Wright v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

Decision Date06 October 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-70045,92-70045
Citation8 F.3d 34
PartiesNOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Roger A. WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, Office of Workers Compensation Programs; Connolly Pacific, Respondents.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Before: POOLE and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges, and KELLEHER, * Senior District Judge.

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Roger Wright, a diver, injured his neck on the job in 1984. In 1985 he sustained two further injuries to his neck, but these were not work-related. The Department of Labor Benefits Review Board found the 1985 injuries to be an intervening cause of Wright's disability, and denied him benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Wright timely filed this Petition for Review of the Board's decision.

The Board had subject matter jurisdiction over the Administrative Law Judge's Decision and Order under 33 U.S.C. § 921(b). We have jurisdiction over the Board's final judgment pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 921(c).

We now affirm.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"The Benefits Review Board reviews administrative law judges' decisions to determine whether factual findings are supported by 'substantial evidence' and to correct any errors of law. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3)." Container Stevedoring Co. v. Director, OWCP, 935 F.2d 1544, 1546 (9th Cir.1991). "[T]he Board must accept the ALJ's findings unless they are contrary to law, irrational, or unsupported by substantial evidence." Port of Portland v. Director, OWCP, 932 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). We, in turn, "review the Board's decisions for errors of law and adherence to the substantial evidence standard." Id.

"Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Container Stevedoring, 935 F.2d at 1546 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)).

"The reviewing court's function is exhausted when it appears that there is warrant in the evidence and a 'reasonable legal basis' for the Board's award." Cordero v. Triple A Machine Shop, 580 F.2d 1331, 1333 (9th Cir.1978) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979).

While legal interpretations of the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Program are owed deference, the same is not true of legal interpretations of the Board, since the Board is not a policymaking body. Port of Portland, 932 F.2d at 838.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
I. The Employer's Standard of Proof

Wright asserts that Connolly was required to prove its case "beyond a reasonable doubt." This claim is meritless. The standard of proof for claims under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is substantial evidence. 33 U.S.C. § 920; Parsons Corp. of Cal. v. Director, OWCP, 619 F.2d 38, 41 n. 3 (9th Cir.1980).

The Supreme Court has defined "substantial evidence" as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951). Under any formulation of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, more is required than "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Accordingly, Wright's claim that the reasonable doubt standard governs is rejected.

II. The 1985 Injuries

Wright maintains that the Board and the ALJ applied the wrong rule in evaluating the causation question that is at the heart of this case. He readily admits that the two 1985 injuries were responsible, in part, for the surgery that brought about his disability. But he maintains that the original injury was also responsible. To Wright, it is enough that his work-related injury was a concurring cause of his ultimate disability. Citing a Fifth Circuit case, Bludworth Shipyard, Inc. v. Lira, 700 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.1983), Wright contends that a subsequent injury is a supervening cause only when the injury entirely "overpowers and nullifies" the effects of the original, work-related injury.

Connolly responds that the Bludworth standard is irrelevant. According to Connolly, the ALJ found that Wright's original injury played no part in his eventual surgery whatsoever. With no causal connection at all between Wright's work-related injury and his eventual neck surgery, Connolly argues, there are no difficult questions about supervening causes. The 1985 accidents were the sole cause. To Connolly, then, the only question for review is whether the ALJ's findings of no causation were supported by substantial evidence.

Connolly's argument is very nearly correct. The ALJ made several findings which suggest he believed Wright's permanent disability was solely the result of the 1985 accidents. For example, the ALJ accepted the testimony of Dr. London that the "sequestered," or extruding, disc appeared for the first time only after the December 1985 accident. Dr. London said the extruding disc that was visible in Wright's post-accident CT scan was a "dramatic" finding which would not have been missed had it been present in Wright's myelogram a year earlier, in March 1985. Because this problem did not show up on the myelogram taken before Wright's accident, Dr. London concluded that the accident caused the disc extrusion.

Based in part on this evidence, the ALJ concluded that the December auto accident "was...

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