Wright v. Griffith

• Decision Date: 15 January 1890
• Citation: 121 Ind. 478,23 N.E. 281
• Parties: Wright v. Griffith et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

121 Ind. 478

23 N.E. 281

Wright

v.Griffith et al.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Jan. 15, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Randolph county; L. J. Monks, Judge.Theo. Shockney, for appellant. S. R. Bell and J. B. Ross, for appellees.

Mitchell, C. J.

Action upon a writing in the following words: “Union City, Ind., March 17th, '82. Messrs. Griffith Brothers: Please let my daughter, Mrs. W. E. Headington, have what goods she wants, and I will stand good for the money to settle the bills. You will find the pay part all right with her, I think. Yours, truly, Wm. Wright.”

The questions presented arise on the complaint, the material averments of which are to the effect that Mrs. Headington applied to the plaintiffs to purchase millinery goods, and that the plaintiffs declined to furnish them to her on credit; that thereupon, in consideration that they agreed to sell and deliver to her from time to time on credit such goods and merchandise as she might require in her business, the defendant, her father, by the contract above set out, promised and agreed to pay for the goods so to be furnished. It is averred that, relying upon the agreement so made, the plaintiffs from time to time sold and delivered to Mrs. Headington goods and merchandise to the amount of $2,264.56, and that there remains due them on account thereof $426.78, for which they pray judgment against the defendant. It is contended that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, because it contains no allegation that the plaintiffs, within a reasonable time after receiving the communication above set out, notified the defendant of the acceptance of the proposal or direction therein contained. The rule is abundantly maintained which requires that, upon an offer or mere proposal to become responsible for credit, which may or may not be extended to another, the person making the order must be notified within a reasonable time of its acceptance, in order that he may be held as a guarantor. This is so upon the familiar principle that, while the proposition remains pending, without notice of acceptance, simultaneous concurrence of mind essential to the completion of a contract has not taken place. Manufacturing Co. v. Black, 111 Ind. 308, 12 N. E. Rep. 504, and cases cited; Powers v. Bumcratz, 12 Ohio St. 273; Brandt, Sur. § 157. “A mere offer,” as has often been said, “not accepted, is not a contract, and a mere mental acceptance of a proposition, not communicated to the party to be charged, is not an acceptance at all in the eye of the law.” Kellogg v. Stockton, 29 Pa. St. 460; Walker v. Forbes, 25 Ala. 139. Where, however, the delivery of the guaranty is not a mere incipient step in the transaction, but is in fact a part or the consummation of the contract to which it is collateral, the acceptance of the guaranty, and the performance of the consideration upon which it rests, are all that are essential to make the contract complete and enforceable. Snyder v. Click, 112 Ind. 293, 13 N. E. Rep. 581, and cases cited; Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S. 159. As has been well observed, however, “care must be taken in all cases to mark the distinction between a consummate and perfect guaranty and a mere proposal or offer or tender of a guaranty, which must be accepted, and the acceptance notified to the maker, and his final assent to the engagement be obtained, ere it can become a perfect and concluded contract.” 3 Add. Cont. § 1115. Mrs. Headington, so it is averred in the complaint, applied to the plaintiffs to purchase goods on credit. The application was declined. Then followed the letter of her father, in which he requested them to let her have what goods she wanted; adding, “I will stand good for the money to settle the bills.” Thereupon, in reliance upon the promise contained in the letter, goods were furnished as requested. The letter was therefore not a mere...