis was the fact that the FDCA did not create a federal cause of action for FDCA violations and "Congress did not intend a private federal remedy for violations of the statute that it enacted." Id. at 811, 106 S.Ct. at 3233. The Court stressed, "the significance of the necessary assumption that there is no federal private cause of action thus cannot be overstated. For ... it would flout congressional intent to provide a federal remedy for the violation of the federal statute where the Act did not create one." Id. at 812, 106 S.Ct. at 3234. Accordingly, the Court held that "the congressional...