Wright v. Dzienis

• Citation: 77 N.J.Super. 455,187 A.2d 8
• Decision Date: 14 December 1962
• Docket Number: No. A--760,A--760
• Parties: Kazimiera WRIGHT, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Stanislawa Bibinski, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jadwiga DZIENIS, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 455

77 N.J.Super. 455

187 A.2d 8

Kazimiera WRIGHT, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Stanislawa Bibinski, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jadwiga DZIENIS, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A--760.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Dec. 3, 1962.

Decided Dec. 14, 1962.

Howard G. Kulp, Jr., Camden, for appellant (Brown, Connery, Kulp & Wille, Camden, attorneys, Howard G. Kulp, Jr., Camden, on the brief).

Charles A. Cohen, Camden, for respondent (Samuel L. Supnick, Camden, attorney, Charles A. Cohen, Camden, on the brief).

Before Judges CONFORD, GAULKIN and KILKENNY.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

KILKENNY, J.A.D.

This is a will construction case. Stanislawa Bibinski executed her will on September 20, 1949 and died on February 18, 1961. At her death she had $2470 in cash in an envelope in a bedroom footlocker or trunk at her home at 1235 Lansdowne Avenue, Camden, New Jersey. Plaintiff, niece of the decedent, claimed this money under paragraph FOURTH of the will which provides as follows:

'I give and devise my property 1235 Lansdown Avenue, Camden, New Jersey to my niece, Kazimiera Wright, together with all my household chattels and contents therein, forever, provided that she pays out of her own funds or by mortgaging the property the sum of $500.00 to my niece, Sophia Kolasa and $300.00 to my niece Wanda Puchala.'

Defendant, sister of decedent, based her right to the money upon paragraph FIFTH which named her beneficiary of the residuary estate.

When seeking approval of her final accounting as executrix of the estate, plaintiff requested the Camden County Court to determine whether she or the defendant was entitled to this $2470. No one else is interested therein. The County Court decided in favor of defendant and plaintiff has appealed from the judgment.

The devise of decedent's real estate, her home, to plaintiff niece, 'together with all my household chattels and contents therein,' did not include the cash in decedent's bedroom footlocker. The words employed in the will do not establish an intent on decedent's part to give this cash to the devisee of the home. 'Household chattels' would comprehend those articles of personal property customarily used in and about the household and appropriate to the functioning and enjoyment thereof. The expression would include the furniture, furnishings, linens, silverware, flatware, chinaware, glassware, utensils, household supplies, equipment and appliances, and kindred articles.

The term 'household chattels' does not in normal contemplation embrace cash in the house, whether simply lying about or contained in a purse, pocketbook, safe, trunk or other receptacle. Thus, in Quick v. Owens, 198 S.C. 29, 15 S.E.2d 837, 137 A.L.R. 201 (Sup.Ct.1941), it was held that money found in a trunk in the house did not pass under a clause granting 'all of the household furniture and fixtures, and other personal property on the premises.' So, too, moneys in bank accounts evidenced by bank deposit books, stocks, bonds and other evidences of indebtedness, personal jewelry, articles of personal adornment, and the like, do not pass under a bequest of 'household chattels' simply because they happen fortuitously to be in the premises at the time of decedent's death. See In re Jones Estate, 128 Misc. 244, 218 N.Y.S. 380 (Sur.Ct.1926); In re Kimball's Will, 20 R.I. 619, 40 A. 847 (1898); In re Patterson's Estate, 69 S.D. 374, 10 N.W.2d 754, 149 A.L.R. 965 (1943); Cole v. Cole, 229 N.C. 757, 51 S.E.2d 491, 6 A.L.R.2d 1335 (Sup.Ct.1949).

As used in this will, the words 'contents therein' more naturally connote the contents of the house rather than the contents of individual household chattels as argued by plaintiff. The 'contents' of a house can be broader in comprehension than the 'household chattels' because conceptually they include all that is contained within the house. Whether the word is so all-embracing in a particular case depends essentially on the intention of the testator. In the instant situation...