Wright v. Colleton County School Dist., 23198

• Decision Date: 07 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 23198,23198
• Citation: 301 S.C. 282,391 S.E.2d 564
• Parties: , 60 Ed. Law Rep. 238 Arthurene WRIGHT, Individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Ray Thaddeus Green, a Minor Over the Age of Fourteen (14) Years, and Ray Thaddeus Green, Respondents, v. COLLETON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, and South Carolina Insurance Reserve Fund, Appellants. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 564

391 S.E.2d 564

301 S.C. 282, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 238

Arthurene WRIGHT, Individually and as Guardian ad Litem for

Ray Thaddeus Green, a Minor Over the Age of

Fourteen (14) Years, and Ray Thaddeus

Green, Respondents, v. COLLETON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, and South Carolina

Insurance Reserve Fund, Appellants.

No. 23198.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 7, 1990.

Decided April 30, 1990.

Charles E. Carpenter, Jr. of Richardson, Plowden, Grier & Howser, Columbia, and Donald H. Fraser of McLeod, Fraser & Cone, Walterboro, for appellants.

Andrew Kenneth Epting, Jr. of Wise & Cole, P.A., and J. Graham Sturgis, Jr. of Altman & Sturgis, P.A., Charleston, for respondents.

HARWELL, Justice:

This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment action in which we must determine (1) the effective date of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (2) whether a political subdivision may waive the statutory cap on damages set forth in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (3) whether a parent may separately recover for medical expenses and loss of services resulting from injuries to a child and if so, in what amount; and (4) the constitutionality of the statutory cap on damages set forth in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.

I. FACTS

On July 3, 1986, respondent Ray Thaddeus Green (child) suffered serious injuries and burns when using a product made by the Savogran Company while he was working on the premises of appellant Colleton County School District. At the time respondent child was injured, he was a minor. Respondent child's mother, Arthurene Wright (parent), was his guardian ad litem and the person responsible for his maintenance and support. The mother is also a respondent in this action. Tort actions were filed against the Savogran Company and appellants Colleton County School District and South Carolina Insurance Reserve Fund on behalf of respondent child for bodily injuries and on behalf of respondent parent for hospital and medical bills and for the loss of services of her minor son.

A confidential settlement was reached in the tort action with the Savogran Company. A conditional settlement was also reached in the tort action with appellants in the amount of $1,000,000.00, representing the limit of the policy. Respondents have received $250,000.00. However, because the South Carolina Tort Claims Act places a ceiling on recovery, the additional $750,000.00 in coverage remains in dispute. The parties stipulated that both the parent's and the child's damages each exceeded $250,000.00.

The conditional settlement provided that the additional $750,000.00 would be paid if the statutory cap on the South Carolina Tort Claims Act was held to be invalid, unconstitutional, or waived. Alternatively, the conditional settlement provided that an additional $250,000.00 would be paid if it was determined that the child's claim and his parent's claim are separately cognizable under the Tort Claims Act.

The parties agreed to resolve the issues by initiation of a declaratory judgment action. The circuit court granted judgment to the parent and child in the amount of $750,000.00. This appeal follows.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Effective Date of the Tort Claims Act

In McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985), this Court abolished the In response to our decision in McCall, the legislature enacted the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. (1989). It was effective on July 1, 1986. Section 15-78-20(c) as originally drawn and effective July 1, 1986 provided:

                doctrine of sovereign immunity in South Carolina with certain limitations.   We delayed the implementation of the McCall decision until July 1, 1986, but provided that:  (1) sovereign immunity would not bar recovery in any case filed after July 1, 1986, and (2) it would not bar recovery in any case pending or in those filed on or before July 1, 1986 if the defendant had liability insurance coverage
                

(c) As to those causes of action that arise or accrue prior to the effective date of this act, the General Assembly reinstates sovereign immunity on the part of the State, its political subdivisions, and employees, while acting within the scope of official duty; provided, however, that sovereign immunity will not bar recovery in any case filed on or before the effective date of this act if the defendant maintained liability insurance coverage. In such cases recovery shall not exceed the limits of the liability insurance coverage.

