Wright v. Ector County Independent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 08-93-00043-CV,08-93-00043-CV
• Citation: 867 S.W.2d 863
• Parties: 88 Ed. Law Rep. 859 Karla A. WRIGHT, Individually and as Next Friend of B.C.W., a minor child, Appellant, v. ECTOR COUNTY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 863

867 S.W.2d 863

88 Ed. Law Rep. 859

Karla A. WRIGHT, Individually and as Next Friend of B.C.W. a minor child, Appellant, v. ECTOR COUNTY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellees.

No. 08-93-00043-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas El Paso.

Dec. 15, 1993.

Rehearing Overruled Jan. 12, 1994.

Walter E. Wilson, Odessa, for appellant.

Blake Hansen and Mike Atkins, McMahon, Tidwell, Hansen, Atkins & Fowler, P.C., Odessa, for appellees.

Before OSBORN, C.J., and KOEHLER and BARAJAS, JJ.

OPINION

KOEHLER, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying Appellant's application for writ of mandamus to compel the Ector County Independent School District to admit her minor child to first grade of the public schools and from a take-nothing summary judgment denying Appellants any relief in their petition for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp.1993) resulting from Appellees' alleged wrongful acts in denying their application for such admission. We dismiss the appeal from the order denying the application for writ of mandamus because the question is rendered moot by the child's present age, and we affirm the summary judgment.

Relevant Facts

Brian Christopher Wright (Brian), a resident of Ector County, Texas, was born on October 20, 1986. He resides with his mother and managing conservator, Karla Ann Wright, Appellant.

During the 1991-1992 scholastic year, Brian attended kindergarten at St. John's Episcopal School, a State of Texas accredited private school. In May 1992, Brian took the "Metropolitan Test" upon which he scored 99 percent. Appellant thereafter sought to have Brian, who would be five years, ten months of age as of September 1, 1992, admitted and assigned to the first grade of one of Appellees' elementary schools. Because of the child's age, Appellant sent a written petition for the assignment to the Board of Trustees of the Ector County Independent School District, requesting a hearing. Appellees advised Appellant that she could appear before them on June 16, 1992. Following her appearance and presentation, she was notified that her petition was denied. Appellant sought a reconsideration. The board allowed her to appear and again present her petition but took no action on her request.

Appellant filed suit, naming the school district, the superintendent, and the Board of Trustees as defendants (Appellees herein), requesting damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and relief by way of a writ of mandamus and/or injunctive relief. In response to Appellees' motion for summary judgment, the trial court in due course issued its order denying Appellant relief on "[a]ll matters pertaining to the Application for Writ of Mandamus." It then granted a final summary judgment for Appellees, and in response to Appellant's request, made findings of fact and conclusions of law.

POINTS OF ERROR

In her six points of error, Appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion: first, in failing to find ¹ that Appellees abused their discretion in arbitrarily adopting a policy excluding the admission of any child under the age of six years to the first grade; second, in failing to grant her application for a writ of mandamus and/or injunctive relief; third, by finding and concluding that Section 16.003(d) of the Texas Education Code, requiring a child to be at least six years of age to be admitted to first grade, is constitutional in its application to Appellant's child; fourth, in failing to find as a fact and to conclude as a matter of law that Appellees abused their discretion in failing to give Appellant a hearing or due process of law; fifth, in granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment resulting in dismissal of Appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 claims; and sixth, in failing to find that the Gifted and Talented Act created an exception to the rule excluding children under six years of age.

Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court's misinterpretation of the law and the policy of Appellees in excluding all children under six years of age from admission to first grade, particularly without a full hearing, were abuses of discretion.

Appellees in response contend that the trial court correctly found that the board acted appropriately and within statutory guidelines when it denied Appellant's request and that it correctly granted the motion for summary judgment resulting in the dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 claims because Appellants' pleadings and evidence failed to show that the board had violated or denied any rights granted to them under the statutes or Constitution.

The issue in this case is whether an independent public school district may deny a five year old, who has completed kindergarten in an accredited private school, the right to the first grade in the public schools without a factual hearing regarding the possible qualifications of the child.

Standards of Review

An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992); Dal-Briar Corp. v. Baskette, 833 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1992, orig. proceeding). However, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on factual issues committed to the trial court's discretion. As a result, an appellant must establish that the trial court reasonably could have reached but one decision. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839-40. On the other hand, when the trial court's determination of a legal principle is being reviewed, it is not entitled to the same deference. In such matters, the trial court has no discretion. A clear failure to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 840. Volcanic Gardens Management Co., Inc. v. Paxson, 847 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1993, orig. proceeding).

In our review of a summary judgment appeal, we must determine whether the successful movants in the trial court carried their burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of a material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985). In deciding whether or not there is a disputed fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant is to be taken as true, and in that connection, every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in her favor. Id. at 548-49. If the defendants are the movants, they must submit summary judgment evidence disproving at least one element of the plaintiff's theory of recovery or they must plead and conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense which would defeat plaintiff's cause of action. Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 657-58 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1992, no writ); Traylor v. Unitedbank Orange, 675 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

When the summary judgment order does not state the specific grounds on which it was granted, the non-movant on appeal must show that each ground alleged in the motion fails to support the judgment. Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 518 (Tex.App.--Austin 1991, writ denied); City of Coppell v. General Homes Corp., 763 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988, writ denied); Southerland v. Northeast Datsun, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, no writ). A summary judgment cannot be affirmed on any grounds not presented in the Motion for Summary Judgment. Jampole v. Matthews, 857 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Vendig v. Traylor, 604 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1980, ref'd n.r.e.); TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c) ("The motion for summary judgment shall state the specific grounds therefor....").

APPLICABLE SCHOOL LAW

In order to give full consideration to the points of error brought to us by Appellant, it is necessary to review some of the applicable statutes which she claims make it an abuse of discretion for the board to have a policy excluding all children under six years of age as of September 1 from first grade and to fail to give Appellant a full hearing as required by due process of law.

Under TEX.EDUC.CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon Supp.1993) ², a "student" is entitled to the benefits of the Texas Foundation School Program ³ if he is at least five years of age; however, he "may" be enrolled in the first grade if he is at least six years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year, defined by TEX.EDUC.CODE ANN. § 21.001(a) as September 1 of the instant year to August 31 of the year following. ⁴ Section 21.040 of the Code then provides that a school board may under such terms as it deems just and proper, admit pupils either over or under the normal school age. ⁵ , ⁶ School boards are required under TEX.EDUC.CODE ANN. § 21.131 (Vernon 1987) to establish and maintain kindergartens for the training of children in the district "who are at least five years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year."

In her sixth point of error, Appellant refers to "gifted and talented student" programs. Under Section 21.652, school districts in Texas are required to adopt a process for identifying gifted and talented students, as defined by Section 21.651 and to establish a program for those students so identified in each grade level not later than the school year 1990-1991. TEX.EDUC.CODE ANN. §§ 21.651 and 21.652 (Vernon 1987 and Supp.1993).

ANALYSIS

Appellant takes the position that under the foregoing statutes, the Board of Trustees does not have the right, power, authority, and discretion to adopt the policy she claims the board has adopted, totally excluding the admission to the first grade of schools in its district of any and all children who are under the age of six years as of September 1 of the then current year. She seems to argue...