Wright v. C. S. Graves Land Co.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1898
• Parties: WRIGHT ET UX. v. C. S. GRAVES LAND CO.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

100 Wis. 269

75 N.W. 1000

WRIGHT ET UX.

v.C. S. GRAVES LAND CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 23, 1898.

Appeal from circuit court, Clark county; W. F. Bailey, Judge.

Action by Horace V. Wright and Emma Wright against the C. S. Graves Land Company for personal services. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The defendant was a corporation engaged in the building up of a village and improvement of a tract of land in Clark county, Wis. In February, 1884, plaintiffs and defendant entered into a written contract, by the terms of which plaintiffs agreed to move to Columbia, Clark county, Wis., on or before March 15th; to keep a boarding house and hotel there; to purchase of defendant not less than 80 acres of land, to be paid for in monthly payments at the rate of $300 per year; “to perform such labor as may be necessary in the superintending the clearing of land, building of roads, constructing of buildings, or any other labor that may be required of him by the party of the first part.” The plaintiffs were also to furnish a span of horses and a vehicle for use there without cost to defendant. For such services defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs $800 per annum,--$500 cash, and $300 to be applied on land contract. On the same day a land contract for 80 acres of land was made; the purchase price being $600, payable $300 and interest April 1, 1895, and $300 and interest April 1, 1896. The plaintiff Emma Wright alone was named as vendee therein. Plaintiffs moved to Columbia early in March, 1894, and entered into the discharge of their duties. On August 31st plaintiffs were notified that one Weaver had been appointed superintendent “of clearing land, constructing of highways, building and constructing of buildings,” etc.; and they were directed to govern themselves accordingly. On September 1st they were further notified “that your neglect and refusal to furnish a team of horses to work on lands” of defendant “is considered and accepted as a revocation of your contract,” and they were notified to vacate the premises. On September 4th another notice was served, reciting the notice of September 1st, asking them “to vacate and keep off the premises.” Plaintiffs vacated the premises, and after the expiration of the first year brought this action to recover the amount due for a year's service, and some small items of account not in controversy, less payments made for April, May, and June. Defendant answered, setting up the contract, and alleging a failure and refusal of the plaintiff husband to comply with its terms, by reason whereof it was canceled and terminated on September 1, 1894, and payment of all sums earned under the same. Judgment was rendered for plaintiffs for $418.78 and costs, from which this appeal is taken.M. C. Ring and A. E. Bleekman, for appellant.

L. M. Sturdevant, for respondents.

BARDEEN, J. (after stating the facts).

The contract in question does not, in terms, specify how long it shall continue in force. The court held that it was at least for a year, and in this he was manifestly right. The two papers introduced in evidence (that is, the contract for service and the land contract) must be construed as one instrument, for the purpose of determining the character of the transaction and the intention of the parties. Herbst v. Lowe, 65 Wis. 316, 26 N. W. 751. The contract of service required the plaintiffs to purchase at least 80 acres of land, upon which they were to make monthly payments in services, at the rate of $300 per annum. The land contract fixes the purchase price at $600, and recites that it was to be paid “according to the terms of a certain contract made by the parties, bearing even date herewith.” The plaintiffs thereby became bound for a term of at least two years' service, and the defendant was as much bound to accept payment in that manner. Under the circumstances, it seems labor lost to argue that the contract could be terminated at will. The chief contest on the trial arose over the proper construction to be given to the clause of the contract quoted in the statement of facts, as to the purpose of plaintiffs' employment. The court was first of opinion that it was so ambiguous that reference should be had to the conversations of the parties at the time the contract was drawn, to ascertain its meaning. He therefore permitted several witnesses to be examined on that subject. Later, the...