The use of the word "filed" in McCall and in Section 15-78- 20(c) of the original Tort Claims Act created confusion. This confusion was resolved by the Court in Moore v. Berkeley County, 290 S.C. 43, 348 S.E.2d 174 (1986) and by the legislature by amending the "filing" language of Section 15-78-20(c). In Moore, the plaintiff received personal injuries as a result of an accident on August 27, 1982. The action was commenced on June 12, 1985. The defendants answered and moved for summary judgment on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The plaintiff then moved for a voluntary nonsuit without prejudice which was granted by the trial judge. This Court affirmed, concluding that the defendants could continue to assert sovereign immunity should the plaintiff decide to refile after July 1, 1986. The intention of this Court was that the triggering event was the accrual of a cause of action and not the filing.

The legislature promptly harmonized our decision in Moore with the Tort Claims Act. In January of 1987, the legislature amended Section 15-78-20(c) to read:

(c)(i) As to those causes of action that arise or accrue prior to the effective date of this act, the General Assembly reinstates sovereign immunity on the part of the State, its political subdivisions and employees, while acting within the scope of official duty provided that sovereign immunity will not bar recovery in any cause of action arising or accruing on or before the effective date of this act if the defendant maintained liability insurance coverage.

This amendment was effective March 16, 1987.

Appellants argue that because respondent child was injured after July 1, 1986, his recovery is limited to the statutory cap set forth in Section 15-78-120(a). Respondents however, argue that the legislative amendment to Section 15-78-20 which became effective March 16, 1987, changed or deferred the effective date of the Tort Claims Act from July 1, 1986, to March 16, 1987 thereby reinstating sovereign immunity to March 16, 1987, unless the defendant had liability coverage. Respondents then argue that because injury to the child accrued prior to March 16, 1987, and appellant maintained insurance coverage up to $1,000,000.00, he is not subject to the statutory damages cap as set forth in Section 15-78- 120(a). In sum, respondents urge us to find that the Tort Claims Act and its statutory cap on damages was not effective until March 16, 1987.

Respondents' interpretation strains a plain reading of the statute. The primary function of the court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). We need not look beyond the words of a statute to ascertain the intent of the legislature when it appears as here, on the face of the statute. Section 15-78-20(a) states in pertinent part It is further declared to be the public policy of the State of South Carolina that to insure an orderly transition from sovereign immunity to qualified and limited liability that the General Assembly intends to provide for liability on the part of the State and its political subdivisions only from July 1, 1986, forward in prospective fashion.

It is clear from this statement that the legislature intended the Tort Claims Act to be effective as of July 1, 1986. We recognized July 1, 1986 as the effective date of the Tort Claims Act in the case of Taylor v. Murphy, 293 S.C. 316, 360 S.E.2d 314 (1987). We further find that the language of the 1987 amendment contained in Section 15-78-20(c)(i) which refers to "the effective date of this act," refers to the effective date of the Tort Claims Act, July 1, 1986, and not the effective date of the amendment, March 16, 1987. Because we find that the effective date of the Tort Claims Act is July 1, 1986 and the injury occurred on July 3, 1986, respondents are subject to the statutory damages cap as set forth in the Tort Claims Act.

B. Whether An Entity May Waive the Tort Claims Act's Limitation On Damages

Appellants assert that in cases accruing after July 1, 1986, possession of liability insurance coverage above the statutory cap set forth in Section 15-78-120(a) does not constitute a waiver of immunity up to the coverage limits. We agree.

Section 15-78-20(c)(i) expressly provides that liability insurance coverage acts as a limitation on recovery only in such cases arising or accruing on or before July 1, 1986. For all actions arising after that date, the limits set forth in Section 15-78-120(a) apply. Therefore, only if respondent had been injured on or prior to July 1, 1986, would he be able to take advantage of the $1,000,000.00 policy limit. To hold otherwise, would defeat the express legislative intent that "the State, and its political subdivisions, are only liable for torts within the limitations of this chapter ..." Section 15-78-20(a). It would also contravene the legislature's directive to construe provisions of the Tort Claims Act relating to limitations on and exemptions to the liability of the State liberally, in favor of limiting liability of the State. Section 15-78-20(f).

Because the legislature created an express waiver of immunity to those actions arising or accruing on or before July 1, 1986, we may infer that the legislature would have provided a similar waiver of immunity to those actions arising or accruing after July 1, 1986 had the legislature so intended. Furthermore, appellant school district is a creature of the State. It is a political subdivisio...