Wright v. First National Bank of Altus, Oklahoma
| Decision Date | 30 July 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-1025.,73-1025. |
| Citation | 483 F.2d 73 |
| Parties | Phillip Lee WRIGHT, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Sidney Franklin Wright, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTUS, OKLAHOMA, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Gerald Weatherly, Dallas, Tex. (Ellis, Frates & Maguire, Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
T. G. Braddock, of Ivester & Braddock, Altus, Okl., for defendant-appellee.
Before BREITENSTEIN, McWILLIAMS and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
This diversity case is here for the second time. In the first appeal we held that the district court, because of the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1138, had no jurisdiction over defendant Altus Production Credit Association, a federally chartered association organized under the Farm Credit Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 636 et seq. See Wright v. Altus Production Credit Association, 10 Cir., 468 F.2d 997. On remand the trial court held that Altus was a necessary party and dismissed the action on the motion of defendant-appellee First National Bank of Altus, Oklahoma. The present appeal is from the order of dismissal.
Plaintiff-appellant Wright sues in his individual capacity and as executor of the estate of Sidney Wright. The complaint alleges that plaintiff, his decedent, Bonita Wright, and Marcus Wright sold Oklahoma land; that defendant Bank holds in escrow approximately $42,000 of the purchase money to which plaintiff is entitled; that Altus, Bonita, and Marcus claim part of that sum; and that Bank refuses to pay. Plaintiff says that a "final computation" of the division of the purchase money was made and a copy thereof was attached to the complaint. Altus is alleged to have "tacitly admitted" that plaintiff is entitled to the $42,-000. The attachment to the complaint shows total sales of $248,250 and, after deduction of expenses and debts, "Net Payment to Wright brothers $41,972.72" and "Total payment to APC $48,660.11."
Bonita and Marcus filed disclaimers. The answer of Bank admits the escrow and says that it "stands ready to disburse the funds held by it as directed by a Final Order of this Court." Altus filed a motion to dismiss because of lack of jurisdiction over it. The district court sustained the motion of Altus and dismissed the action.
On appeal we held that the court had no jurisdiction over Altus. We also held that the failure of jurisdiction over Altus did not destroy federal jurisdiction over the other defendants who had appeared and raised no jurisdictional question, and ordered the case to proceed as to them.
Bank anticipated our November 3, 1972, mandate by filing in the district court on October 19 a motion to dismiss because Altus was an indispensable party. Three days after the filing of the mandate the district court ordered plaintiff to file a brief in five days opposing the motion to dismiss. On November 22, the court entered an order of dismissal.
Rule 19, F.R.Civ.P., provides in its ¶ (a) for joinder if feasible and in its ¶ (b) for determination by the court of action to be taken when joinder is not feasible. A decision to proceed under ¶ (a) is a decision that the absent person is merely "necessary" while a decision to dismiss under ¶ (b) is a decision that the absent party is "indispensable." Provident Tradesmens Bank v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118, 88 S.Ct. 733, 19 L.Ed. 2d 936.
In its judgment of dismissal the district court found that Altus "is a necessary party to the action." This is not enough to justify dismissal. The plain wording of ¶ (b) permits dismissal only when a party is indispensable. Accordingly, the dismissal violates the rule and cannot stand.
If the use of the word "necessary" was a mere inadvertence, and nothing shows that it was, the question is whether the other conditions of ¶ (b) have been met. It there says that the court shall determine "whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it," and in making such determination four factors are to be considered. These are (1) prejudice to the absent party or to those already parties, (2) the lessening or avoiding of prejudice by protective provisions in the judgment, by shaping relief, or by other measures, (3) the adequacy of the judgment which might be entered in the person's absence, and (4) the adequacy of a remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
The trial court made no determination whether "in...
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...therefore, remand for sufficient analysis of its reason for finding indispensability, citing our decision in Wright v. First National Bank, 483 F.2d 73 (10th Cir.1973). In that case, however, the trial court's single, conclusory statement was that "complete relief cannot be afforded the rem......
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Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 870312-CA
...to follow a two-part inquiry. See, e.g., Ogalalla Land Ltd. v. Wexpro Co., 587 F.Supp. 453, 454 (D.Wyo.1984) (citing Wright v. First Nat'l Bank, 483 F.2d 73 (10th Cir.1973)). Pursuant to subsection (a), "a court must first determine whether an absent party has sufficient interest in the act......
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Walsh v. Centeio
...competently apply the abuse of discretion standard. Bakia, 687 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). See also Wright v. First National Bank, 483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir. 1973) (district court failed to comply with the rule when it dismissed by simply saying, "complete relief cannot be afford......
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Davis v. USA
...determine whether an analysis of the four Rule 19(b) factors compels dismissal as a matter of law. See Wright v. First Nat'l Bank of Altus, Oklahoma, 483 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir. 1973) (remanding a Rule 19 determination for fact finding). Accordingly, this court declines to undertake the Rule......