Wright v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-CV-71311.,02-CV-71311. |
| Citation | 220 F.Supp.2d 832 |
| Parties | Antoinette WRIGHT, Plaintiff(s), v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Joan M. Barnes, Barnes, Monroe, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for plaintiff.
Thomas A. Cattel, Kristin P. Allen, Cattel, Tuyn, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Being fully advised in the premises, having read the pleadings, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
In 1996, Plaintiff Antoinette Wright applied for a position as an hourly worker with Defendant DaimlerChrysler. Resp. at 1. The application, which Ms. Wright signed, stated in relevant part:
8. In consideration of Chrysler's review of my application, I agree that any claim or lawsuit arising out my employment with, or my application for employment with, Chrysler Corporation or any of its subsidiaries must be filed no more than six (6) months after the date of the employment action that is the subject of the claim or lawsuit. While I understand that the statute of limitations for claims arising out of an employment action may be longer than six (6) months, I agree to be bound by the six (6) month period of limitations set forth herein, and I WAIVE ANY STATUE OF LIMITATIONS TO THE CONTRARY. Should a court determine in some future lawsuit that this provision allows an unreasonably short period of time to commence a lawsuit, the court shall enforce this provision as far as possible and shall declare the lawsuit barred unless it was brought within the minimum reasonable time within which the suit should have been commenced.
Application for Employment, attached as Defendant's Exhibit A.
In 1996, DaimlerChrysler hired Ms. Wright to work in its Mound Road facility, under Juan's supervision.1 Compl. ¶¶ 16-17. In either December of 1998 (Compl.¶ 16) or August of 1997 (Letter from James C. Brown, attached as Plaintiff's Response to Affidavit of Judith E. Caliman, Esq.), Juan "repeatedly asked her to meet him after work." Compl. ¶ 19. Ms. Wright rejected his advances. Compl. ¶ 20. In retaliation, Juan re-assigned her to the "Pit," an area of the plant soaked in oil and regarded as the worst in the plant to work. Resp. at 1. While working in the Pit, Ms. Wright slipped on the oil and injured herself. Id. She was still lying on the floor after the fall when Juan ordered her to continue working. Unable to do so, and injured, Ms. Wright reported to the plant infirmary. Id. When Ms. Wright was unable to return to work the following day, Juan fired her. Id.
DaimlerChrysler reinstated Ms. Wright to her position following Ms. Wright's filing of a grievance pursuant to the relevant collective bargaining agreement. Id. Upon her return, Juan assigned her to a difficult job and continually visited her work area. Id. On his numerous visits he criticized her work and threatened to fire her. Id. Plaintiff complained about Juan's requests for a sexual relationship, his retaliatory behavior, and the overall hostile environment to management. Id. at 2. In response to Ms. Wright's complaint, DaimlerChrysler transferred her to the Trenton Engine facility in November of 1999. Id.
Chris Buzenbark supervised Ms. Wright at the Trenton facility. Compl. ¶ 43. In December of 1999, Mr. Buzenbark propositioned her. Compl. ¶ 44. She consistently rejected his sexual advances. Compl. ¶ 45. In response to Ms. Wright's rejections, Mr. Buzenbark threatened to fire her or give her poor work evaluations. Compl. ¶ 47 and Resp. at 2. Ms. Wright complained to management about his threats. DaimlerChrysler, in turn, removed Mr. Buzenbark as her supervisor during the week. Resp. at 2. On the weekends, however, Mr. Buzenbark remained Ms. Wright's supervisor and continued his retaliatory behavior. Id. Ms. Wright complained to management again, and in response DaimlerChrysler transferred her to another area of the plant. Id. At that point, Plaintiff was aware of DaimlerChrysler's practice of re-assigning women who complain of sexual harassment. Id.
On February 17, 2000, Ms. Wright left her job at DaimlerChrysler under a disability described by her psychiatrist as "chronic and debilitating episodes of anxiety and depression," d.; Letter from Dr. Xavier White attached as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Prior to the harassing incidents, Ms. Wright took medical leaves for a psychiatric condition. Letter from James C. Barnes, Jr., attached as Plaintiff's Response to Affidavit of Judith E. Caliman, Esq. Nevertheless, she maintains that her current disability was caused by her hostile work environment and DaimlerChrysler's practice of "punishing the victim."2 Resp. at 2.
Ms. Wright contacted DaimlerChrysler's benefits department to request workers' compensation benefits. Compl. ¶ 59. Instead of following her request, DaimlerChrysler's benefits administrator enrolled her in the company's Sickness and Accident benefits plan. Compl. ¶ 60. Ms. Wright claims that the benefits under that plan are significantly less than the benefits she would have received from workers' compensation, and that she suffers "emotionally, financially, and otherwise as a result of the conspiracy to deny her benefits." Compl. ¶¶ 60-61.
An employee is required to visit a plant doctor in order to continue receiving Sickness and Accident benefits. Resp. at 3. In May of 2000, DaimlerChrysler discharged Ms. Wright for failing to attend a scheduled appointment with a plant physician. Id. Ms. Wright claims that DaimlerChrysler did not notify her of the appointment. Id. She filed a timely grievance of her discharge pursuant to the relevant collective bargaining agreement, and DaimlerChrysler reinstated her. Id.
In 2001, DaimlerChrysler reduced Plaintiff's Sickness and Accident benefits. Plaintiff's Affidavit ¶ 17. On October 3, 2001, Plaintiff formally applied for workers' compensation by filing an Application for Mediation or Hearing, attached as Plaintiffs Exhibit 6. DaimlerChrysler answered her application on February 11, 2002, by denying her liability for her claim. Plaintiff's Exhibit 7
On April 3, 2002, Ms. Wright filed a complaint in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan pursuing three claims. The first alleges sexual harassment in violation of the Elliot-Larson Civil Rights Act due to the events involving Juan and the Mound Road facility. The second alleges sexual harassment in violation of the Elliot-Larson Civil Rights Act due to the events involving Chris Buzenbark and the Trenton Engine facility. The third claim alleges tortious refusal to pay workers' compensation benefits.
Defendant responded to Plaintiff's complaint with this motion for summary judgment, arguing that her complaint is untimely because a provision in Plaintiff's employment contract places a six month limitation on any claim or lawsuit arising out of her employment. Plaintiff replied that the six month limitation is unenforceable, or, in the alternative, she satisfied it by making a claim within the six month period. Lastly, she argues that Defendant's motion is premature because it denies her the ability to conduct discovery.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-aided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c) mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The movant has an initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant meets this burden, the non-movant must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To demonstrate a genuine issue, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant; a "scintilla of evidence" is insufficient. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The court must believe the non-movant's evidence and draw "all justifiable inferences" in the non-movant's favor. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The inquiry is whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying the relevant evidentiary standard could "reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant." See id.
Plaintiff argues that the six month limitation on claims and lawsuits is not enforceable for three reasons. First, contracts that shorten statutory limitations on lawsuits must be reasonable, and she contends that this limitation is not reasonable. Second, Plaintiff argues that the savings clause invalidates the entire limitation. Third, Plaintiff argues that the limitation is contrary to public policy.
Michigan courts allow parties to contract for a period of limitation shorter then that provided by statute. Camelot Excavating Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 118, 301 N.W.2d 275, 277 (1981). However, the limitation...
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